# THE INCARNATION

SUMMER SCHOOL OF CATHOLIC STUDIES


Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2026

https://archive.org/details/incarnation0000revc_g7n3

# THE INCARNATION

*Mater dei memento mei*

LA VERGINE E S. ANNA

Lorenzo da S. Severino Pinacoteca Vaticana, Roma

# The Incarnation

Papers from the Summer School of Catholic Studies held at Cambridge, July 25—31, 1925

Edited by
THE REV. C. LATTEY, S.J.
(M.A., OXON.)

Professor of Holy Scripture at St. Beuno's College, North Wales,
Editor of *The Religion of the Scriptures*,
of *The Westminster Version of the Sacred Scriptures*, etc.

W. HEFFER & SONS LTD.
CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND

B. HERDER BOOK COMPANY
15 & 17, SOUTH BROADWAY, ST. LOUIS, MO.

BT
220
.I5
1926

NIHIL OBSTAT

G. H. JOYCE, S.I.

*Censor deputatus*

IMPRIMATUR

✠ DUDLEY CAROLUS

*Epus. Northantoniensis*

*Die 9° Novembris*, 1925.

*Printed in England*

# PREFACE.

Among the many anniversaries that nowadays beset us, it was natural and fitting that the sixteenth centenary of the Council of Nicaea, the first general council, should occupy a prominent place; all the more so, because of the crucial significance for modern times of the chief doctrine which it defined. Once more the Summer School can claim that the subject of its choice was in especial harmony with the mind of the Holy Father, and with celebrations at the centre of the Faith. Perhaps these have attracted less attention because of the many functions of the Holy Year; perhaps also in part, because no sane man would accuse the Holy See of having deserted the creed of Nicaea. Such celebrations, therefore, except in so far as they bring out this very fact, can have no very great historical significance.

With other celebrations in England it has been otherwise. The commemoration has been the occasion of a service in Westminster Abbey, wherein 'orthodox' patriarchs and prelates took part; a service which beyond question was an event of grave historical significance, though the precise bearing of it may take some time to make itself clearly seen. Speaking before such an assembly, the Archbishop of Canterbury is reported in *The Church Times* of 3rd July, 1925, to have said:

> No one will aver or suppose that phraseology agreed upon in the fourth century will be exactly what theologians would compile in the twentieth, but, as has been well said by a bishop of today: 'The Church which formulated and accepted these phrases was perfectly aware of the

difference between experience and the rationalized account of it; the experience was what mattered; and with a marvellous completeness the purely temporary forms of thought and speculation were excluded.'

It would be out of place to quote or analyse fully what was, in truth, at its crucial point a somewhat nebulous and diplomatic utterance; but it is surely ominous that at such a time, in such a place, the principle should have been quoted with approval, even (and how falsely!) as that of the Nicene fathers themselves: 'the experience was what mattered'! Here we have, in truth, the great solvent of definite belief, the appeal to religious experience within, in despair or doubt or denial of a divine revelation from without—truly from without, and utterly unattainable by man, yet sweetly embracing our poor nature and strengthening it to climb the very heaven.

How things have come to such a pass in the Protestant West may be gathered from the able papers contributed by Father Knox and Dr. Downey; of the East little need be said here, but the state of affairs depicted by Père d'Herbigny, for example, in the lecture-book of this series treating of *The Papacy*, gives room for much anxiety. The strong persecuting arm of Russian czardom has meant more for the 'orthodox' churches than has for the state church the similar, though milder, intolerance practised in England up till a time within our parents' memories. But if British be to supplant Russian support, there can be little doubt that sooner or later the price to be paid will be found to include the Nicene Creed.

Over here we are faced by a theory or creed of purely natural evolution, accepted for the most part without

any serious discussion of the grounds upon which it rests. The 'higher criticism' applies this to Christianity in the shape of a progressive idealization, propounding 'sources' for Old and New Testament to suit its pleasure; and those who would preserve Christianity seek a terror-stricken refuge in a doctrine of religious values, fit to land them in a 'Reunion all round' such as only Father Knox can adequately describe. The warning with which he concludes his paper is fully borne out by what the present writer has noticed in matters biblical. The doctrines even of the 'Anglo-Catholics' do not keep pace (to use the obvious term of comparison) with their vestments; they look too much to outward appearance, and fail to see the vast difference in things more essential. Fully to appreciate these, careful attention must be bestowed upon Dr. Downey's paper also, which brings out more fundamental differences in the whole point of view.

Much more then, of a truth, do those fail to appreciate the Incarnation who have no standard of faith at all, but only the guidance of uncertain sentiment. We are faced by a crisis, not merely in industry and empire, but in thought and morality and religion; and it remains to be seen whether anything short of the Incarnation can stave off the crash. Meanwhile it is of little profit to be repressing communism, when all parties are apparently at one in administering the Incarnation, the only rival force of any power, out of the schools.

In the present papers it is the fact of the Incarnation that is set forth, with the witness thereto in Scripture and Tradition; a mighty witness in itself, even for those who do not see in it forthwith the testimony of Almighty God. To a theory of progressive idealization

the Catholic opposes a survey of progressive realization, which will here be found traced out in its essential course. The first volume of this series, *The Religion of the Scriptures*, will be found to supply a useful background to the present work, especially in the lectures upon the Prophets, Christ, and the Church (Nos. III-V). Perhaps it is also worth while to allude to the treatment of St. John (pp. 8-15) and of Malachy's prophecy of the Sacrifice of the Mass (*Appendix B*) in *Catholic Faith in the Holy Eucharist*. Nevertheless the present volume is of course complete in itself. All that the Incarnation actually means to us is too vast a theme to be included.

The Vice-President of Maynooth has indicated with admirable insight and knowledge the extent to which messianic expectation formed part of Old Testament religion. Dr. Boylan first favoured us with his presence at the Bible Congress, and the present Summer School owed much to his kindly help in a difficult subject, both in lecture and subsequent class. The School was fortunate in having His Eminence Cardinal Bourne, who was present at the lecture, to express the grateful appreciation felt by all. It will be seen that the Incarnation itself was not clearly and definitely revealed in the Old Testament, though much was there from which the Jews might have learnt to expect something of the kind ; most of all in Isaiah, even though one must remember in regard of the messianic titles there set forth that such names as Joab (*Yahweh Father*, or *Yahweh is Father*) could be given to indicate a divine fact rather than a divine person. Dr. Arendzen, however, shows how even the non-Biblical Jewish literature shows some preparation for a divine Messiah,

a way ready, had the Jews but walked therein. Yet in the Jewish apocalypses, dating from a century or two both before and after the New Testament, we see a lower type of messianism asserting itself, such as that to which Dr. Boylan draws attention.

Our Lord, therefore, did not proclaim Himself explicitly and unreservedly to be Yahweh, He did not say to men (so far as we know), 'I am your God.' We can feel tolerably sure that to say that would have been to shock even the pious Jew, and to hasten His own end. But Father Pope by accumulated passages (which will repay search and consideration) makes it clear how impossible it must have been to accept His divine mission without at least some notion that He was far more than man; how still more impossible it is for us not to conclude even from the Synoptic gospels alone that He deemed Himself God. How eloquent in this regard are even the simplest words of Christ! 'Lord, if Thou wilt, Thou canst make me clean,' says the leper, almost at the outset of the Galilaean ministry; and like a flash comes the answer, 'I will, be thou made clean!' And in the very next incident Christ says to the paralytic, lowered down before Him, 'Thy sins are forgiven thee.' 'Who can forgive sins save God alone?' Yes, but Christ will not proclaim Himself the mere instrument and minister of God, as must every priest: 'that you may see that the Son of Man *has* power on earth to forgive sins,' that is why He works the miracle, without any sort of further explanation.

And this in the common narrative of the Synoptists, the plain and unsophisticated tale that was the first stereotyped tradition of the Church. In St. John we have deliberate supplementing, deliberate selection;

it is set forth by Father Martindale, who treats both this gospel and the preparation of the gentiles, both congenial subjects to him, with a like skill. Far different the theological controversy at Jerusalem with the rabbis, or the intimate instruction of disciples, from the popular preaching in Galilee, where the one discourse recorded by St. John is found 'a hard saying' and marks the climax of failure. Even of Our Lord's profoundest doctrine we have but careful and purposeful extracts; yet it is striking evidence of the evangelist's scrupulous faithfulness that he refrains from putting into Our Lord's own mouth what so many have seen to be the sum of his own conscious theology, the doctrine of the *Logos*. How different from this careful restraint is the full outburst of the mind and heart of Paul; different also in its whole manner of envisaging the same essential truth, too different for any that have understanding to put John and Paul as a before and after in the same current of thought! Where the material is so abundant, I have thought it best to concentrate on the great Christological passage in the Epistle to the Philippians, by far the amplest expression of the Apostle's thought.

'My Lord and my God!' So cries St. Thomas; and blessed are they that echo his cry without his privilege of touch and vision (John xx. 28 and 29). This confession, indeed, may have closed the Fourth Gospel as it was first written, even as the confession that 'the Word was God' and yet 'became flesh' begins it. And that confession it was the purpose of the Church to maintain. It was not long before she was plunged into many difficulties of thought and expression in her Christology, difficulties through which Canon Myers provides full and secure guidance. One fact is

clear from his masterly treatment of the great Christological period; it was not from any desire to plunge into a labyrinth of metaphysics that the Fathers and Councils were at such pains to frame their definitions and anathemas; the Incarnation itself was at stake, and to have remained silent, or to have refused to employ the terminology which alone could safeguard it, would have meant an infidelity to their trust, a desertion of the ancient faith, such as to render meaningless that hallowed cry, 'My Lord and my God!'

In this decisive witness of Fathers and Councils, Our Lady's prerogative as 'God-bearer' (*Theotokos*, *Deipara*), as Mother of God, could not but play a large part. In her own gospel, as with so many we may call the first chapters of St. Luke, she has left recorded in the *Magnificat* the prophecy that 'henceforth all generations shall call me blessed' (Luke i. 48). Father Garde has well shown how swiftly the prophecy was fulfilled, and in this way his paper serves as a valuable background to the discussion of the Christology as such. It is St. Luke who in Acts i. 14 shows us Mary as the mother of the infant Church, as of the infant Saviour; while St. John, who tells so clearly His Godhead to whom he was beloved disciple, claims for himself before all others (and yet for others in himself, as the children of the Church so well know) to be son of Mary, by the last will of the God-man whom upon earth he supplants. He tells also how the public ministry began before its otherwise appointed time at her bidding. 'Let me be, mother!' So we may paraphrase the gentle protest in John ii. 4. The phrase occurs several times in Old and New Testament, always deprecating in some way interference, but capable of quite a friendly

sense, as in II Parahpomena (Chronicles) xxxv. 21; the word 'woman' in Greek, as is remarked in the lexicon of Liddell and Scott, is used 'often as a term of respect or affection.' The writer may perhaps mention that he discussed these words in letters to the *Tablet* in 1917 (Feb. 17, March 3, and April 7); it must be enough here to express astonishment that any can doubt how the evangelist himself understands the matter, who have read Our Lady's answer and Our Lord's very deed. They understand little of the gospels who do not read therein the love of Luke and John for Mary; from their love, or rather from her Son's, that mighty stream takes its rise whereof the higher reaches are here surveyed by Father Garde.

Far different from the attitude of the Fathers, speaking broadly, is that of the Schoolmen; the former at war, the latter at peace; the former witnessing earnestly to the Faith in time of cloud and storm, the latter exploring to the uttermost that same faith in calm and light. The analytic power of Aristotle, harder and keener (though in a manner less profound) than that of his master Plato, was reflected in those fearless rationalists of the faith, who brought logical system into the vast patristic synthesis. Of their searching methods, of the inspiration that faith can give to reason, Père de la Taille is no mean exponent, and there is much to learn, both in matter and method, from his scholastic explanation and investigation. In his first paper he sets forth Catholic doctrine as it is to-day; in his second he applies St. Thomas' doctrine of the real distinction between essence and existence (to employ the usual technical terminology, which Père de la Taille spares the reader) to the problem of

Christ's personality. The assumption of such a distinction (a point in philosophy about which there has never been complete agreement in the School) is found to provide the clearest and most satisfactory formula for the ulterior explanation of the Incarnation.

A word in conclusion upon the Summer School itself. This last session, as has been mentioned, was honoured by a visit from His Eminence Cardinal Bourne, who spoke in the strongest terms of the work already done, and of its promise and significance for the future; the organizers are grateful for a generous recognition which exceeded hope or expectation. In the conduct of the School, trial was made of informal classes, a few beforehand to prepare the minds of the members, and subsequent classes offered (so far as possible) by each lecturer for the purpose of answering difficulties and giving any further explanations required. These informal classes were much appreciated and frequented, and will doubtless be retained as an important feature in future sessions. A word of praise is certainly due to those who attended them, and in general to the earnest desire to profit to the full by the School which is displayed by so many of its members; it is a striking and encouraging feature, and almost of necessity produces a corresponding zeal in the lecturers, who are lavish of their time and trouble. It is tolerably evident that the School has a true mission to priests and religious, to teachers and enquirers, and many others. A word of welcome may be added to visitors from other countries, who sometimes lack the necessary information; the School may be expected to be in progress during the week common to July and August (otherwise during

the week that begins with August), and a note addressed to the Secretary at St. Edmund's House, Cambridge, will secure any necessary information. The inclusive fee is ten shillings, and no person whatever is excluded.

The correspondence school is now fully organized, in regard of which enquiries may be addressed to the Rev. C. M. Davidson, D.D., The Presbytery, Aldeburgh, the former Secretary of the School itself. The inclusive fee is thirty shillings, a sum felt to be necessary to ensure the careful and efficient service that has already to some extent been rendered. A correspondence course may now be taken upon *The Religion of the Scriptures* and *The Papacy*, and a third will be prepared upon *The Incarnation*, when the present volume is published. The correspondence courses are thus based upon the books of this series, the only books that have any peculiar connection with the Summer School. Not, of course, that the correspondence courses are in any way restricted to those who have attended the School. On the other hand, those who have so attended will in any case find it very profitable to read these lecture-books carefully, in order the better to assimilate what they have already heard. Indeed, the value of the series has already been widely recognized; and it may not be amiss to remind Catholics how great an apostolate may be theirs in these days of eager questioning, if they will make it their aim to know their religion thoroughly. And in the last resort, such thorough knowledge cannot be procured, unless to oral instruction be added careful reading, if not as a pleasure, then at least as a work of charity and penance! It may also be mentioned that, as Father Martindale has often insisted, such books as these are valuable

and welcome in many places abroad, where the rate of exchange makes it almost impossible to purchase them; if any should wish to make a gift to our brethren in other lands, or again to the foreign missions, or in a word to the many who deserve and would welcome it, I do not anticipate much difficulty in directing their generosity.

My last word must be one of grateful thanks to Father Jerome O'Hea, for indexing most of the volumes of this series.

C. L.

# CONTENTS.

PAGE

PREFACE - - - - - - - - - v

I. MESSIANIC EXPECTATION IN THE OLD TESTAMENT - - - - - - - 1

By the Rev. PATRICK BOYLAN, M.A., D.Litt., D.D., Vice-President and Professor of Sacred Scripture, Maynooth; Professor of Eastern Languages, University College, Dublin (author of *The Psalms*, etc.).

II. THE PREPARATION OF JEWRY - - - 19

By the Rev. J. P. ARENDZEN, D.D., M.A., of the Catholic Missionary Society (author of *The Gospels: Fact, Myth or Legend?* etc.).

III. THE PREPARATION OF THE GENTILES - 39

By the Rev. C. C. MARTINDALE, S.J., M.A. (author of *St. Paul*, etc.).

IV. THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS - - - - - 58

By the Rev. HUGH POPE, O.P., S.T.M., Doct. S. Script. (author of *The Catholic Student's Aids to the Bible*, etc.).

V. THE GOSPEL OF SAINT JOHN - - - 68

By the Rev. C. C. MARTINDALE, S.J., M.A.

VI. SAINT PAUL (PHILIP. ii. 1–11) - - - - - 84

By the Rev. C. LATTEY, S.J., M.A., Professor of Sacred Scripture at St. Beuno's College (author of *First Notions of Holy Writ*, etc.).

VII. THE FATHERS AND COUNCILS.

By the Very Rev. Canon MYERS, M.A., President and formerly Professor of Dogmatic Theology and Patrology at St. Edmund's College, Ware (author of *The Holy Eucharist in the Greek Fathers* in *Catholic Faith in the Holy Eucharist*, etc.).

PART I: THE HISTORICAL SETTING - - - 104

PART II: THE HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE - - 122

PART III: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RECENT WORK - - 148

VIII. THE SCHOOLMEN.

By the Rev. M. DE LA TAILLE, S.J., Professor of Dogmatic Theology at the Gregorian University, Rome (author of *Mysterium Fidei*, etc.).

PART I: THE DOGMATIC TRUTH - - - - 152
PART II: THE SCHOLASTIC PROBLEM - - - 170

IX. OUR LADY IN THE EARLY CHURCH - - 190

By the Rev. THOMAS GARDE, O.P., S.T.M., Lic.S. Script.

X. KENOTIC THEORIES - - - - - - 211

By the Rev. R. A. KNOX, M.A., New Testament Professor at St. Edmund's College, Ware; sometime Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford (author of *A Spiritual Aeneid*, etc.).

XI. RATIONALIST CRITICISM - - - - 229

By the Rev. RICHARD DOWNEY, D.D., of the Catholic Missionary Society (Editor of *The Catholic Gazette*, contributor to *The Papacy* and other volumes, etc.).

SELECT CATHOLIC BIBLIOGRAPHY - - 252

INDEX - - - - - - - - - - 255

I.

# MESSIANIC EXPECTATION IN THE OLD TESTAMENT.

By The Rev. Patrick Boylan, M.A., D.Litt., D.D.

The purpose of this paper is not to discuss the fulfilment of the ancient prophecies of Israel in the person and work of Our Lord, but rather to examine certain important aspects of those prophecies considered as a feature of Old Testament religion.

It is admitted on all hands that there exists in the Old Testament a body of texts which deal with the fortunes of Israel in the more or less distant future, and that these prophetic texts are, for the most part but in very different fashions, optimistic in tone. They are, in large measure, forecasts of a greatness and glory which shall be given to Israel at a time variously named the 'End of days,' or 'the Day of Yahweh,' or 'that Day.' While the books of the Old Testament which are known technically as the 'prophetic' books speak frequently of the glories of the 'End of Days,' it is clear from the whole trend and tone of those books that the prophets whose oracles are recorded therein—the so-called literary prophets—were not the first heralds of the great Hope of the End-time—that they did not announce it to a mystified and uninitiated world. In speaking of the Hope they dealt with it critically as with something already deeply rooted in popular belief. Thus we have to distinguish in the old prophetic texts of Israel between the type of theory of the End-period which was current among the people before the

date of the oldest literary prophecy, and that which was taught by the great prophets of Yahweh; we have to distinguish, that is, between a popular and a prophetic eschatology. And it will be found that the prophetic Eschatology is largely a revision and correction of the End-time hopes that prevailed among the people. Since in both the popular and the prophetic Hope there stands out the figure of a divinely appointed Leader, a Messiah, or Anointed One, who will be the immediate author of Israelite greatness at the 'End of Days,' we call the texts which embody the Hope of Israel, 'Messianic.' Those texts also which deal with the Hope for the End-period without explicit reference to an Anointed One are usually styled Messianic, and thus, in modern work, 'Messianic' and 'eschatological' are often treated as practically synonymous.

Taking the Messianic Hope as a prominent feature of Old Testament religion, I wish to discuss a few points, suggested mainly by recent research, in connexion with the content, date, origin, and formulation of that Hope. These points will be found useful, perhaps, by those who have to deal with the apologetic value of Old Testament prophecy.

In seeking to establish the essential details of the Messianic Hope we might take up the so-called Messianic texts in the order in which they occur in the books of the Old Testament as they are arranged in our Bibles. But since modern criticism will not accept the old traditions as to the dates and authorship of the Old Testament books, apologists must proceed differently.

It is, however, generally agreed that the earliest (technically) so-called literary prophecy is to be found in Amos and Hosea, and that these prophets wrote

about the middle of the eighth pre-Christian century. It is also accepted by criticism that a large part of Isaiah and nearly all Micah belong to the second half of the same eighth century. From these prophets, then, we ought to be able to gather with confidence both the popular and the prophetic Messianism of the eighth century, and from the Messianism of the eighth century, we ought to be able to work backwards to that of earlier, and forwards to that of later periods.

From Amos we learn that the populace of his time kept their hopes centred on what they called the 'Day of Yahweh'—a day, according to them, on which their God, Yahweh, would come forward with visible and terrifying manifestation of power, to overthrow the enemies of Israel, and to establish Israel itself in greatness. All Israel would share, as a nation, in the glory of that Day. The Hope of the people in the time of Amos was, therefore, at once a confident expectation of a final triumph of Yahweh and Israel, and an equally confident expectation of the utter discomfiture of the foes of Israel and Yahweh. All Israel would see salvation, and all the 'nations' would meet their doom on the 'Day of Yahweh.' Amos corrects the enthusiasm of the people. There will be, indeed, a Day of Yahweh, but it will not bring doom to the heathen merely.

> Woe to them that long for the Day of Yahweh!
> The Day of Yahweh is darkness, not light,
> Blackness, not brilliance;
> As if one fleeth from a lion,
> And a bear falleth on him,
> And he cometh into the house,
> And leaneth his arm on the wall,
> And there is a serpent to bite him (v. 18-19).

There are godless ones in Israel as well as among the 'nations,' and they will share in the doom of the heathen peoples on the Day of Yahweh. Indeed, those of Israel that shall escape the doom will be 'as if a shepherd should snatch out of the lion's mouth two legs, or the tip of the ear' (iii. 12). Thus Amos emphasizes the moral, as against the merely national, aspect of the Hope: but though he differs from his people regarding a fundamental feature of the Hope, it is clear from his book that the popular expectation of the Day is already so old at the middle of the eighth century that it has come to be expressed in stereotyped phrase, and it is evident also that Amos himself accepts the Hope—in what he regards as its true meaning—as both ancient and true. Over and over again in the prophetic literature of the eighth and succeeding centuries the Day is referred to as something with which the popular mind was actively occupied. Sometimes it is imagined as ushered in by a theophany, like that on Sinai, or like that described in Judges v. or Psalm xvii. Sometimes, again, it is thought of as a day of battle or carnage in which the enemies of the Lord are brought to naught; sometimes again it is spoken of as a great Assize, a great trial of the nations, presided over by Yahweh. It is always the Day of Yahweh, and in the earliest literary prophecy it is generally Yahweh Himself that leads Israel to victory, or vindicates her against her foes.

But the prophetic texts of the eighth century are by no means the oldest Messianic documents accepted by criticism. There is abundant evidence in the Psalms, and in early texts of Samuel and Kings, that vivid Messianic hopes existed in Israel in the first period of

the Monarchy. And it is interesting to note that in these older texts the final victory of Israel is more frequently ascribed to a vicegerent, or representative, of Yahweh, than to Yahweh Himself. It will, however, be more useful here to omit, for the moment, consideration of the Messianic texts of the monarchical period, and to ask whether there are clear traces of Messianism in the Israel of still earlier days.

Many modern critics are prepared to admit that the striking oracle of the non-Israelite prophet, Bileam (Balaam) in Numbers xxiv. 17 ff. is as old as the period of the Conquest:

> I see him, but not now;
> I behold him, but not near.
> A Star cometh from Jacob,
> And a sceptre ariseth from Israel:
> It smiteth the foreheads of Moab,
> And the skull of the sons of Sheth;
> And Edom will be conquered,
> Yea, Seir will be conquered,
> So that Israel attaineth victory;
> And he ruleth from Jacob,
> And destroyeth from the city
> Those that have escaped of his foes.

The mysterious, yet almost casual, reference to the 'Star' and 'Sceptre' in a text which, because of its general outlook and style, is admittedly as old as the Hebrew Conquest of Palestine, can scarcely be explained otherwise than by assuming that, even at the period of the Conquest, a hope was widespread and familiar that a hero godlike in origin—a Star—would arise from Jacob in the End-time and establish his rule over the nations.

The blessing which Jacob imparts to Judah in Genesis

xlix. 10–12, is also regarded by many non-Catholic critics as being as old at least as the Conquest:

> The Sceptre will not depart from Judah,
> Nor the staff from between his feet,
> Till he to whom it belongeth cometh,
> Whom the peoples obey,
> Who tieth his ass to the vine,
> To the vine-branches his ass's foal,
> Who washeth his garment in wine,
> His cloak in the blood of the grape;
> Whose eyes sparkle with wine;
> Whose teeth are white with milk.

Here again we have a mysterious, unexplained reference to 'him to whom it (the sceptre) belongeth,' and the blessing obviously supposes the existence of a popular belief in the coming of a descendant of Judah who would control the nations, and be the king of a golden age. There can be little doubt that we have in the Blessing of Jacob one of the most ancient tribal traditions of Israel. At a later period the oracle of Nathan (II Samuel vii.) was to identify the mysterious son of Judah here mentioned with a scion of the house of David; but it is not unreasonable to suppose that much more was known in the period of the Conquest about the 'Star' and Sceptre-bearer than is expressed in the prophecy of Bileam, or in the Blessing of Jacob.

It is well known that there is much dispute among non-Catholic scholars as to the date and authorship of the Pentateuch, but no critic at all reasonable will deny that we have enshrined there a multitude of genuine pre-Mosaic traditions. When we find, then, in most of the Patriarchal blessings and in the divine promises to the Patriarchs recorded in Genesis persistent iteration of a Hope similar to that so clearly expressed

in Bileam's oracle, we are justified in accepting the ancient Jewish tradition of Patriarchal Messianism as authentic. And if the Messianic Hope was as vigorous in the days of Abraham as the ancient tradition implies, there can be little difficulty in accepting the truth of the narrative of the Proto-Evangel in Genesis iii. and its implication that the Messianic Hope was a primeval possession of our race.

It is to be noted that the opposition which appears clearly in the period of the oldest literary prophecy between the two types of Messianism which have been called popular and prophetic, appears also in somewhat analogous fashion in the earlier periods. The popular mind in Israel tended always, it would seem, to make the traditional Hope purely racial and national; but the other point of view suggested by the Proto-Evangel that the victory of the End-time would be a victory of good over evil, without reference to race or nationality, was never forgotten.

We have seen that in the so-called Messianic texts the Messianic victories are often ascribed directly to Yahweh Himself, and often to a great leader of human stock, but of more than human greatness, and apparently of mysterious origin. These two sets of texts could be easily reconciled by regarding the Leader, the Anointed One, as at once divine and human. It is difficult to say, however, whether such a reconciliation was ever made consciously in the early days of Ancient Israel. There are certain Psalm texts—such as Psalms ii., xlv., cx.—which undoubtedly represent the Ruler of the End-time as divine, but critics are not agreed as to the date of these texts. Taking up again, however, the prophetic literature of the eighth century, we find

there indubitable evidence of the existence—even in the popular thought of that century—of the belief that the End-period would be ruled by one who, though of Davidic stock, would be of godlike nature and mysterious birth. In his interview with Achaz described in the seventh chapter of his book, Isaiah speaks of the Maiden and her child, Immanuel, as personages who were so familiar to popular thought that a reference to them required no explanation. Micah, the contemporary of Isaiah, speaks also of 'her that bringeth forth' without explanation, in a context that deals with the coming forth from Bethlehem of 'One of an ancient line.' There is no doubt that the Immanuel of Isaiah vii. is the same as the Child of Isaiah ix., of whom the prophet says:

> For a Child shall be born to us,
> A Son shall be given to us,
> And the government shall be upon His shoulder,
> And His name shall be
> 'Marvellous Counsellor,' 'Mighty God,'
> 'Father for ever,' 'Prince of Peace.'
> Great shall be His dominion,
> And no end shall there be of peace
> For the throne of David and His kingdom,
> Setting it up and stablishing it
> By right and justice,
> From now and for ever.

Neither can there be any real doubt that Immanuel—to whom belongs all the land—is the Shoot from the venerable stem of Jesse of Isaiah xi.—on whom shall rest the Spirit of Yahweh, the Spirit of wisdom and insight, the Spirit of knowledge and of the fear of Yahweh, who will not judge according to what the eyes see or the ears hear, but will judge the lowly in

justice, and in fairness will give judgment on the wretched in the land, who will smite the violent with the rod of His mouth, and will slay the godless with the breath of His lips; who will usher in—like Him to whom the sceptre belongeth—an age of idyllic peace, when men will abandon war and wild beasts forget their fierceness, and in whose reign the nations will flock to the standard of Jesse.

The prophecies of Isaiah, then, as well as those of his contemporary Amos, show that a vivid and vigorous Messianism existed in Israel in the second half of the eighth century. The recognition, even by advanced critics, that the prophecies of Isaiah, however much their genuineness in places has been questioned, presuppose among the Jews of about 730 B.C. a considerable wealth of knowledge regarding the Messiah and His Mother, is a valuable result of modern Biblical study. It is now almost universally admitted that the literary prophets, instead of being the first heralds of the Messianic oracles, which are contained in their writings, found existing among their contemporaries a considerable body of Messianic thought, with which was associated a mass of stereotyped phrase and imagery. The prophetic attitude towards this traditional Messianism was, as has been said, critical. The prophets constantly insisted on the fundamentally ethical aspect of the Hope which the people tended to accept in a chauvinistic sense. Isaiah, like Amos, emphasizes the truth that the Day of Yahweh will be a day of doom for the godless in Israel as well as the godless among the heathens. It is in this connection that the Isaian doctrine of the 'Remnant' is proclaimed. On the Day of Yahweh only a section, a mere remnant

of Israel will survive, and it will survive only because it has tried to make itself worthy of its God, Whom Isaiah, with peculiar iteration, calls the 'Holy One of Israel.' The Kingdom which shall follow the judgment of the great Day will be a Kingdom of peace and justice, a universal empire centred in a spiritual Jerusalem, to which the nations will stream—not to make humble submission to a proud Emperor, but to learn the ways of Yahweh from Him who sits on the throne of the Son of Jesse. The spiritual character of the Messianic Kingdom is expressed with no less emphasis by the prophets of the seventh and sixth centuries. For Jeremiah the old covenant of Sinai, written on tablets of stone, will be replaced in the End-time by a covenant written on men's hearts, and the Shoot of Hope from Jesse, the Ruler of the End-time, will be called 'Yahweh our justice.'[1] For Ezechiel, men will dwell in peace after the days of the great Judgment, under David their Prince and Shepherd,[2] and from the Temple there shall flow eastwards a stream whose banks will be lined by ever-verdant fruit-trees that bear fruit every month—a stream whose waters flowing into the Dead Sea shall make it sweet and drinkable.[3] The stream of revelation and instruction that shall go forth from Sion shall make sweet, that is, even the insipidity of the heathen.

In the Messianic Kingdom of prophecy, then, the whole world will be united under the sway of a Davidic king, of mysterious birth and God-like being, the pillars of whose throne are justice and fairness. It was inevitable that the Messianic King should be thought

[1] Jer. xxxi. 33-34: xxiii. 5–6.
[2] Ezech. xxxiv. 24–28. [3] *Ibid.* xlvii. 1–12.

of as ruling from Sion—but his rule is almost completely spiritual. He is both Priest and King, for the oriental King was usually chief lord of the liturgy; and as mediator between men and God in virtue of his position, he would necessarily have some kind of priestly power. Thus the 'Shoot,' as the Messiah is so often styled,[1] will be another *Malki-sedek* (Melchisedech), King of justice, Prince of peace, and Priest of God Most-High.[2]

In all the Messianic texts hitherto considered the Messiah appears as a victorious ruler, or king. But there remains to be examined another set—an extraordinary set—of Messianic texts in which the Lord of the End-time is very differently described. These texts in question are to be found in the second part of the Book of Isaiah. They occur in a number of poems, which, because of their chief subject-matter, are known as the 'Poems of Yahweh's Slave.' These poems are four in number: (*a*) Is. xlii. 1–7; (*b*) Is. xlix. 1–9 ; (*c*) Is. l. 4–9; (*d*) Is. lii. 13–liii. 12. Few texts of the Old Testament have been so frequently discussed as these poems; but in spite of great difference of opinion among critics as to their date, authorship and meaning, the following points, among others, are widely, though not of course universally, accepted by scholars:

(1) The poems are certainly at least as old as the close of the Babylonian Exile.

(2) They are the work of a single writer.

(3) They can be readily identified as forming a definite group of texts, not belonging necessarily to the literary contexts in which they occur.

(4) As the 'Slave' of the poems receives from God

[1] Zach. iii. 8, vi. 12, Jer. xxiii. 5, xxxiii. 15: cf. Is. xi. 1–10.
[2] Psalm cx.: cf. Heb. vii. 1–3.

a mission to Israel, he cannot be a mere symbol of the nation Israel, or of any portion thereof: he must be regarded as a definite individual.

(5) The mission which the 'Slave' receives in reference to Israel is to restore the nation to its home and greatness, and to become the Mediator of a new covenant between Yahweh and Israel. Thus he is sent to Israel as a second and greater Moses.

(6) His mission to Israel, as such, is a failure: he is despised, maltreated and put to a shameful death by his people.

(7) But he received a mission also to the Gentiles: he is to be a light, or enlightenment, to the peoples. This mission, in spite of the Slave's failure and death in Israel, he carries out successfully, and in the end he receives from God and men the glory which the accomplishment of his mission has deserved.

We have then, in these strange 'Slave-poems' a picture of an individual: but it portrays neither Zerubbabel, nor Cyrus, nor Jechonias, nor Moses, nor Jeremiah, nor the author of Deutero-Isaiah himself, nor any other leader or prophet known to Hebrew history. The details of the 'Slave's' picture are to be found united in one historical individual only—Jesus of Nazareth. And it is to be remembered that, however criticism may dispute the date and authorship of these poems, it is certain that they were published many centuries before the Christian Era.[1]

[1] For the 'Slave-poems' see the important works of Dr. J. Fischer in the *Alttestamentliche Abhandlungen, Isaias* 40–55 *und die Perikopen vom Gottesknecht* (Münster, 1916), and, *Wer ist der Ebed* (1922). See also the interesting discussion on the *Serviteur de Yahveh* in Médebielle, *L'Expiation* (Rome, Biblical Institute, 1924).

The idea of a suffering and dying Messiah was never palatable to the Hebrew people, and though we find again in the prophet Zachary[1] indications that the Messiah would be lowly, and that he would have to endure suffering, and though perhaps a certain amount of trial and suffering may have been associated even in the minds of the people with the career of a political Messiah, who to establish his power would first have to battle with and defeat his foes, it would seem that the teaching of the 'slave-poems' never became popular in Israel.

There is, of course, no real opposition between the Messianism of these poems and the Messianism of the 'Immanuel period' of Isaiah, and scholars have often rightly insisted on the agreement of the two in fundamental points, and even in matters of detail. But there is no real common ground between the Messianism of the 'Slave poems' and the political Messianism which the prophets rejected. Students of the Gospels are aware that the Messianism of the 'Slave-poems' holds a central place in the Gospel message. We find the Baptist proclaiming Jesus as the 'Slave' when he calls Him the 'Lamb of God that takes away the sins of the world.' For the old man Simeon, Our Lord, like the 'Slave', is the Light of the Gentiles, and for Zachary he is, like the 'Slave,' a herald of the *Torah* (Law) to the peoples. When the Baptist's messengers come with their questions to Jesus He commissions them in effect to explain to their Master that He (Jesus) is the 'Slave,' the *Servus Domini*. The narrative of the Temptations in the Desert is a narrative of the clash of political Messianism with the Messianism of the

[1] Zach. ix. 9–10.

'Slave-poems,' in which the former is equated with Satan-worship. It was the study and explanation of the 'Slave-poems' that led to the conversion of the Ethiopian eunuch; and it was the policy of the first Christian preachers to use the poems of the *Servus Domini* to show that Christ's death had been divinely fore-ordained, and that therefore it was meet that the Messiah should suffer in order that He might enter into His glory—the cross being thus a token of victory, not of defeat.

Whence was this Hope of a Redeemer, that in one form or another dominates the Old Testament, derived?

Recent liberal scholarship has sought to explain it as a natural product of Israelite chauvinism, or as the inevitable offspring of national calamity. But, as we have seen, the Hope is older than the nation Israel itself on the one hand, and on the other, when national calamities occurred, the expression of the Hope was not noticeably modified or moulded thereby.

Quite recently strenuous attempts have been made to find the prototype and inspiration of the Messianic Hope in Egypt, or in Babylon, or in both. The documents on which such theories are based cannot be examined here. But it may be pointed out that the most important of the Egyptian documents in question[1] has been shown by our best Egyptologists not to contain prophecy at all; and it has been established further, that the other Egyptian texts which have been cited

[1] This is the Leyden Papyrus 344. See Gardiner, *The Admonitions of an Egyptian Sage*, Leipzig, 1909, and Erman, *Die Mahnworte eines ägyptischen Propheten* (*Proceedings of the Berlin Academy XLII*, 1919).

in this connection are partly prophecies after the event, and partly collections of courtiers' flatteries.[1] Attempts also have been made to establish resemblances between the Messianism of the Old Testament and certain myths of Babylon. It can be shown however, that there is no real similarity of *motif* between the Messianic Hope of Israel and any actual myth of ancient Babylon. With supposed or invented myths of Babylon we need not concern ourselves. It may be said in general, then, that while parallels of phrase or of other details of mere form between Old Testament Messianism and Babylonian or Egyptian texts may occasionally be found, neither in Babylon nor in Egypt has any text yet been discovered which contains the idea of a Leader or Saviour of the End-time like the Hebrew Messiah.[2] Further, we find nowhere in ancient oriental non-biblical texts the thought of a judgment of God against His enemies in the last days, such as is implied in the Messianic Hope of Israel.

Since, then, the Hope has no genuine parallel in the ancient world, it has to be regarded as being as unique and original as is ancient Hebrew religion in general, and must, therefore, be as supernatural in its origin as the ancient Israelite notion of God itself.

[1] The Petrograd Papyrus 1116B (See *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, April, 1914), and *The Prophecies of a Potter in the time of King Amenopis* (a Greek text published by Wessely in the *Denkschriften* of the Vienna Academy, 1893). See on the supposed parallels to Hebrew prophecy in Egyptian and Babylonian literature, Dürr, *Ursprung und Ausbau der israelitisch-jüdischen Heilandserwartung*, Berlin, 1925.

[2] Cf. Sellin, *Der alttestamentliche Prophetismus* (Leipzig, 1912), p. 176.

While however, the essential points of the Messianic Hope cannot be derived otherwise than from some form of divine revelation, the formulation of the Hope —its form as distinguished from its content—has often been regarded, even by Catholic scholars, as betraying the influence of the political and cultural development of the Hebrew people. This matter has been the object of much recent investigation, but it cannot be considered at any length here. There can be little doubt that, in regard to the Messianic Hope, we are justified in making a distinction between content and form, provided that we regard the former as much more vital than the latter. When however, we try to make the distinction in detail, we find ourselves faced with difficult problems. It is certain that the prophets of the eighth century adopted much of the imagery of the popular Messianism of their time. But it is by no means easy to determine whether the imagery thus adopted was regarded as merely imaginative, or as symbolical. Again, it must be admitted that great events of Hebrew history, such as the Exodus, the Covenant at Sinai, the Settlement in Palestine, the heroic deeds of the Judges, the establishment of the Monarchy, *etc.*, must have contributed something towards the formulation of the Messianic Hope. The true meaning of the Hope inevitably became clearer as the centuries passed by. The events of Hebrew history supplied the conception of the Messiah as a second Moses, as the Founder of a New Covenant, as the Ideal King of Israel, and so on. But in admitting all this we have to keep an important idea in view. The History of Israel is the history of the development of the Kingdom of God. In that development each incident and crisis summarizes, as

it were, all that went before, and foreshadows all that follows. The full significance of each stage of the Kingdom of God is revealed only by the ultimate completion of that Kingdom's history. Hence when elements taken from national history are employed to formulate the Hope of Israel, we must not regard them merely as helps to popular imagination, nor as merely symbolical. And while on the one hand the Messianic Hope grew in clarity as history unfolded itself, it is true on the other that popular thought in Israel frequently cast around Hebrew heroes and national crises the glamour of Messianic glory. In the Psalms we frequently find Israelite kings clothed in Messianic robes, and the victories of the nation described as the opening of the Messianic Age. Thus it comes about that Messianism plays an enormously important part in the Old Testament. Each individual and each event in the history of the nation could be regarded as a foreshadowing of features of the End-period, or could be invested by anticipation with eschatological attributes. This way of thinking is familiar too in the New Testament. Christ is said to have recapitulated all things in Himself,[1] and things which in the Old Testament are predicated literally of the nation Israel, are asserted in the New Testament of the greatest of Israel's sons—in a deeper and fuller sense.

We have spoken above of stereotyped features of the Messianic Hope. One of the most persistent and most striking of these is, perhaps, the description of the End-time as a sort of re-established Golden Age.

[1] Ephes. i. 10.

In the End-time the earth will give its fruit in teeming abundance. As Amos says (ix. 13-14):—

> Behold days are coming, saith Yahweh,
> When the ploughman shall press close on the reaper,
> And the grape-treader on him that streweth seed,
> And the mountains shall trickle forth must,
> And all the hills shall melt.

In the Blessing of Jacob cited above, we see him 'to whom the sceptre belongs' tethering his ass to a vine because of the multitude of vines, and washing his cloak in wine because of the abundance of the blood of the grape, and numerous parallels to these texts of Genesis and Amos might be quoted.[1] With the teeming bounty of nature in the last days will be combined a reign of idyllic peace. The lion and the ox will graze together, and the little child will lead them as he wills, and the babe will play with the adder and the basilisk.[2]

The bounty and peace of nature are no doubt symbolical of the spiritual blessings of the Messianic Age. But probably more than such symbolism is contained in this imagery. There is present here also, it may be conjectured, the implication that the beauty and perfect peace of the Garden in Eden which were forfeited by Adam's sin will be restored when the Messianic victory is complete. The Messiah will be a second Adam, and the curse which was set upon the earth because of the first Adam's sin will be removed by the work of Christ; and nature, liberated from the primeval curse, will share sympathetically in the glory to be attained by the sons of God. Thus the End-time comes to be painted in the colours of Paradise, and thus also, underlying the imagery even of popular Messianism, there is ever present the idea of Atonement and Redemption.

[1] Cf. Isa. xxxv. 1–8; Deut. xxxiii. 13–16; Psalm lxxii.; Gen. xxvii. 27–29; Isa. xxxii. 1–5. [2] Isa. xi. 1–10: cf. Micah v. 9.

## II.

# THE PREPARATION OF JEWRY.

By the Rev. J. P. Arendzen, M.A., D.Ph., D.D.

Were the Jews of the first century in any way prepared for the revelation contained in the opening words of the Fourth Gospel: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God, and the Word became Flesh and dwelt amongst us'? Or did this truth come unforeseen, as a flash of lightning in a dark sky, suddenly revealing things never dreamt of before? St. Paul refers to it as a mystery which has been kept in silence through times eternal but is now manifested, *μυστηρίου χρόνοις αἰωνίοις σεσιγημένου* (Rom. xvi. 25): the expression could hardly be stronger to suggest the complete secrecy in which this truth was hidden. On the other hand St. Paul adds, 'and through prophetical writings according to the commandment of the eternal God it was made known unto all nations.' The mystery therefore, though kept in agelong silence, did not find men totally unprepared at the time of its revelation, but through God's Providence the minds of God's Chosen People were capable and ready to receive it. Those that were of good will realized that the mystery had cast its shadow before across the pages of their sacred books. It is this historic preparation of the Jewish mind which we are about to study.

The mystery of the Incarnation means that God the Son became man for us. This involves a two-fold truth, first that God has a Son, and secondly that this

Son took a human nature and dwelt amongst us. For both truths the Jews were in some way prepared, though in a different way and in unequal measure. Through God's Providence it had entered into the thoughts of many that even within the Godhead there might be some distinction, some distinct subsistency, some one who was one with God and yet in some sense not the same, be he called Wisdom or Word, Angel or Son, or Sitter on the throne, or Glory or Presence; some one the same with God and yet distinct from Him. Though the Jews never fully grasped the distinction of the two Persons in God, yet they used personifications, hovering between metaphor and reality, till God revealed to them the actual truth of the existence of the Word that was with Him. The second truth, that God Himself was to come to redeem them and that God should be clothed in human nature, was also in some sense prepared for. God would redeem Israel through His Messias. Israel's deliverance from the hand of their foes and the ushering in of the kingdom of God was ascribed now to God Himself, now to His Christ; Jewish meditation on the nature of the coming Messias, especially the identification of the Messias with the Son of Man in Daniel, had led to such exalted ideas concerning him that something mysterious and almost divine was felt to be connected with him. To a real identification of the Messias with God Jewry never rose. The Messias remained less than God and a creature, though higher than the angels. Moreover Jewry never identified the Word of God with the Messias. These two ideas remained disparate and disconnected, till the fulness of revelation came in Christianity. The mystery of the Incarnation therefore was really kept secret through times

eternal, as St. Paul writes. Flesh and blood could not reveal it, but only the Father who was in heaven. But ideas which were apt to lead up to it, terms which would make it intelligible, thoughts which would render the acceptance of the mystery easier and more natural, once it was revealed, such things God gave to the Jews before Christ came.

Let us consider these points in detail. Well known to all is the personification of divine Wisdom which occurs in the books of Job, of Baruch, of Proverbs, of Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom. In the twenty-eighth chapter of the Book of Job, Wisdom is described as some hidden being, whose abode no one knows but God. No one on earth, nor in the realm of the dead, has ever seen her, but only God. When He created the world, 'then He gazed upon her and made her manifest, then He established her, and yea, He probed her through and through.' The same magnificent theme is treated with almost equal grandeur in the third chapter of the Book of Baruch. Israel is in exile because Israel has abandoned the bourn of Wisdom and has forsaken the ways of God. None of the kings of the earth, none of its craftsmen or merchants, not even the sons of Agar or the traders of Median and Thema, none of the giants of old, mighty and strong in war, knew the hidden way to Wisdom, only He who knows all things, He understands her, and in His prudence found her, when He sent out the light and it burst forth, when He called for the light and it obeyed in trembling. The first act of creation is God's finding of Wisdom, this Wisdom God enshrined in the Book of the Law and gave it to Israel His beloved. Those that remain faithful thereunto shall find life.

The personification of Wisdom which Job and Baruch employed is used to such an extent in the Book of Proverbs, that no reader but must ask himself, is this mere poetical personification of divine Wisdom, or is this Wisdom really a person, a subsistent reality, in or with God? Wisdom is introduced as speaking in the first person. She stands at the crossways in the city and bids the passers-by obey her, and when they refuse she threatens, 'Because ye rejected my counsel and did not accept my guidance, I also shall laugh when ye perish and I shall mock when the time of your terror comes.' In chapter iii. the intermediacy of Wisdom in the act of creation is emphasized as in Job and Baruch. The whole of chapters viii. and ix. are devoted to the personification of Wisdom, and their contents are so well known that they need no further quotation. What is most remarkable is the description of Wisdom as a child of God, in the bosom of God before all ages and born in time, and at the creation playing as child before God's face:

The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His way,
Before His works of old.
I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning,
Or ever the earth was.
When there were no depths I was brought forth,
When there were no fountains abounding with water.
Before the mountains were settled,
Before the hills, was I brought forth,
While as yet He had not made the earth, nor the fields,
Nor the beginning of the dust of the world.
When He prepared the heavens I was there,
When He set a circle upon the face of the deep;
When He made the skies above,
When the fountains of the deep became strong;
When He gave to the sea its bound,

That the waters should not pass beyond His decree;
When He marked out the foundations of the earth,
Then I was by Him, as a child He fostered;
And I was daily His delight,
Playing always before Him,
Playing over the plains of His earth (Proverbs viii).

No preparation for the opening verses of St. John could be closer than this sublime description of the conception and birth of divine Wisdom here given.

The same idea is dwelt upon in the Wisdom of Ben Sira, commonly called Ecclesiasticus, written but two centuries before Christ. The first ten verses of the first chapter describe the birth of Wisdom before the creation of the world. In the fourth chapter she is the teacher of her sons. In the fourteenth chapter is the description of the blessedness of him who sought her and found, 'for she will come to meet him as a mother, and as the bride of his youth she will be hostess to him.' In chapter xxiv. is Wisdom's hymn of praise to herself: 'I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, and as His breath I spread over the earth. From eternity in the beginning He created me, and unto eternity I shall never cease to be.' Wisdom then seeks a place to rest and finds it in Sion amongst God's holy people, and its embodiment is the Book of the Covenant of God most high and the Law which Moses commanded.

Finally in the Book of the Wisdom of Solomon, which preceded the Christian era but by a few generations, we read of Wisdom that she is the breath of the power of God, and a clear outflow of the glory of the Almighty. Therefore can nothing defiled find entrance in her, for she is an effulgence from light everlasting, an unspotted mirror of the working of God, and an image of His goodness. The personification of Wisdom

reaches its highest point in the sentence of the prayer of Solomon, 'Give me Wisdom, her that sitteth by thee on thy throne':

*τὴν τῶν σῶν θρόνων πάρεδρον σοφίαν.*

As God's eternal bride, she is the sharer of His heavenly throne.

Both in Hebrew and Greek the word Wisdom is feminine, and both languages had to use the feminine gender in describing her nature. This is a mere necessity and imperfection of speech, the ruling thought is that Wisdom is the counterpart of God, the sharer of the throne of His divinity, equal and yet in some sense distinct from Him. There are no further vestiges of the personification of Wisdom in Jewish literature, but though the name disappeared, the thing remained, for divine Wisdom was regarded as embodied, inspired, and in a sense incarnate, in the *Torah*, *i.e.*, the Jewish Law. The tendency to regard the *Torah* as the subsistent manifestation of God's wisdom in creation is visible already in the Book of Ecclesiasticus, but this tendency led to the strangest extravagances in subsequent Jewish thought.

The *Torah* was supposed to have existed coeternal with God from the beginning. Written in red flames on pages of flames of white, it lay on the knees of God sitting upon His flaming throne from all eternity. All that the Old Testament said of divine Wisdom, almost all that the New Testament says of the Only-begotten Son of God, Jewry has said of the *Torah*, till it almost became a secondary deity and the worship of the text almost approached idolatry.

Parallel to the personification of Wisdom, but less

developed, is the mysterious figure of 'the Angel of the Lord' or 'Maleak Jahveh,' the Messenger of Jahveh. Sometimes indeed the term signifies probably a spirit created by God, as the angel that appeared to Balaam or to Elias, or the angel that slew the army of the Assyrians, or slew the people of Israel with pestilence; but in a number of instances we find the Angel of Jahveh[1] strangely identified with Jahveh Himself. When Agar fled from Sara, she was met by the Angel of the Lord at the well, who promised her numerous offspring. This is referred to as Jahveh speaking with her. So likewise when Abraham cast out Hagar, the Angel of Jahveh and Jahveh Himself are mentioned as if they were the same individual. When Abraham offers his son Isaac, the Angel of Jahveh calls from heaven to Abraham, yet Abraham calls the place 'Jahveh sees.' Again the Angel of Jahveh speaks for the second time and as if He were God Himself, takes an oath by Himself that He will give Abraham numerous progeny, because Abraham has not refused Him his only Son. Now the reader will remember that it was God who had given Abraham the command to sacrifice Isaac. In this account therefore the Angel of Jahveh is Jahveh Himself. When Jacob fled before Esau, Jahveh appears to him in a dream. And on his return the Angel of the Lord says to him in a dream, 'I am the God of Bethel.' The unknown personage with whom Jacob wrestles is God Himself according to Gen. xxxiii. 25, yet the Prophet Osee calls him the Angel of Jahveh.

[1] In this paper 'Jahveh' (in a less accurate but better known form, 'Jehovah') is used as the proper name, so to speak, of God, indicated in Exod. iii., vi. For fear of irreverence the Jews did not use it, but substituted for it the word 'Lord,' which accordingly represents it in our bibles (cf. also p. 98).

Moses sees in the thorny bush the Angel of Jahveh, yet when he comes near it is Jahveh Himself that speaks to him. Jahveh Himself goes before His people through the desert in the pillar of fire, yet it is according to Exod. xiii. 19 the Angel of the Lord that does so. In a later chapter (Exod. xxiii. 20) God promises to let His Angel go before Israel and tells the people to hearken unto His voice, lest He should not pardon their transgression for, said God, 'My name is in him.' This sentence certainly in some sense makes him divine. In chapter xxxiii. a distinction is drawn between 'an angel' and the Presence of God Himself, as if an indefinite angel was not 'the Angel of the Presence,' not the Angel of Jahveh, not 'my angel.'

In the prophet Zachary (ch. iii.) the high priest is seen standing before the Angel of Jahveh, who seems to represent God Himself. So likewise in the prophet Malachy the angel which Jahveh sends as His angel before Himself to prepare His way is 'the Angel of the Covenant, whom ye delight in. Behold He cometh, saith the Lord of Hosts, and who shall stand when He appeareth?' It seems as if the Angel is Jahveh Himself. The Great One that is to come is called according to the Septuagint the Angel of great counsel (Isaiah ix. 8). This may not represent the Hebrew or be in all MSS., but it at least represents the thought of the Jews a century before Christ's coming.

The Jews had noticed all these things, the Christians were not the first to call attention to them. In consequence the Angel of Jahveh was a theophany, a manifestation of God, but this manifestation was an emanation rather than a creation of God. No very concise ideas had been formed about this matter, the

utmost freedom seems to have reigned in matters of such speculation, but generations before Christ's birth the Jews had realized the transcendence of God, the infinite distance between God and all created things. In consequence, the use of His holy name had ceased, and death awaited him who pronounced it inconsiderately. A number of substitutes for the Holy Name and even for the word God had been invented, such as 'the Name,' 'the Glory,' 'the Power,' and so on. God, being Himself utterly transcendent, had created this world 'by His Spirit,' 'by His Power,' 'by His Wisdom,' 'by His Word,' and these words almost seem to indicate some intermediaries, God indeed, but God as manifested.

The idea of a demiourgos, the idea of the *Logos* had existed in the Greek world almost for six centuries before Christ. The contact of the Jews with the Greek world, especially since the days of Alexander, must have been considerable, and their thought was influenced by Greek ideas. Philo the Jew, born but a few years before Our Lord, is an example of what Jewish speculation might achieve. Philo was an orthodox and devout Jew, in fact he was an acknowledged leader and champion of Judaism, and his description of the divine Word or *Logos* prepared the way for the revelation expressed in the first sentences of the Gospel of St. John. Note however, it only prepared the way: for the Philonic and the Johannine *Logos* do not represent fully the same idea. Philo's Word is on the one hand the Stoic *Ratio* or *Nous*, *i.e.*, the Intelligence that underlies and is manifested in all creation and comes to supreme consciousness in the human mind. His Reason, indwelling in the world, and

especially in man, is the intelligent soul of the Universe. On the other hand Philo had borrowed from the Platonists also the thought of 'pre-existing ideas', the exemplary causes, as it were, of all physical things, and actually existing before them. The pre-existing idea of the Universe, considered as a unity existing with God, is the *Logos* according to Philo. Often Philo speaks as if this *Logos* had a subsistency distinct from God, in fact he will speak of it as the highest of the angels of God, and even as the first-born Son of God, but one is never certain whether his speech is more than metaphor, or if there seems to be no metaphor, whether this angel or son is not merely a created spirit, as Michael or Gabriel. In any case Philo does never associate this Logos with the Messias in any possible appearance in human form on earth. At most his Logos is a cosmic power created by God by which (or whom) as intermediary He produces this world.

Alexandrian speculations find echoes in the *Metatron* and the *Memra* of rabbinic and targumic literature. The quaint speculations on the *Metatron*, *i.e.*, the After-throne, or Second-throne (a word coined probably to avoid the use of *Synthronos* or Sharer of the same throne) seem to date from the time of Christ. They are connected by the Rabbis with a certain Elisha ben Abuyah, a contemporary of the apostles. The idea seems to have arisen from meditation on the words 'I beheld till thrones (plural) were placed, and the Ancient of days sat, and His throne was like flames of fire' (Dan. vii. 9). And likewise on such words in the Psalms as, 'His throne shall be as the sun before My face, and as the moon in its fulness for ever' (Psalm lxxxviii. [lxxxix]. 38). This *Metatron* is either St.

Michael, or the highest of the angels, or the Angel of the Presence and Jews apply to him God's word (Exod. xxiii. 21) 'My name is in him,' by which he is exalted to a sort of theophany. In certain circles this *Metatron* was referred to David, either to the historical David, or the ideal David the Messias. This, however, does not necessarily mean ascription of divine dignity to either of them. Later Rabbis scorned the idea of 'two powers in heaven,' but one wonders how far the idea of the possibility of two powers in heaven was allowed in rabbinical circles in the first century.

With surprising frequency there occurs in the Targumim the term *Memra*, the Aramaic for 'word.' Everything is done by God through His *Memra*, and God's *Memra* does everything. The term occurs hundreds of times, so that the *Memra* of the Lord is used interchangeably for some designation of the divinity. This striking use of the term was continued in later rabbinism, when the Hebrew rendering of the same term, *Dibbura*, came in use. It is maintained, and that most recently by Strack and Billerbeck, that no importance can be attached to this use of *Memra*; that it was merely one of those devices, of which the Jews had many, to avoid saying the Holy Name or using the word God. The arguments adduced seem not quite convincing. If it was a mere common substitute for the Holy Name, one cannot account for its use instead of *Shema*, the Name. *Memra* means word as utterance, not merely as designation or vocable. One cannot account for its being translated later on in Hebrew. Its disappearance under the pressure of the Christian use of *Logos* is quite intelligible. The attempt to see in *Memra* merely an idiom for 'Self,'

so that *Memri* means 'myself,' *memrekh* 'thyself,' *memreh* 'himself,' seems unsuccessful. And we are left with the fact that contemporary Jewry had a terminology which would make the sentence, 'In the beginning was the *Memra*, and the *Memra* was with God, and the *Memra* was God, and the *Memra* became flesh,' sound familiar to anyone who attended a Palestinian synagogue.

The idea of the Glory of the *Shekhina* can likewise be considered as preparing Jewish thought for the Revelation of the Incarnation. *Shekhina* means 'dwelling,' and is used of God's dwelling or presence on earth and in the midst of Israel. It was in heaven, and descended on the mercy-seat between the Cherubim. Though this perished, God spiritually dwelt or was present in Israel, when ten Jews prayed, or when the Law was studied. This 'dwelling' or 'presence' was at first not conceived as a person; but finally it became simply a name for Jahveh Himself. We can hardly set aside the suggestion that when St. John wrote 'The Word made his *Shekhinah* amongst us and we have seen his glory,' he used terms familiar to every Jewish ear. 'The Glory of the *Shekhinah*' is a common term in the Targums, and it is actually used in juxtaposition to the term *Memra*, or *Word*. Thus in Targ. Jon. *Mich.* iii. 2: 'They trust in the *Memra* of Jahveh, as they say: Is not the Shekhina of Jahveh in our midst'; Targ. Jer. I, *Levit.* xxvi. 12: 'I shall let the glory of my *Shekhinah* dwell amongst you, and my *Memra* be unto you as a divine Redeemer.'

We now come to the second part of our task. In what measure had the Jews before Christ exalted the person of the Messias, so that his possessing divine dignity would be conceivable to their minds? God they certainly never made him, but in many circles thought of him as having existed with God before the world was made. It is a little difficult sometimes to decide whether mere ideal pre-existence in the plans of God is meant or real pre-existence, but at times there can be no doubt that real pre-existence is meant, even before the creation of the world. This idea was in some way assisted, no doubt, by the belief in platonic circles in the pre-existence of all human souls. There was apparently in Jewish circles in the time of Christ no consistent and coherent, no authoritative and fixed conception of the Messias. Sometimes their expectations rose to sublime heights, sometimes they did not exceed that of an earthly king. In the so-called *Similitudes of Enoch*, an apocryphal book written between B.C. 94 and 79, we find a description of the Messias so sublime that he is superhuman and has something of divinity about him. Professor R. H. Charles summarizes it practically in these words:

> The Messias is the Judge of the world, the Revealer of all things, the Champion and Ruler of the Righteous. As judge he possesses righteousness, wisdom and power. He is the righteous One in a unique sense. He possesses righteousness and it dwells with him. He has been chosen on the ground of his essential holiness, as well as according to God's good pleasure. Wisdom, which could find no dwelling-place on earth, dwells in him, and the spirit of God who giveth knowledge. The secrets of wisdom stream from his mouth and wisdom is poured out like water before him. In him abides the revealer of all things.

His appearance will be the signal for the revelation of good and the unmasking of evil. He will bring to light everything that is hidden, alike the invisible world of righteousness and the hidden world of sin. He will call to life those that have perished on land and sea, and those that are in the netherworld and in hell. Evil, when once unmasked, will vanish from his presence. All judgment has been committed unto him, and he will sit on the throne of his glory. All men and angels will be judged before him. Before him no lying utterance will be possible. He will slay the wicked by the mere word of his mouth. He is the stay of the righteous and has already been revealed to them, he is the avenger of their life and the preserver of their inheritance. He will vindicate the earth as their possession for ever, he will abide in closest communion with them for ever in the immediate presence of God, and his glory is for ever and ever and his might unto all generations, hence he is called the Chosen One, the Elect, and his lot surpasseth all things in uprighteousness.

It is plain from this collection of Messianic attributes, almost literally taken from the Similitudes, that the identification of the Messias with the Son of Man in Daniel led to a transcendental and spiritual conception of the Messias which exceeds all mere human measure. He was some celestial being, unutterably close to God, the embodiment of holiness and wisdom, the divine instrument of eternal salvation and of the bliss of the saved with God for ever. Of his origin the Similitudes tell us nothing, it is left in obscurity and mystery. Contemporary Jewry thought that no one should know whence he came. Jesus of Nazareth could not be the Messias, for the simple reason that every one knew whence he came, he was the son of a village carpenter and they knew his brethren and sisters. He must indeed be the son of David, that was taken universally for granted. Sometimes he was conceived as David

the king himself, returned to life. In a few instances they thought of him as a new David, having the same name as the king of old.

Most remarkable in the Similitudes is the statement that the Elect 'sits upon the throne of his glory,' for this throne of glory is in rabbinical thought some divine effulgence and majesty, which existed before all ages. Later Jewry sharply rebuked Rabbi Akiba for the suggestion that the Messias should have his throne with God, as if this were a blasphemous idea. The two thrones were, one for God's mercy, the other for his holiness. But earlier Jews seem to have been much bolder in their speculations. In Sim. iv. God is made to say, 'The Elect One in those days will sit on My throne.'

In the *Apocalypse of Esdras*, which portrays Jewish thought immediately after the Fall of Jerusalem, and was written between 81 and 96 of our era, the Son of Man is repeatedly referred to as 'My Son.' In chapter xiii. we read, 'the wind caused to come up from the midst of the sea as it were the likeness of a man, and lo, that man flew with the clouds of heaven.' War is then made by the wicked on this Son of Man, but he destroys his foes by a flood of fire and a flaming breath, and he gathers his people together. In the interpretation of this vision we read: 'My Son will be revealed, whom thou sawest as a man ascending.' The same designation of the Messias as 'My Son' occurs later in the sentence, 'This My Son shall rebuke the nations.' To Esdras it is said that he shall be taken away from men, and shall henceforth remain with 'My Son and such as be like thee until the times of the end.' Esdras asks, 'Wherefore have I seen the man coming up from

the midst of the sea? And he (the Angel or God) said unto me: Like as one can neither seek out nor know what is in the depth of the sea, even so can no man on earth see My Son, or those that be with him, but in the time of his day.' In the third Vision we read of the coming of the New Jerusalem as a bride that was hidden and then, 'My Son shall be revealed with those that be with him and shall rejoice them that remain, four hundred years. After these years My Son the Messias shall die and all that have breath of life. The world shall be turned into the old silence seven days, and after seven days the resurrection.' Should the Latin and Syriac text be original, then the Messias, though a pre-existing being, close to God and the instrument of God's salvation, dies, apparently as if he were an ordinary man, and his resurrection is merely presupposed in the general resurrection, after which resurrection he seems to have no further function to perform, his function only being that of introducing a temporary Messianic kingdom. It is however very probable indeed that the original text contained no mention of the death of the Messias. Even so the rôle of the Messias after the resurrection is passed over in silence.

The designation of the Messias as 'My Son' is clearly derived from the Second Psalm. In fact the vision of Esdras is a kind of amplification of this Psalm:

> Why do the gentiles rage,
> And the peoples imagine a vain thing?
> The kings of the earth set themselves,
> And the rulers take counsel together,
> Against the Lord and against His Messias? . . .
> The Lord shall speak unto them in His wrath:

I have set My king
Upon Sion, My holy hill.
I will tell of the decree:
The Lord said unto me, Thou art my Son,
This day I have begotten thee.

There can be no doubt that this Psalm was commonly referred to the Messias, and that the title, 'My Son' applied to him, would have been nothing very strange to Jewish ears, although the idea of actual divinity of the Messias was beyond their range of thought. The same idea was also contained in the 110th Psalm as rendered by the Septuagint: 'from the womb before the daystar I have begotten thee.' In the Massoretic text of the Hebrew, however, the words, 'I have begotten thee' are differently vocalized and made to mean 'thy youths.' None the less the Psalm was normally interpreted of the Messias, and the Septuagint represents the older form of Jewish interpretation. Even as late as the third century after Christ, Jews appealed to this Psalm, and placed the Messias at the right hand of God, and Abraham on the left, *i.e.*, in the less honourable place. In the *Apocalypse of Baruch*, an apocryphon not much later than IV Esdras, it is said of the Messias, 'and it shall come to pass that after he has humbled all that is in the world, he will sit for ever on the throne of his kingdom.' The permanency of the Davidic and Messianic throne was rightly inferred from Psalm lxxxix. ,'His throne is as the sun before My Face.' In the same Psalm it is said by God of the Messias: 'He will call me, My Father, My God, the rock of my salvation. Yea, I will make him My first-born, most high above the kings of the earth.' All this was undoubtedly referred to the

Messias in the days of Our Lord, but the Jews did not understand by this fatherhood and sonship any sharing in the divine nature, though the words raised their minds to some unique dignity of the Messias, to some ineffable height of glory with God.

In the *Assumption of Moses*, which was written when Our Lord was a child, we read (ch. x.) that God's 'kingdom shall then appear through His whole creation, and the devil shall have an end, and sorrow shall be taken away with him. Then the hands of the Angel shall be filled, who is established in the highest, who shall straightway avenge them of their adversaries.' The Angel is beyond doubt 'the Angel of Great Counsel' of Isaias xx., in other words the Messias. Filling the hands of a man is technical expression for the anointing to the priesthood (Exod. xxviii. 41). The Great Anointed, or the Messias, is therefore the Angel of the Lord, but the Angel of the Lord was often spoken of as a theophany, a manifestation of God which in a certain way was interchangeable with God Himself.

Salvation was to come from God and from the Messias. The coming of the kingdom was in a sense the coming of God Himself, though it also was the kingdom of David, when God should say to David's Son, 'Sit thou at my right hand.'

The mystery of the Incarnation was in no sense revealed before its time, but the Jewish mind through divine Providence was so prepared that when it was revealed, numbers of Jews throughout the world accepted the revelation as the consummation of all previous prophecy, and they could easily follow the reasoning in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, that God, who at sundry times and in divers

manners spake in time past to their fathers by the prophets, had in those last days spoken unto them by a Son, whom He had appointed heir to all things, who being the brightness of His Glory and the express image of His Person, and upholding all things by the word of his power, sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high.

In conclusion we must remark that the exact state of the Jewish mind at the time of the coming of Christ is not easy to ascertain. The great catastrophe which overtook the whole Jewish nation, first in the year 70 A.D., and secondly more completely in 135 A.D., when they were well-nigh exterminated on Palestinian soil, was calamitous also for their literature. Jewish books and writings must have perished in great numbers. It was a time of disaster, of blood and of sorrow, unfavourable to literature. Fragments have remained, because they were embodied in Christian works. Rabbinic literature began to collect the remnants of Jewish literature about 200 A.D., and is mostly concerned with ceremonial and civil law. Another fact must be kept in mind. The very rise of Christianity caused in Jewish circles a recoil from anything which in any way favoured Christian ideas concerning the Messias. Whatever speculations may have been considered permissible before the rise of Christianity, Christianity itself acted as a check amongst Jews to any too great exaltation of the Messias. Trypho the Jew probably portrays the state of mind of the second century correctly when he says that the Messias, even if he is already born and exists somewhere, is somebody unknown, and not even he himself knows himself in any way, nor has he any power until Elias comes to anoint him

and to make him manifest to all. For the Jews of the second century the idea of a superhuman Messias had almost entirely disappeared; this however, does not prove that it had not existed in many Jewish minds three generations earlier. There is ample documentary evidence for the contrary, as we have seen. Jewish absorption in the Law and their aversion to Christianity drove them to narrow down their ideas and leave the idea of the Messias in deliberate obscurity. The light of the World came unto His own, but His own received Him not, and the light passed to us the Gentiles, who follow Jesus the Christ and walk in the noonday of the Glory of God Incarnate. We have seen His Glory as that of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and of truth.

## III.

# THE PREPARATION OF THE GENTILES.

By the Rev. C. C. Martindale, S.J., M.A.

When Our Lord entered this world as man, did His advent as it were crash across the line of human things, disregard or defy what it found, and eliminate the past? Or, did Our Lord in any way interweave His action with the life He found men living, insert Himself into some human current without shock, so that at first sight He might be taken to be just the product of an already ancient history, *until*, having revealed Himself for what He was, we should then be led rather to declare that all history had been but the Introduction to His Life?

What is certain is that He entered into the life of His own land in silence and undetected. Imperceptibly His influence stole forth into His immediate world. He did not cry nor strive. The Baptist indeed had startled the pilgrims to the holy city, when he appeared on a sudden beside the desolate roads, standing on some rock, passionately proclaiming the Coming of the Kingdom. Yet even he was well within the limits of Hebrew tradition; he was but reviving the customs of the prophets. Christ, when He came, placarded no such exceptional austerity and, if He shocked, did so by seeming all too like His fellows. At least His preaching, He might have urged, contained no novelty; the Kingdom and Repentance were the topics that all were prepared to listen to, the normal 'texts.' Thus

upon the great flood of Hebrew tradition Christ as it were was carried into our world; and at the outset there was no ruffle on the waters.

With the Hebrew past, in so far as it prepared men's minds and hearts for the Gospel, another lecture deals.

But what of the rest of the world? Soon enough the Gospel was to pass outside of Palestine. Could it be said to enter that wider world as naturally, as prepared for, as Christ entered Palestine? Or did the Church simply have to disregard, even to eject, what it found upon its path? Had any prophets, any precursors, even unconsciously, made smooth and straight its road?

It is not necessary for me to say a word about remote civilizations like that of China. Very indirectly shall we have to allude to India, though I think the time is coming when Indian philosophies and their influence in the West will be much more carefully attended to than they now are. But on the whole we have to think of the nearer-Asiatic, the Egyptian, the Greek, and the Roman worlds.

In a complete survey of the religious state of the pre-christian world, even of the this-side-India world, so to call it, I could not possibly avoid speaking of Persia and Mesopotamia. But they were not precisely influencing what I may call the Pauline world. Persia presumably had had an effect on Judaism. The religious mind of the Jews developed considerably owing to the eastern exile. It is not for me to discuss how far Judaic theories about angels and surmises as to the population of the spirit-world may have been elaborated in consequence of the very advanced Persian speculations in this field. Nor yet whether the Jewish ideas of the destiny of the soul in the next world may

have been stimulated by Persian notions. When Christianity with its very simple doctrines of the next world, and its beliefs about angels, afterwards reached Persia, it would not have met with resistance on those heads; but elements in Jewish literature that suggest a Persian influence are not substantial ones; and the wildest critic ought not to detect anything in orthodox Jewish belief or in Our Lord's teaching, or in the belief and preaching of the Early Church, that had a Persian origin. The only matter in which Persia can be made to look important for Christianity is the cult of the god Mithra, to which I refer below.

As for Mesopotamian influences from remote Assyrian and Babylonian sources, they too reached Christianity, if at all, through Judaism. Such influences are doubtless discernible in the Old Testament, and even, odd though it may appear, in the Apocalypse of St. John; but I should insist energetically that these influences are verbal, literary, or what may be called plastic. I mean, to take one instance, the great Sea-Monster who figures so frequently in Job, the Psalms, and the Prophets, is a literary figure derived assuredly from Babylonia, though its use implies no more belief in its reality than the word 'Titanic' on our lips involves us in a belief in Titans. And an enormous percentage of the Apocalyptic imagery seems to me undoubtedly Mesopotamian in origin, more or less consciously used by St. John as moulds into which to run his ideas, which he could do even more easily than we, for example, can build a Christian church like the Madeleine at Paris in the shape of a Greek temple, not to mention the London Stock Exchange. The most that we can say, and we gladly say it, for it shows the freedom and flexibility

of the apostle's mind, is, that where a suitable form of expression was to hand, the writer did not disdain to use it, but took it and adapted it to his purpose.

It would have been certainly awkward for an Apostle if he could not find one word, notion, or image familiar to his environment that he too could use. But the idea remains on the whole negative. Babylonian legacies were not quite antagonistic to Christian utilisation; that they were a positive assistance to any Christian does not seem to me likely; that they created anything is demonstrably false.

It is often said that the spread of Christianity was much facilitated by the existence of the Greek language. Four hundred years before the missions of St. Paul, Alexander's conquests had carried the Greek tongue right up to and into India. Even westward, in Roman circles, educated people talked in Greek, and the Church did, as a matter of fact, talk Greek for quite a long time. Well, it is true that there was a more or less general language: but you may say that this constituted a difficulty almost as much as a help, since the Christian dogma was propounded by Our Lord in no Greek manner, and the first apostles could no more think in a Greek way than we are likely to think in, say, an Arab way. A most tremendous effort of translation had to be made.

Not only Christian dogma, then, had to be put into Greek, a difficult task enough, but new ideas had to be put into a language that had no words into which to put them, since, precisely, the ideas were new. I cannot imagine anything more courageous than St. Paul, when he tried to put into Greek, while still thinking in Aramaic, the idea of the supernatural life, unless it be St. John, who not only determined to write

in Greek about the Incarnation, but forcibly took hold of a Greek term, *Logos*, the Word, and far from submitting the Christian dogma to the limits of the Greek notion conveyed by *Logos*, manipulated *Logos* till he made it mean what he intended it should. The Greek language then provided a certain help, in so far as it was everywhere used, but also a hindrance, because it had grown up so as to be able to express certain ideas, which were doubly removed from the apostles' mind, inasmuch as what the apostles were thinking was, first of all Christian, and secondly Oriental.

Again, it is said, the Roman Peace and the Roman roads facilitated the work of Christian missionaries. They could go anywhere within the Empire. Precisely; but it *was* within the Empire. The more the Empire was welded together by Roman institutions, the more it was differentiated from what surrounded it. The harder was it for Christianity to penetrate into anything non-Roman. I may go so far as to say that the Church, even while it gained by having a language that ultimately became so useful as an instrument for expressing her theology, as Greek was, suffers too from her wedlock with Greek thought and phrase: she finds it very hard to explain herself to those who are divorced from these, and among such people, I rank not only all the East, but the modern Englishman. And again, if the Church was much helped by the structure of the Roman Empire, so that her very dioceses coincided soon enough with the 'imperial geography,' as it has been called, and where there was a provincial magistrate, there was a bishop, all the harder did she find it to consolidate herself where there was no such framework.

It may seem almost banal if I say that it was the

greatest help to the Christian religion that it went forth into a *religious* world. The pagan world was religious. It was full, of course, of superstitions, of false ideas about God or false systems of worship. Pagandom was polytheist; its mythologies were crude, contradictory and often obscene; its worship often silly and sometimes cruel. But the fact remains that pagans recognized, even when they scoffed at the popular religions, the fact and need of *religion*; the genuine atheist was as hard to find as he is in England now. In consequence, some sort of worship was always felt as necessary, and again, the gods were held to have at least a kind of presiding interest in ethics. St. Paul is very strong on this. In the very chapter of the letter to the Romans where he describes in searing language the degradation of the pagan world, his point always is that it is a religious world that is thus degraded. He uses the same strong word—*epignosis*—for the knowledge that all men have of God, as he uses for the Christian knowledge in other contexts. What he does catch sight of, with a frightful shudder, is the dying out, here and there, of the very faculty, so to call it, for religion, when the religious sense or intelligence has been too long defied; nay, the dying out of the more delicate human perceptions themselves—he speaks of the cauterized conscience, of the disappearance of kindliness and natural affection, of the slipping from normal sins, so to call them, to sub-human sins. True, the pagan world was not in most of itself like that, any more than the world is to-day. But I ask myself, whether there is not more chance of the post-Christian world becoming like that. Very many American citizens, for example, have spoken to me with real

alarm of the complete atrophy, which they thought they diagnosed in whole layers of their fellow-citizens, of the religious sense itself: religion just meant nothing at all to them. And one may see the same in those whose whole life is taken up, for example, with machinery. It remains, that this appalling problem was not what chiefly confronted the Christian missionary. He came forth with a religion, and all whom he met knew what he was after.

Personally, I hold that the sense of an Ultimate on which you totally depend, with its consequences, a sense of guilt when for some reason or other you conceive yourself to have acted in an insolent and independent way, and the practice of sacrifice, by which I mean the symbolizing of your total personal dependence by the handing over this or that exterior object to That whereon you depend, and the further symbolizing as a rule of the totality and irrevocability of your gift by its destruction—I hold that all this, well established in a nation's mind, is a very good preparation for the preaching of a Creed.

But was there not any element in the actual religions of the pagan world which made a *special* preparation for the actual religion of Christ?

This much improvement, I think, is noticeable in books written on Comparative Religion. Their authors are seeking, far more than they used, to look inwards and to see by what a system of religion lived, and not merely in what it dressed itself. Once upon a time a vast number of small details would here have been accumulated, showing that pagan cults and Christianity expressed themselves in much the same way. A start was usually made from ritual. Look at the lights,

the flowers, the incense round about pagan shrines: at the great fans that wave near Pope and Egyptian images: the shaven Isiac priest, the tonsured monk: the white-robed devotee of half the heathen worship, and Christian surplices. The mitre is seen in Persia, the rosary in Buddhist hands. Art, too, is invoked—look at Christ represented in the form of Orpheus, of Hercules. And the holy books of India and of Persia would be quoted, and sentences practically coincident with phrases from the gospels. And elements in various worships might be offered, singularly calculated to recall Christian dogmas—in Egypt, India, and Babylonia, three divine personages would constantly be found united in one worship; in Asia and again in Egypt, statues of some divine mother with her child would be found, such that it were indeed difficult to be sure whether they represented, say, Isis and her babe Horus, or Mary and her divine Son. Nay, all over the fanatical East, you would find focussing on 25th December the god's birthday, the winter cult of some divine yet human being; and again, as spring came round, a ritual would be performed in which the worshippers were shown the actual death of a youthful god, his bloodthirsty passion, followed at once or after a brief space by his triumphant return from the dead and his exaltation in glory.

A variety of conclusions were at first drawn from all this. That primitive Christianity had got 'overlaid' with pagan rituals: that assimilative Christianity had drawn into itself pagan elements, and had become not so much an affair of layers as a compound: that there had been *no* early Christianity, but that it had from the outset entered the world from an already highly

paganized Judaism, and carried across from it all such items as I have catalogued. Those who rather fought shy of such sweeping statements, and who really had not the nerve to say that Jesus Christ never existed but was an ideal figure of a 'saviour,' and of the same sort as Adonis, Attis, Tammuz, Osiris and the rest of the dying, rising heroes, none the less had to invent some sort of Christianity which they could say was the original germ or nucleus of the great church that later on existed, and they held that Christ was but a demagogue, or a believer in the imminent end of the world, or what not, right up to our own times when He is explained according to the rules of psycho-analysis.

As a matter of fact, students are rapidly giving up basing their theories upon external similarities whether of ritual, or written text, or even mythological incidents. It is realized that you must not, if you want to detect what a movement or general state of mind and feeling is, first dismember it, and then compare and connect the fragments with other fragments similarly obtained from other such cults anywhere, or even adjacent. But perhaps we ought just to indicate why we hold not only that there is, of course, no interconnection between the elements that constituted pagan systems and those that made up Christianity, but why the pagan elements mentioned scarcely, to my mind, even facilitated the spread of Christianity. The real point is, that Christianity for quite a long time felt as its main business the keeping of itself different from everything else, and not till it felt itself perfectly safe and independent did it allow itself to do all those most natural things which pagans also did. I mean, to light lamps round shrines, to decorate them with flowers, to wear festal dress at

worship—all that is natural: even had the Christians done all this at once, we should still have no need to suppose that they copied the pagan ritual unless we could show specific instances; to tell the truth, I have been astonished and almost sorry to notice how little they ever did so, and how altogether not during the time when Christianity was spreading. In a sense the bright, gay naturalism of the pagan cult was a hindrance to Christianity, because Christianity felt it had to deny itself all these cheerful things for the sake of spirituality of worship. No one now ought to suggest that Christians helped themselves to pagan formulas out of pagan books. In any case, one only has to read the pagan literature at a stretch in order to see how fantastic is the idea that Christian literature owes anything at all to it. And frankly, pagan religious books had so little effect on the mass of men that their existence cannot possibly be said to have helped the spread of Christianity. Had it done so, the help ought to have been given to the men who conceivably might read both sets of books, that is, religious philosophers. But these were they who least of any were converted.

As for the doctrines which are supposed to have been enshrined in pagan myth and disseminated by pagan art, like that of a Virgin Mother, I would say that in dealing with Christianity, anything you can take back to a Palestinian source ought so to be taken back, and that the story of the Virgin Birth is as rooted in Palestinian tradition, that is, in the Synoptists, as anything well can be, while the pagan goddess-mothers or human mothers who gave birth to semi-divine heroes were far from being thought of by the ordinary pagan as virgins. Indeed, a writer like Plutarch,

who beautifies and spiritualizes all the myths he touches, and makes a quite wonderfully sublime yet tender picture of the *universal* motherhood of, say, Isis, oddly enough does not work up what lay so ready to his hand, the human tale of her giving birth to Horus. And as for art, really there was but one way of drawing a mother with a baby in her arms, and the odd thing is that there is so little similarity, rather than so much, between the Catacombs or Oriental madonnas and the pagan mother-goddesses. Last of all, as for the tales of slain yet re-living gods, like Attis, the first thing about them is, that no one thought that these symbols of the dying year and springing corn were historical persons, while the first element in the Christian story is its historicity. The element of nature-cult was inwoven with the very essence of the pagan rituals, while not the remotest trace of any such thing is to be found in the Christian one. Finally, no element of ethic is to be found in the pagan ones. Let us say frankly that a Christian, far from feeling himself 'helped' by the existence of such cults, would have felt disgusted beyond words by them; while the pagan who might be anxious to become a Christian would be far more repelled by any element in Christianity that reminded him of this particular sort of worship, than attracted by it.

Was there really then nothing in the pagan world which can be supposed to have made things easier for the Christian missionary? I must still answer, that what made the Christian's path smoother in some ways, made it harder in others; still, there existed three sorts of facts especially, all of them interconnected, which did perhaps obtain for Christianity a hearing where else it might never have found one. These were;

Philosophy, Theosophy, and what I may term Sacramental Magic.

Greek philosophy had always aimed at discovering the ultimate nature of things and the originating cause of the universe. Most such philosophy had been, or became, materialist. By the time of the Christian era, philosophy as such had gone downhill again towards the materialistic, and further than during an intermediate era that I need not discuss. With this difference, that especially in the West, Stoicism, for example, used so much human metaphor in which to state its conclusions, that to listen to a Stoic preaching you really would have thought that he believed about God just what Christians do. But what Stoicism and practically all systems of contemporary philosophy could not cease talking of just then, was the *Logos*, or Word. This term must have been as frequently on men's lips in that time as 'evolution' is on ours, and its meaning was scarcely more defined. But in some shape or another the doctrine of the *Logos* implied that the eternal Thought, while remaining Itself, yet expressed Itself, wholly in the Universe, partly in all that was at all. The Mind of God could manifest itself in limited conditions, could descend into the world, which indeed apart from It had no meaning and no true existence. Even the Jews of Alexandria had listened to this doctrine, and made much use of it in explaining the Old Testament. In many ways, the doctrine as of the Stoics, so of the Alexandrian Jews, differed from what Christianity was bound to teach: there was no real question of an Only-Begotten Son of God taking up human nature and so conjoining it to His Divine Nature as to make one Person. But you

cannot fail to see how easily a Christian philosopher might talk with such pagans or such Jews, and it was in this way that St. John in his gospel did indeed begin to talk. Not, as I said above, that he adapted Christianity to pagan philosophy, even the sublimest, nor sought to 'state' his creed 'in terms of modern thought,' as they love to say nowadays: but looking upon philosophy he saw in it elements that he need not despise, picked them up and said: 'In my preaching you will find the Truth to which your surmises are indeed approximating: the real meaning of your *Logos* is'— and the doctrine of the Incarnation followed. The existence and spiritual nature of God, His eternity, infinity, unicity, immensity, immutability, and our consequent duty of a spiritual cult, could then quite easily be deduced from admissions of most pagan philosophers, even in spite of themselves; and the doctrine of the *Logos* was of a true service, even though it offered every opportunity for downright mistakes or awkward ambiguities. Some of these, Christian Fathers like St. Justin, the first apologist, a gentle, friendly-minded man, eager to see the very best in pagan thought, did not wholly avoid. We may frankly say that without the current philosophies, it is hard to see how Christianity would have begun to speak with the educated classes of the Empire, and the amount of Catholic philosophy that in some substantial sense is the heir of Greek philosophy is enormous. Yet even here I must repeat that the very interwovenness of the Greek philosophical mind with our own, has made it almost impossible for us to talk to the Brahman, the Buddhist or the Sufi.

But at this time, notably in Egypt and to a less

degree in Greece, religious-minded men who had despaired of metaphysics were seeking to reach the Divine, the Ultimate, the One, by ecstacy, not reasoning. Mysticism, as we should loosely call it, should replace, in the long run, philosophy. Variants of the great Egyptian schools existed, too, in Syria. And at the back of all this stretched, I am ready to believe, the immemorial meditations of the Hindu. Frankly, Greek-speaking philosophers who pilgrimaged to the East did not seem on their return to have made much of what they met: the Hindu, like the Egyptian, though perhaps for profounder reasons, thought the Greek but a clever child. And I feel no conviction that the trade that came freely, we seem to be learning, from the Orient by Persia into Syria, was likely to be a good vehicle for the deepest musings of the Brahman. Self-contained China made no contribution to all this. But from Pythagoras himself and the Orphics down to the Gnostics and the Neo-platonists and many another, the same desire was expressing itself—to reach the Ultimate Reality and to mate with it, to effect a union beyond that of will and reason; and along with all this, at one end (so to say) of the scale, to construct a philosophy of Being that should serve to support the whole spiritual quest, and at the other, an asceticism that should keep the body and all that belonged to it in its proper place. Such philosophers, such ascetics, were often willing to use the myths of any religion that might be found attractive, allegorize them, and make them all mean the same thing in the end, since Truth was one, and no religion could do more than interpret it more or less successfully to the limited, departmental mind. Hence allied to these lofty

speculations came into existence a sort of fusion of religions that might be called a religion, a kind of vague pantheism, perfectly tolerant, and usually finding that the Sun was the best symbol it could use under which to convey its universal doctrines. You may see at once how Christianity might have found in the souls who were inclined for this sort of doctrine admirable stuff for conversion, and also why, precisely because Christianity was so exclusivist, among such mystics it found its most definite and relentless enemies.

Let me add in parenthesis—You may be saying here, 'But was it not the State—Caesar—that persecuted Christianity?' Yes: but from an allied cause. That Roman Empire which might so well have helped Christianity to spread, and into whose framework the Christian Church, once it conquered, did indeed fit itself, had to persecute the Faith for the same reason—that Christianity was exclusivist and would not render its homage to that State above which there was to be nothing, but within which there was room for everything that did not refuse equal rights to every other thing. And the persecutions really became thought-out and universal when at last the religion of the State was able to express itself adequately in terms of that Pantheism (so to call it), whereof the completest symbol in the heavens was the Sun, and the concrete image upon the earth, was Caesar.

The last feature in the religious world when Christianity invaded it was what I called Sacramentalism. Briefly, simple and sober religions like the Roman and the Persian, and even the native Greek forms of belief and worship, stressed always the present world. In it behaviour mattered, and there reward or punishment

might be expected. But strongly, I surmise, under Eastern influences even from the outset, certainly about the time of the Christian era, ideas of personal guilt became commoner and more vivid, and the destiny of the soul was seen as merely begun in this world, and a heaven, hell, and purgatory awaited it in the next. To ensure the first, avoid the second, abbreviate and mitigate the third, methods of initiation were devised, and what were called 'mysteries' were developed. Initiates, who formed an inner and most secretive group, were in specially good case with regard to the perils and sufferings to be experienced hereafter. These mysteries included, I expect always, a sort of miracle-play in which the history of that god or goddess was rehearsed by whose special grace you were to be saved. In the course of initiation, you were usually admitted to a mysterious meal, and underwent ritual purification in a sacred bath, and fasted, prayed, and perhaps experienced emotions such that an indelible mark was left upon the imagination; a complex (we might now say) was created in the mind, almost a psychic lesion. Such were mysteries of Isis and perhaps of Mithra. They *can* so be described as to seem practically identical with the Christian doctrine and most definitely sacramental worship. There was (we are told) a 'baptism'; a Eucharist wherein you fed upon the god and identified yourself with him. There was a clergy, a hierarchy, even a Pope. There was an elaborate ritual and a lofty ethic, involving purity and fraternal union. Whereas it used once to be said that the Church had accumulated her sacramental worship and theology in the Middle Ages, it is now the custom to recognize all this in her from at least Pauline times, only it is St. Paul who is

supposed to have filched from his pagan environment the material for this complete transformation, as of Christianity, so of Christ Himself. Each one of these exorbitant claims could, in a special paper, be separately criticized. I can here but sum up what I hold about Mystery religions. Nothing is known of Mithraism in particular to warrant our bringing it into connection with Christianity, nor even for holding that there was very much in it. Other mystery cults were in a worse position: they had a bad repute: there were affairs of an *élite*, not of the whole social group like Christianity: they taught no special doctrine and affected the nerves rather than the mind: they were magical, producing a mechanical effect in the initiate, and not religious properly speaking. And in all this they were the exact opposite of Christianity. There is nothing in Paul's language or ideas to connect him with mystery cults, but the opposite, and there are solid links connecting him with the other apostles, with Our Lord, and with the Jewish past. And there is in him a firm and articulated doctrine which owes nothing to any kind of paganism. In a word, I should say that there was on the Christian side and from the beginning so fierce a hatred for all that the mysteries in the concrete stood for, that mystery-adepts themselves, ready enough till they knew what Christianity was to give it a welcome, soon enough became its equally fierce opponents.

Must I then say (with satisfaction perhaps) that there was nothing in the pagan world that made any human, natural preparation for Christianity? And regretfully, that there are no traces of any divine preparation for Christ's Faith? For were we to be able to show that everything naturally conspired to make Christianity

a success, we should be less inclined to admire in it any special revelation of God: yet, were we unable to see any trace of divine preparation for it, we should half feel that God had not taken that tender care of His children that we should have expected from so dear a Father: and again, we should feel somehow, dare I say, that the intrusion of even so great a gift as Christianity into a world quite alien to it, the cramming of bread into mouths in no way hungry, this flashing of a light into eyes utterly un-attuned to anything save the dark, had something inartistic, unkind, unlike the delicacy and considerateness of God about it, unlike, at any rate, the coming of Christ Himself.

St. Paul held that part of the function of the Law was to show those who should have obeyed it that they could not: it signed its own death-warrant by driving its would-be votaries to something beyond itself, namely Christ. In the varied world of paganism, I seem to see something of the same sort—that every desire was operative which Christianity was destined some day to satisfy, and that every desire was cheated. Every experiment had been tried, and no experiment led to anything. The mind had applied itself with incredible energy to the tremendous problems and challenges of life, and had weakened; and the soul had taken great leaps into the dark of mysticism and had found that it fell back upon the pavement of the commonplace, into the brambles of charlatanry, and into the mire of sensuality. Certainly, in the world into which Christianity was first to penetrate, all this had at last, you may think, reached some sort of finish. Really the circle had swung full sweep: there was nothing left to be done. Then Christianity came, with

its appeal to world-old history, its sympathy with instinct and with sense, its fearlessness when bidden to think about its doctrines, and its bold picking up, refashioning and wielding of the best in all philosophy, and with its sublime insistence upon grace and the supernatural. There at any rate was the great new factor—Grace, that was at once an object and a gift of revelation, and also the means of appropriating and working out in the soul and in the world the whole of revelation. And all this, in no abstract scheme, no magical formulary, no myth nor allegory, but concentrated in the Person of Him who in His one self reached from end to end, and wedded man with God.

All then that Christianity wanted to use, it found present and active in the human nature it encountered, and nothing of what was there present and asking for succour, did Christianity despise. 'Just as little children,' wrote the pagan Dio Chrysostom, 'bereft of father or mother and longing terribly for them and missing them, oftentimes in dreams stretch out their hands to them that are not there, even so do men unto the gods.' Humanity was doing that: 'My soul hath thirsted for Thee, yea, and my very flesh, ah, in how many ways!' Its asking met with no refusal: its search was not foredoomed to failure: to its knock, a door was opened. And for our age, in which men are so feverishly asking anew those questions, risking the same perils and the same despairs, then is no other door, no other answer, and the gift is the selfsame Christ.

## IV.

# THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS.

By the Rev. Hugh Pope, O.P., S.T.M., Doct. S. Script.

There is a traditional portraiture of Christ with which all are familiar; it is that of sacred pictures and of devotion. Is this portrait really based upon the Gospels? We are not, of course, speaking of the actual lineaments of Our Blessed Lord, rather of that mental picture all have formed of Him, whether as a Child in His Mother's arms, as a Boy at the carpenter's bench, as a Man weary and emaciated with the labour of His ministry, as a reputed criminal dying in His prime on a cross, and finally as very God rising from the tomb and ascending into heaven, whence He shall come to judge the living and the dead. Is this a true picture? Or is it pure fancy—a product of devotion rather than of history?

The devout Catholic, for whom careful study of the Gospels may be a practical impossibility, can of course reply: 'I know it is true because the Church so teaches': and that in the last resort is the only final answer. But it remains true that the Church could not so teach unless her doctrine were legitimately derived from the Gospels. Hence to the question proposed we can reply by saying that it must be a true picture based upon the Gospels, else the Church would not so teach. But leaving the realm of faith, putting aside for the nonce all authority outside the Gospel narrative: is the Christ of our devotions the Christ of history? And by history we mean the Evangelists' narrative, the historicity of

which we here assume. Is it a fact that the Christ of Catholic piety emerges as a matter of course from a study of the Four Gospels? Those who have had to peruse recent literature dealing with the character, person and nature of Christ cannot have failed to notice certain very disquieting features. In the first place there seems to be an over-emphasis of the human nature of Christ so that at times no room seems left for His Godhead; at other times, while emphasizing the fact that Christ was a man, His manhood seems to be of such a transcendent type that it is hardly recognizable as manhood at all, indeed we almost have an apotheosis, the Man becomes God! Again, while the Divinity of Christ is insisted on in words it is negatived in fact, since it is reduced to a Sonship of adoption which, by the very nature of the case precludes a Sonship, in nature. When we cast about for some explanation of views so incompatible with Catholic teaching, we generally find that their patrons are convinced that the Fourth Gospel, that of St. John, is at variance with the Synoptics, Matthew, Mark and Luke, in the picture it presents us of Christ, and further that it is almost certainly not by John the son of Zebedee. This supposed conflict can hardly be better set out than in the words of Loisy, who may be termed 'the father' of modernistic teaching on the person of Christ. For him the divergence between the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptic narrative on this point was complete; he states it schematically as follows:[1]

| *The Synoptist narrative.* | *The Fourth Gospel narrative.* |
|---|---|
| 1. Practically 'points for preachers.' | 1. A carefully planned mystical treatment of the Gospel story. |

[1] *Autour d'un Petit Livre*, pp. 90–92.

| *The Synoptist narrative.* | *The Fourth Gospel narrative.* |
| --- | --- |
| 2. Depicts Christ the man. | 2. Christ is a transcendental Being who moves automatically to His goal, and with a foreknowledge of His 'hour.' |
| 3. He begins in Galilee and is apparently unconscious of His mission. | 3. Alternately in Galilee and Judaea. |
| 4. He preaches the near approach of the 'Kingdom.' | 4. His teaching is amazing and difficult. |
| 5. He draws crowds to whom He is always compassionate. | 5. Is an isolated and unintelligible figure. |
| 6. He is surrounded by sinners, Pharisees, publicans, lepers, etc. | 6. They are notably absent. |
| 7. Miracles abound. | 7. Miracles are few; none are given without an ulterior object. |
| 8. Regular and intimate intercourse with His disciples. | 8. Only at the Last Supper. |
| 9. He criticizes the Law and the Traditions. | 9. Practically never. |
| 10. His idea of the 'Kingdom' is repudiated by the people. | 10. It is never mentioned. |
| 11. Reiterated moral teaching by parables. | 11. No moral teaching and no parables. |
| 12. The question of His Divinity is avoided. | 12. It is reiterated on every possible occasion. |
| 13. He at length reaches Jerusalem. | 13. He goes there repeatedly. |
| 14. He is treated as a political agitator. | 14. He dominates Annas and Pilate. |
| 15. His glory only appears with His resurrection. | 15. His Cross is His throne. |
| 16. The crisis develops naturally. | 16. His acts are chosen by Himself as fulfilments of prophecy. |

We do not propose to make a detailed examination of this very one-sided picture. Its very exaggerations shew how unfair it is. Yet the picture is substantially correct; in the Fourth Gospel we are in a totally different atmosphere, for the simple reason that we are listening to one who is writing seventy years after Christ's

Ascension, who is looking back down the vista of years, who has seen not only the Christ of God but His Church, and has watched more than one crisis, more than one heresy arise. There is, however, the negative aspect of the question; is it true that the Synoptic Gospels present so inadequate a picture of the Divinity of Christ, one so fundamentally different from that given by St. John? If so, it might reasonably be argued that St. John shews us a growth in the idea of Christ's real nature, and that consequently not his picture but that furnished by the Synoptics is the truly historical one.

In the first place the incompleteness of the Synoptic Gospels must be acknowledged. Only Matthew and Luke, for example, give the story of the Infancy of Christ; Matthew omits the Ascension; both he and Mark have but brief accounts of the trans-Jordanic ministry, whereas Luke devotes a long section to it. All three omit the discourse on the Holy Eucharist after the multiplication of the loaves; to St. John alone are we indebted for it as well as for the story of Lazarus, which antecedently we should have expected all to give. Yet despite this incompleteness, each Evangelist must have thought he was fully meeting the needs of his readers. The truth of course is that each had a definite purpose in writing, and that consequently each had certain principles of selection in harmony with the end he had in view. The incompleteness is not due to inadequate knowledge, but simply to the fact that none intended to write a biography of Christ, but to portray some particular features in His life. It is this fact that makes the fourfold picture so marvellous: it is so brief as almost to be 'sketchy,' so full of detail that the portrait seems to have been stippled in, so

utterly simple that it defies analysis, so profound that analysis is compelling, and withal so perfect that it is undying.

Fully to understand, then, the Synoptic portrait of Christ we must grasp the purpose Matthew, Mark and Luke had in writing. The symbols of the Man, the Lion and the Calf—derived from Ezechiel's vision—express very clearly the picture each had in mind. To Matthew is generally assigned the symbol of 'the Man,' because he dwells so insistently on the Human nature of Christ; to Mark that of 'the Lion,' since he depicts the Regal character of Christ; to Luke that of 'the Calf,' because for him Christ is peculiarly the Priest who offers sacrifice. Nor can we afford to lose sight of the personality and individuality of the Evangelists. St. Matthew was an apostle, a Hebrew, a man of affairs, an eye-witness of what he narrates; moreover he wrote for his fellow-countrymen, to whom he would prove that Jesus of Nazareth was the long-expected Messias. Neither Mark nor Luke were Apostles, nor were they eye-witnesses. They stood respectively for SS. Peter and Paul whose companions they had been. As Papias has told us, Mark simply set down what St. Peter preached. Hence the vividness so characteristic of his Gospel, hence the impression that he sees what he narrates. With Luke it is quite different. He neither saw nor heard the Christ; he was a stranger to the land and its people. But, steeped in the spirit of St. Paul, who had seen Him in vision and who could say that he had the mind of Christ, he was a most diligent gatherer of fragments, and spent the two years of the Apostle's imprisonment at Caesarea in collecting details of Christ's ministry.

Thus the three Synoptic narratives are really portraits by Matthew, Peter and Paul, portraits which owe their individuality to the natural prepossessions of these three. Hence dissimilarity of presentment and of style, hence peculiar features which each offers and without which our portrait of Christ would be lacking in essentials.

But side by side with this individuality is the amazing similarity of the three narratives. All three run on the same traditional lines: the Galilaean ministry, the arrival in Judaea, the final week—with the tragedy of Calvary, and then the Resurrection.[1] Nor is the similarity confined to these broad outlines. To an extraordinary extent each tells the same story in the same words; they give the same miracles and parables, and in the same order.[2] If one omits, it is not simply an incident but a whole series of connected incidents;[3] if one adds, it is an entire block;[4] all three would, on a cursory reading, lead one to suppose that the entire Ministry occupied but one year.[5] The problem thus presented is of course that known as 'the Synoptic problem,' which we cannot now discuss and which is concerned rather with their similarity than their dissimilarity. Whence their mutual dependence? Proto-Matthew and proto-Mark have had their day; now it is the day of proto-Luke.[6] The unravelling of the problem does not concern us so much as the fact of

[1] Cp. Acts x. 37–41.
[2] Cp. Matt. xvi–xviii. 5; Mark viii–ix; Luke ix.
[3] Cp. Luke ix. 17 with Matt. xiv. 22–xvi. 12 and Mark vi. 46–viii. 26.
[4] Luke ix. 51–xix. 28.
[5] Eusebius, *H.E.* III. xxiv.
[6] Streeter, *The Four Gospels*, 1924.

its existence. There did exist from the outset a primitive portrait which each has preserved, despite individual methods of handling the material. What was that portrait? Was it different from that presented by St. John, or from that which has now become traditional? In other words; has the portrait of Christ preserved by devotion and piety got its roots in the Synoptic narrative or is it something which has insensibly grown and which those original painters would not recognize?

This traditional portrait may for convenience sake be identified with that left us by St. John. What is it? A Man who is in a sense a transcendent Being, who speaks of Himself as 'the Light of the world,' as very God, who receives unhesitatingly the homage offered Him,[1] who moves serenely through the warring elements around Him,[2] who apparently holds them all in the hollow of His hand, who—in the prophet's words—is 'offered because Himself willed it,' who lays down His life when and where He chooses,[3] who speaks plainly of His ministry and of His descent from heaven,[4] who has deep human affections,[5] is weary and tired,[6] who mixes with the people and takes part in their joys,[7] who discourses most sublimely of eternal truths with which He is perfectly familiar, whose Cross even is His pulpit, whose death His glory, who knows the human heart—nay the inmost thoughts of men[8]—even as He knows the future, with absolute certainty,[9] who declares that He is consubstantial with the Father,[10] while at the same time He does not shrink from the seeming paradox that the Father is greater than He,[11]

[1] John xiii. 13. [2] vii. 28, x. 19–25. [3] x. 15–18. [4] vi. 51, xvi. 17–28. [5] xi. 36. [6] iv. 6. [7] ii. 1–11. [8] ii. 24. [9] xvi. *passim*. [10] x. 30. [11] xiv. 28.

who in fine is 'God of God, Light of Light,' pre-existent to this world.[1]

Do the Synoptists give us a different picture? Each of them, as we have seen, fills in his picture from a different angle: with one He is the Messias, with another the King and wonderworker, with another the Priest and victim. Yet no one of them has a monopoly of these features. For all three He is the Christ or Messias, the King who has established a new Kingdom which is to last for all time,[2] for all of them He is 'very God of very God.' As this latter point is really the whole question at issue, we will focus our attention on it. Two of them tell of His virginal birth and His conception 'of the Holy Spirit.' At His baptism the Father's voice declares 'This is My beloved Son'; the devil himself says: 'If thou be the Son of God,' and though the challenge is not taken up the claim is not denied. In fact it is always so with the evil spirits, they know Him for what He really is—God's own Son.[3] If John portrays Him as speaking with amazing familiarity of the Father, it is the same with the Synoptists, who describe Him as knowing all about the Father, His will and His purpose.[4] How significant the fact that never does He speak of '*our* Father' but always of 'your Father' or 'My Father.' Calmly and authoritatively He claims to be greater than Moses,[5] Solomon,[6] Jonas[7] and the Temple[8] itself. He forgives sins by His own power[9] and—what is more—He delegates His power.[10] Similarly He cures by His own power and casts out evil spirits, yet again He delegates that power

[1] John viii. 58, xvii. 5. [2] Matt. xvi. 16–18, xxviii. 19–20. [3] iv. 6: viii. 29: xiv. 33: xvi. 16. [4] vi. 8, 14, 18, 26: x. 29: xii. 50. [5] v. 28, 32, 34, 44. [6] xii. 42. [7] xii. 41. [8] xii. 6. [9] ix. 5–6. [10] xvi. 18: xviii. 18.

as being His own and not merely a power He has received.[1] If in John we find Him saying, 'Before Abraham was—I am,' it is the same with the Synoptic narrative: 'I saw Satan like lightning falling from heaven.'[2]

The Angels are His,[3] He has power over Hell[4] and over nature,[5] and is the Lord of the Sabbath[6]—God's own peculiar institution. He has 'come' into this world of His own power,[7] yet also is He 'sent';[8] and just as He came by His own power, so will He come again to judge this world. He is 'the Bridegroom' of prophecy,[9] and as such He demands from men a personal love and devotion transcending all human affections.

This Synoptic portrait is, we maintain, identical with that furnished by St. John, with that cherished by Christian piety. It is urged, however, that the Synoptists indicate a reticence in Christ's statements about Himself which is notably absent from the Fourth Gospel. Yet what else was to be expected? Matthew, Mark and Luke were preoccupied with Christ's human nature, precisely because they wrote when that Sacred Humanity was but a recent memory; for them Christ was but the natural outcome of the Law, the Prophets and the Synagogue. John wrote when seventy years had elapsed since Christ's Ascension into heaven. And is it quite true that the Christ of the Synoptic narrative is so reticent? Such passages as 'Come to Me all ye that labour . . .'[10] and 'I confess to Thee, O Father . . .'[11] *etc.*, are so Johannine in tone that many who are not

[1] Matt. x. 1. [2] Luke x. 18. [3] Matt. xiii. 41. [4] xvi. 18. [5] xvii. 26. [6] xii. 8. [7] *e.g.* viii. 7, 15: ix. 22, 29, 33, 35: xiv. 32. [8] xv. 24. [9] ix. 15: cp. Ps. xliv. [10] xi. 29. [11] xi. 25: Luke x. 21.

deeply versed in the Gospels might instinctively attribute them to the Fourth Gospel. There does, however, remain the fact that the parabolic teaching so characteristic of the Synoptic Gospels is conspicuously absent from the Fourth. Yet the answer seems to be the same: they present the Christ veiled, because yet present among men and demanding faith despite appearances; John presents Him as stripped of the veil of His flesh, as 'the Light of the world,' precisely because not only had He proved His Godhead, but the subsequent march of events had made that claim even more convincingly true.

V.

# THE GOSPEL OF SAINT JOHN.

By the Rev. C. C. Martindale, S.J., M.A.

The subject of this paper is, strictly speaking, the Doctrine of the Incarnation in the Fourth Gospel. I have, then, no direct duty over and above trying to set that forth, and need not say anything at all about questions like: Did St. John write the Fourth Gospel? did someone else, though also named John? when was it written? has the document a historical value? does its doctrine coincide with that of the Synoptic gospels or of St. Paul? and so forth. All I need really ask is, what is taught in this document?

But it is clear that the character of the doctrine it contains has much added interest and value if the gospel be indeed by the Beloved Disciple of our Lord; if it do indeed correspond with what the other New Testament authors taught; and if the incidents narrated in the Fourth Gospel be as historical as those told by the synoptists. And according as we take one view rather than another of the method of writing used by the author, we shall be actually justified in detecting more, or less, *doctrine* in what he writes.

Therefore I make a few preliminary remarks which will, I hope, be of service, and will anyhow eliminate all chance of any misunderstanding.

I hold that, even by itself, external tradition makes it morally certain that John, son of Zebedee and the Beloved Disciple of our Lord, was the author of the

Fourth Gospel. I hold further that all the internal evidence assists this tradition—even, I make bold to say, the kind of Greek in which it is written: for while patently quite different in many ways from the Greek of, say, the Apocalypse, it yet has just those very subtle points of identity with it which could not possibly result from imitation. Add to which, the warp both of expression and of thought is so thoroughly Aramaic, that the late Prof. Burney has strongly argued that the gospel was originally written by John in Aramaic, and earliest of the four, and that what we possess is a translation. But there is no tradition to support this theory. I cannot then but hold that while John was indeed the author, he composed his gospel when he was very old; roughly about 100 A.D. To an extent that we cannot estimate, his disciples may have helped the aged apostle to write the document and to adapt the Greek to suit the audience for whom it was intended; but first, I have not the least difficulty in allowing that the same man may have written two very different Greeks, and second, whatever these disciples did, amounted to no personal reconstruction of the apostle's own work. In a word, though it was held that Mark simply wrote down Peter's ordinary teaching, yet the second gospel is and always has been called, 'according to Mark': the Fourth Gospel is *not* the work of secretaries to an extent such as to warrant it being called, 'according to the Disciples of John.'

More important, perhaps: I hold, not only that the episodes narrated therein were historical occurrences, but that John's whole point would be lost were they not. For he presents them, not as fictions amiably illustrating a doctrine, but as facts containing, preparing

for, and guaranteeing doctrine. Thus the cure of the paralytic, the raising of Lazarus, are works on account of which we are encouraged to believe the doctrine of the New Life, as I shall say: the multiplication of loaves sanctions the proclamation of the doctrine of the Eucharist: the cure of the blind man, that of the True Light, and so forth. If we had been excusable for rejecting the mere preached doctrine of Jesus, we are so no more, Our Lord Himself declares, once we have seen His works (John v. 36: x. 25, 38: xv. 24). If the works are fiction, He appeals to a fiction—in fact, the appeal has no meaning whatsoever. John therefore relates historical happenings, but he chooses and orders them in view of the supporting and instilling of a doctrine. This is so definitely true, that we are thereupon warranted in looking for a doctrine led up to, and pressed upon us by, each event narrated, which, had John not used this method, might have seemed mere isolated facts, like the miracle of Cana, or the charge given to St. Peter. As for the discourses, we despair of a criticism that cannot distinguish between those in the Fourth Gospel, and those which an anonymous apocalyptic writer, for example, may put into the mouth of some long-dead hero, like Enoch. John manifestly offers the discourses as spoken by Jesus, and as having their whole value because they were spoken by Him. Does this mean that they were, so to speak, taken down by a stenographer and reproduced *verbatim*? Of course not. The midnight talk with Nicodemus lasted no mere five minutes: yet it scarcely takes so long to read it: the sermon on the Bread of Life occupies but a page or two of our New Testaments. Clearly, the gist of the discourse is given, and that,

not haphazard, but in a manner calculated to ensure our obtaining precisely the real point of the discourse. And if, throughout, the apostle uses a vocabulary and turns of phrases that he prefers and is accustomed to, that does not in the least prevent the discourse being genuinely Christ's and not a mere invention. Were I, in five minutes, to explain to you what Father Pope said this morning, I should obviously abbreviate, omit much, insist on and put in vivid prominence the essential, quote him verbally here and there, and express the remainder in language such as is at my habitual disposal.

I hold then that John, son of Zebedee, the Beloved Disciple, composed in his old age a dogmatic gospel, in which historical events are accurately related for the sake of a doctrine, a doctrine intended also to be gathered from discourses authentically Christ's. The point now is, what *is* that doctrine?

St. John himself tells us (John xx. 31) why he wrote his gospel:

> These things have been written that you may believe
> That Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God;
> And that, believing,
> You may have Life in His name.

His intention therefore is double—first, that we should 'believe,' and second, that we should appropriate the consequences of that belief. Were this a paper on Grace or the Supernatural Life, I should select and emphasize what concerned this practical appropriation of Christ and all that He offers. As it is, I must insist on the doctrine contained in the words, 'the Christ, the Son of God.' And not till we have looked at the

rest of the gospel shall I comment on the Preface—'In the beginning existed the Word,' and what follows. That really is like the overture to some magnificent opera, that uses and weaves together the motifs that recur later in the music, and cannot be fully appreciated till they have been heard and learned separately. Yet so intricately is every part of this gospel interknit with what precedes and follows, that this division is hard to make. None the less, for practical purposes we can begin with verse 19 of chap. I, the witness of the Baptist.

In four great scenes a transference is set before us—a change from one mighty dispensation, that of the Old Testament, in which the preaching of the Baptist was a climax, to something new and utterly transcendent.

'Are you the Messiah?' asked the representatives of the Jewish Church from the enigmatic prophet. And to this, he answered unambiguously, No. He was but a Voice, a Herald. One was to follow him—nay, He was even then, invisibly, among them: and His was a dignity such that the Baptist, than whom no prophet, Christ Himself was to say, had been born greater, was not worthy to perform for Him the humblest office.

Again, the Baptist is shown, seeing this time, Jesus Himself walking among the crowd. 'That is He,' he cries. 'There is He of whom I spoke! God's Lamb who takes away the sin of the whole world! On Him I have seen the appointed sign imposed: the Spirit resting upon Him—that Spirit with which He henceforward shall baptize! Yes, I have seen, and I bear witness that *this* is the Son of God!' Mysterious title, that still needed interpretation, but significant

here at least of the unique election and consecration and vocation of this Jesus.

Forthwith a transference, as I said, begins. Two of the Baptist's disciples detach themselves, and join Jesus. And these summon others—'We have found the Messias!'

And finally, Jesus acts for Himself, and calls Nathanael. He startles him by a miracle into the cry—'Master—Thou art the Son of God—Thou art the king of Israel'—and He forthwith uses, as will be His wont, that miracle for something better: 'Because I said, I saw thee underneath the fig-tree, dost thou believe? Greater than that shalt thou see.' The time should come when through the opening heavens the Christ should be perceived, the centre of the ministry of God's angels (cf. the angels of Jacob's vision, Gen. xxviii. 12, 'ascending and descending' between heaven and earth by the stair that linked them).

Even now the Evangelist moves slowly. In two more great scenes he shows us how Jesus changes the water that sufficed 'for the purification of the Jews' into that 'good wine' that had been 'kept until now.' As far richer as good wine was than insipid water, so was what He, by His coming, could offer, than the best that man hitherto had possessed. And in the scene that follows at once, the cleansing of the Temple, culminating in the mysterious hint that if 'this temple' be destroyed, in three days He would raise it up, the Jews, true to their habit, exemplified again and again in this gospel, take the material, concrete view of Our Lord's meaning; but the disciples—though not till long afterwards, after the resurrection—realized that He was speaking of Himself, in whom 'the plenitude

of the Divinity corporally dwelt' (Col. ii. 9). That which He was to offer, as replacing the Temple which was for a Jew the localization, all-but very incarnation of the true religion, was His own Self.

Now John enters fully into the sphere of revealed and supernatural dogma. Nicodemus comes to Jesus. The night wind breathing round them, he hears from Our Lord the doctrine of the new and supernatural birth to be given to mankind. The 'Master in Israel,' as the old man was named, could not grasp what was meant. And Our Lord sighs. The Law, the Prophets, the Baptist, His own public preaching, the thousand years of preparation, had not sufficed to teach the Jews even those 'things of earth' whereof Christ's ordinary doctrine was composed. How then, when He declared these heavenly things, and the supernatural contents of the Faith, should they believe? Yet indeed He was but telling, as all good witnesses must, what He had seen, what He knew: and 'No man hath scaled the heavens' so as to bring down God's secret; yet it has been brought down, but by Him only who Himself 'came down from heaven, the Son of Man whose existence is in Heaven.' God, made man, and thus the world's Messiah, He hath declared it!

And John proceeds, in anguish, you would say, to insist that although God has so loved the world as to give over His Sole-Begotten for the world's sake, men would have none of Him. Or rather, the world forthwith fell into two divisions—those who accepted and were saved by Jesus, and the tragic category of the Rejectors, those who preferred the Dark and condemnation.

I would wish to linger over the little comments with

which John concludes each of these sections, like that in which at the end of the following episode he repeats just what he has said here—that He alone who comes down out of heaven has seen and can bear adequate witness to that vision, that is, to divine Truth. At best the Baptist had been but the 'friend' of the Bridegroom; and now he abdicated, as it were, and gave this Bride that the Chosen People should have been, and that all souls of men were called to be, into the hand of the one and only Lover. Henceforward, all the Old must dwindle, and the New increase. 'All things' the Father has put into the hands of the Son of His Love.

In the story that follows that of the Samaritan woman, the doctrine of the Supernatural Life is carried forward, and the Messiahship of Jesus reaffirmed.

We have now seen that Jesus offers to the world a New Gift, a Breath of Life, a Water of Life, springing up constantly within the faithful soul into an Eternal Life. He now teaches that this is given by means of a vital union with Himself. He can give it because He has it: He has it because He *is* it. He restores the paralytic, as we say, to life (chap. v.), and forthwith insists that 'greater things than *these* shall be shown, that then indeed ye may marvel!'

'For even as the Father maketh alive, so the Son too, whom He wills, them maketh He alive . . For even as the Father hath Life in Himself, so to the Son too, hath He given to have Life in Himself.'

And at the hour of the supreme miracle, this declaration completes itself. Lazarus dies. Jesus meets his sister. 'If Thou hadst been here, my brother had not died. Even now, I know that whatsoever Thou shalt

ask of God, He will give it Thee.' 'Thy brother shall rise again.' She, still in the realm of earthly things, the current doctrines of *revival* from the dead, answers that she knows he will rise again at the Last Day, and elicits thus the tremendous identification—

I AM
The Resurrection and the Life:
He that believeth in Me, though he die,
Shall live;
And all who live and believe in Me
Shall never die.

The Life, then, is no third thing merely, given as by one to another: it *is* Jesus, giving Himself. 'I live, I no longer: but Christ lives in me.'

I have no space to dwell on the doctrine of the Light of Life, which in a special way, concerning Faith, developes what I have said, but pass at once to recall that the doctrine of union with Christ is, of course, set forth still more fully in the chapters on the Living Vine and the Bread of Life. Not Moses gave the true Bread from Heaven—our fathers ate of the Manna but they died. There is only one true Bread, that truly came down from Heaven, that gives true Life—*I* am that Bread of Life! I am that Living Bread—and, yes! the Bread that I will give for the life of the world is My Flesh. He that eateth not, drinketh not, hath no life in him. He that doth eat and drink, *hath* eternal Life. He abideth in Me, and I in him. He that eateth Me, he shall, too, live by Me.

Now *why* is Jesus what He thus claims to be, Source and Giver of Life? If He can only give this Life, because He has it: and have it, because He is it, still,

why *is* He it? *Because He is one with the Source of Life itself, even God.* His descent into physical life is as voluntary as that into physical death, and as His return into His glory. 'I came forth from God . . . I came forth from the Father, and I came into the world : now I am leaving the world, and I fare forth to the Father . . . I lay down My life, that I may take it again: No man snatcheth it from Me, but I lay it down of Myself. Freedom have I to lay it down, and freedom to take it up once more.' If He be 'sent' by God, in Him, thus sent, the Father 'comes': if He does not His own Will, but the Father's, that marks not divergence of wills, but their pertect identity. The Father loves the Son, because that Son does ever what is pleasing to the Father; and again, because the Father loves the Son, He reveals Himself fully to Him, so that the Son sees all that the Father does, and Himself can do it, and can do nothing else. This more than mutual presence, this involution of personalities, and this perfect reciprocity of knowledge and of will indicate already an ultimate identity of nature, co-natural and communicated.

Thus the Father can substitute the Son for Himself. 'He who receiveth Me, receiveth God who sent Me.' The Father has given all things over into the Son's hands. He pours into Him that full power over life and death that marks essential identity of being with the source of all life, and Life itself. Hence they who do not know the Son, dare not claim that they know the Father either. And thus, although the Father, Immortal Source of Life, be 'greater' than that which is to fall into the earth and die, yet are the Father and the Son 'One Thing.' 'Before Abraham came into being,

I AM.' 'He who beholdeth Me, beholdeth Him that sent Me.' 'Philip, He that hath seen Me, hath seen the Father.'

This sublime doctrine is most strongly reiterated, gratefully we own, in the tender and intimate scenes of the Supper Room. No more the wranglings of the Temple Courts, nor the muttered recriminations of Capharnaum, but only the gentlest converse and prayer with His 'little ones,' His 'little flock,' His children, His chosen and His friends. The day is coming when you indeed shall know that 'I am in the Father, and you in Me, and I in you.' True, He is the Way, and by Him we must walk, but He is also Truth and Life, and in Him we have already reached home. When He and the Father shall 'come' to their beloved, and 'make our abode in him,' that is a Real Presence, offered to us here and now, whereof the manifestation only is hereafter.

Holy Father, keep them in Thy Name
whom Thou didst give to Me,
that they may be One Thing
as we are . . .
that they may be all one thing,
even as Thou, Father, art in Me,
and I in Thee,
that so they too may be in Us . .

And I, the glory that Thou hast given Me
have I given to them,
that they may be One Thing,
as We are One Thing,
I in them,
and Thou in Me,
that they may be made perfect into One.

I have made known to them Thy Name,
and will yet make it known,
that the Love wherewith Thou lovedst Me
may be in Them,
and I in them.

The doctrine therefore of this gospel is, that (to keep to our exact subject) in the One God there yet are Two—Eternal Father and Eternal Son: that for us men and for our salvation, the Son took up our nature, and wedded it to His own, so that He came into the world a true Man. And into Himself He further catches up all those who will come to Him, hear Him, believe in Him, and they forthwith are changed from being children of the earth into Sons of God. And we can now go back to that mysterious prologue as we proposed to do. I premise only that the term *Logos* was in common use in contemporary philosophies, variously interpreted, but always including the notion that a Thought could be both conceived in the mind, and also uttered, and that even when uttered as a word, it still remained in the mind that conceived it. And further, God's ever-immanent Thought was uttered in the created world, so that He who knew creation, knew by implication the Creator; nay, every fragment of that creation, and not least each created mind, was as a scattered letter or a syllable of the All-inclusive Word. John takes up this notion and adapts it to his creed, finding it of especial utility, since one of his main themes is, precisely, that of *Witness*—witness varying from that of prophet, or of Baptist, to that of miracle and quality of doctrine, and above all, of the Person of the Teacher, Jesus Christ, whose knowledge of His message was drawn, not from hearsay, but from

contemplation of That whereof He came to speak.

In the Beginning,
the Word existed,
and the Word was along with God—
yes, the Word was God.
This Word existed, in the beginning, with God.
All things came into being by means of Him,
and apart from Him came into being not one thing.
And that which in Him came to be,
was Life.
This Life was the Light of men,
and the Light is shining in the darkness,
and the Darkness imprisoneth it not.

The Evangelist pauses. He places beside this Essential Word, the witness of a man. In the beginning the Word existed—There came into being a man. And the Word existed along with God—Sent from God. And the Word was God—his name was John. The Word revealed God, the Invisible, by expressing Him in and through Creation; in and into that creation He came, a Light sufficient for every man that they might know and come to the Father. Yet that very Light so fills men's eyes, that they are no more conscious of it, though no Dark can put it out: the endlessly ringing word ceases to be audible in their ears. The Word and the Light, eternal Witnesses, themselves need a witness, and the Baptist was sent, a Lamp that might teach men's weakened eyes to tolerate the Light, a Voice that might school their ears to listen to the Word. Yes, continues the Evangelist, there existed the True Light, that giveth light to all men; it comes streaming into the world, it existed in the world, why, the very world was made by It, yet the world knew it not! He came unto what was His own, and they who

were His own received Him not. But *some* received Him; and to them gave He power to become Children of God—men begotten not by passion of flesh and blood, but God-begotten. Yes—The Word became Flesh, and spread His tent amongst us—full of grace and truth, and of that fulness all we have received—ah! favour upon favour! Yes, a Law was given by Moses; but grace and truth came to be through Jesus Christ. We have beheld His glory, the glory as of the Sole-Begotten of the Father: and if indeed no man hath seen God ever, the Sole-Begotten Son, who lives in the Bosom of the Father, *He* hath made God known.

Were I to use, as well as the Gospel, the First Epistle of St. John, you would find this doctrine much reinforced, though not added to, save perhaps in this—that John also emphasizes there the reality of Christ's manhood. 'That which existed from the Beginning, That which we have heard, That which we have seen with our eyes, That which we have watched, and our hands have handled of the Word of Life—Yes, for the Life was made manifest, and we have seen, and we are bearing witness, and we are announcing to you, that Eternal Life which existed with the Father and was made manifest to us—That which we have seen and have heard we are announcing to you too.' So complete was the recognition of the Divinity of Jesus that the preaching of the gospel had obtained, that questioners were asking whether He could, then, be truly man. John anathematizes those who do not confess that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, true God and true man too.

Add to this that doctrine of the Holy Ghost which fills up the doctrine of the Trinity, sufficiently stated in the gospel, yet, you may say, left for long generations

of theology to explicitate. Even as the Word is God, and yet, inasmuch as He is Son, is not Father, though one thing with the Father, so too the Spirit proceeds from the Father, and at the Son's prayer (xiv. 16) is given to the elect, and indeed is sent by the Son into the world—and the Sender is not less than the Sent (xvi. 7). And within the world, the Spirit shall bear witness to Jesus and thereby glorify Him, and neither shall *that* witness be an independent one, for the Spirit shall take from Christ, and reiterate Christ's message, and since all things that are Christ's, are God's, and what is God's, is Christ's, so too from that one divine store comes what is the Spirit's. Here then you have the doctrine of the Most Blessed Trinity, of the Father who begets the Son, from whom, no less than from the Father, the Spirit too proceeds. Though the doctrines of the Holy Spirit and of the Trinity are not part of the subject here to be treated, yet the Divinity of the Son stands out the better when His relation to the Spirit Itself of God is perceived.

Such then in dim outline is the teaching of this gospel, to whose sublimity no other pages, it may be, have attained. As the old hymn says:

Volat avis sine meta
Quo nec vates nec propheta
Evolavit altius.
Tam implenda quam impleta
Numquam vidit tot secreta
Purus homo purius.[1]

[1] High as heaven see him soar:
Never sage or saint of yore
Winged more loftily his flight.
Ancient mysteries and new
Whiter soul shall never view,
See more stainlessly that sight.

Like the storied eagle, he soars so high that he gazes unblinded on the sun in his midday splendour, but again descends, heaps himself in his nest at the hour of sunset, to brood in feathery warmth and restfulness upon the visions he has seen. So tender, so homely, so cleansed of all mere human bitterness of heartbreak is the very grief itself of the vigil of Christ's death. And at the close of the old Apostle's life, it was to the 'Love,' there so earnestly reiterated, that his mind by preference returned, to the human love that made Jesus trust His mother to His friend, send Magdalen to be His messenger, and remain, wearied by the long road's dust and the fierce sun, beneath the trees that sheltered the ancient well.

## VI.

## SAINT PAUL (Philip. ii. 1–11).

By the Rev. C. Lattey, S.J., M.A.

What Christ is in Himself, all that He is or ought to be to man, none have told better than St. Paul. 'Unto me,' he says, 'the least of all saints, hath been given this same grace, to preach to the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ' (Ephes. iii. 8). Scarcely to-day do we venture to stammer and blurt out the message that he was at such pains to deliver fully and faithfully to his Christians; we deal out almost fearfully and reluctantly what he poured forth in full and overflowing measure. We greatly need to draw upon this inexhaustible store in order to cope with the Christ-hunger of our time. And in doing so we shall be following the example of St. Augustine in the West, and of the Greek Fathers generally; the familiarity of these latter with the language and words of the Apostle doubtless made it easier for them to saturate themselves with his thought.

More than this: the Apostle sets forth the person and work of Christ more fully and explicitly even than Christ Himself and the evangelists. Partly to spare the Jews too great a shock, partly not to be executed before His time, Christ spoke with reserve of His claims, and even towards the end of His ministry they could demand petulantly, 'If Thou art the Christ, tell us plainly' (John x. 24)—'If Thou art the Christ,' notice, not 'If Thou be God': even the Messiahship had not been quite explicitly proclaimed.

But Paul, writing to his Christians, already well

taught by word of mouth, has nothing to hide. This is how he addresses his beloved Philippians: I take his words in the first instance from Archbishop Goodier's rendering in *The Westminster Version of the Sacred Scriptures*:

> If, then, ye have for me any comfort in Christ, if any encouragement through charity, if any fellowship in the Spirit, if any affection and compassion, fill up my joy by thinking alike, and loving the same things, with one soul and one mind. Do nothing out of contentiousness or vanity, but in lowliness of mind let each think the rest better than himself, let each look, not merely to his own interests, but also to those of others. Let that mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus. For He, though He was by nature God, yet did not set great store on His equality with God: rather, He emptied Himself by taking the nature of a slave and becoming like unto men. And after He had appeared in outward form as man, He humbled Himself by obedience unto death, yea, unto death upon a cross. Wherefore God hath exalted Him above the highest, and hath bestowed on Him the name which is above every name; that at the name of Jesus 'every knee should bend' in heaven, on earth, and under the earth, and that 'every tongue should confess' that 'Jesus Christ is Lord,' to the glory of God the Father (Philip. ii. 1-11).

Here then we have, not a bit of dogmatic propaganda, but an affectionate exhortation, good for ourselves and for all time; an exhortation to harmony, to mutual agreement, charity, humility. To carry it out, however, is to put on the mind of Christ; the motive is to be the double humiliation of Christ, first of all in the Incarnation, then in the Crucifixion. He took the nature of a slave; in that nature He became obedient, even unto the death of the Cross. Such humility and humiliation we ourselves must be minded to suffer for one another; and in the final glorification of Christ we are evidently

intended to find the pledge of our own share in His glory. That a little after the middle of the first century St. Paul should thus casually, as it were, fall back for a motive of practical conduct upon such a statement of Incarnation and Redemption is a fact of tremendous historical and dogmatic significance. He has no doubt that his readers are familiar with the premises; he is merely concerned that they should draw from them a rule of actual conduct.

We may now come to close quarters with these statements, omitting the exhortation and confining our attention to Philip. ii. 6–11. The passage contains many points of interest and significance, even of some difficulty; let us take them in detail.

'For He, though He was by nature God, yet did not set great store on His equality with God.' For purposes of discussion, it seems best to translate this at once more literally, thus: 'Who, being in the form of God, did not think it a prize to be equal to God.' Much here calls for exposition. In the first place, let us realize here as elsewhere, that it is the Godhead of Christ which matters. St. Paul could never have given Christ the tremendous place—the supreme and all-embracing place—in his system of life and doctrine, if he had not believed Him to be God. Only upon such a condition can Christ be 'all and in all' (Col. iii. 11). St. Paul's Epistles without Christ as God would indeed, in the time-honoured phrase, be as Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. It is said, 'being' in the form of God, and we must say 'being' for want of a stronger word, but the Greek ὑπάρχων implies much more than this. It is not the regular word for 'being,' used with simple and undetermined

meaning; but it signifies being pre-existing and permanent, a fact still further emphasized by the use of the present participle, indicating continuous state, in contrast to the aorist participles which follow, indicating point-time or single events.

'Being in the *form* of God.' This word (μορφή) is the regular technical term in Aristotelian philosophy for 'form' as opposed to 'matter,' but we must beware of interpreting it too strictly along these lines, for St. Paul was no peripatetic or scholastic. The Greek Fathers take the word as equivalent to 'nature,' in the rough and ready language of popular philosophy. Still, in the light of the valuable collection of passages laboriously collected by Professor Schumacher (and intended, I fear, to prove the contrary) I find it impossible to believe that this word had altogether lost some implication of visible appearance; I mean, it would have been more appropriately used, *ceteris paribus*, of a nature expressing itself in some outward shape. How then could St. Paul use it here? I believe that the correct answer to this question is given by Père Prat in his truly epoch-making work, *La Théologie de Saint Paul* (*ad loc.*: Vol. I, p. 442): 'Cette expression, *forme de Dieu*, aura été probablement attirée par l'antithèse, *forme d'esclave*.' In other words, Paul is about to speak of Christ having taken 'the *form* of a slave,' where there is evidently some reference to outward appearance, as is shown by the following words; and this leads him to use the word 'form' for the Divine Nature also, although in itself, and apart from the required antithesis, the word was not the most perfect that might have been chosen. But that it does actually signify the Divine Nature there is no shadow of doubt.

The pre-existence of Christ, then, stands fast, the fact that He was already existing as God before the facts to be forthwith related took place, and chiefly before the Incarnation. It is the presupposition of these facts, inserted to show their significance, without which they lose their meaning. It is Christ, existing and pre-existing as God, who does and becomes all that follows. It is the Apostle's preface to his brief statement of the Incarnation, comparable only to that of St. John : 'In the beginning was the Word . . . and the Word was God.'

'Who, being in the form of God, did not think it a prize to be equal to God.' In considering the second part of this clause, let me first say a word upon the final words, 'equal to God.' The Latin says, 'to be equal to God,' using the adjective, and we are practically bound to do the same in English; but as a matter of fact St. Paul uses, not the adjective, but the adverb, (ἴσα, not ἴσον), thereby emphasizing somewhat more not merely equality, but identity. He did not think it a prize to count for God, to be able to be taken for God, and so forth; an expression which St. Paul, with the strict monotheistic doctrine carried by him from Judaism into Christianity, and there strengthened and developed, could not possibly apply to a mere man. Some of the multitude of non-Catholic modernists appear to think that St. Paul, or even Christ Himself, might think it a matter of trifling interest whether Christ were thought mere man or very God as well, whether Creator or mere creature. Such gentlemen only show how utterly out of touch they are with the New Testament spirit and its Jewish background.

But it is before all upon ἁρπαγμόν, which I have

rendered provisionally 'a prize,' that ink has been poured out like water. The difficulty of rendering in English the right sense, even when one has made sure of it, may be illustrated from the *Westminster Version of the Sacred Scriptures*, wherein a somewhat roundabout phrase is used, which however hardly seems to me to admit of improvement in English: 'did not set great store on His equality with God.' Upon the whole, the phrase that satisfies me best is the German *festzuhaltendes Gut*. But first let us discuss the alternatives.

These alternatives may be represented as three. We may say, 'He did not think it an act of rapine, plunder, usurpation, to be as good as God, equivalent to God.' This is the *active* sense, and the more obvious sense of the Latin *rapina*, employed in the Vulgate. Secondly, we may render, 'did not think it a thing unjustly seized or usurped, that He should be equal to God.' This is the *simple passive* sense, and this sense too the Latin *rapina* can bear, though it is the less obvious and less frequent meaning of the word. Thirdly there is the *passive gerundive* sense, which it will already be clear that I favour, 'He did not think it a thing *to be* seized and kept at all costs, a prize in no way to be let go, a *festzuhaltendes Gut*.' This is a rather more subtle meaning, and it implies the Divinity of Christ in a rather more subtle, yet no less certain way. The sense would be, that Christ did not *insist* upon His Divinity, that He did not insist upon being God and God alone, upon existing only in a Nature essentially and of itself Divine; but He was content to take 'the form of a slave,' a nature of itself created, in which His Divinity did not manifestly appear, or even save Him from death upon a cross. In that sense He 'let go' His Godhead.

And the Apostle exhorts His Christians, 'Let that mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus.' Do not be afraid to seem to lower yourselves; do not stand upon your dignity, do not hold fast to your own opinions, do not look to your own interests. What humility or humiliation of ours can bear comparison with the Incarnation and the Cross?

That the Christians of Lyons and Vienne, writing of their martyrs in 177 A.D., in a beautiful letter preserved by Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl.* V. 1–3), that Origen also, St. Methodius and St. Cyril of Alexandria (not to mention others) understood the passage in the sense just explained, seems to me clear from Lightfoot's quotations in his special note upon the passage. It is upon him also that I rely in the main for the proof of this meaning of ἁρπαγμός from the consideration of the passage itself, which proof now follows. It is, indeed, a pleasure to be able to refer in this regard to one whose massive yet delicate scholarship remains one of the glories of Cambridge. We Catholics cannot agree with all his conclusions, yet we have cause to be grateful for his labours; for it was owing to him, I suppose, more than to any other single man, that this country was not swept off its legs by the torrent of German rationalism. Had it been so carried away, the situation to-day would be vastly different, and far more desperate.

He is arguing, then, more directly against the rendering 'did not think it an act of usurpation':

It takes no account of the clauses which immediately precede and follow. (1) It neglects the foregoing words. For the Apostle is there enforcing the duty of humility, and when he adds 'Have the mind which was in Christ Jesus,' we expect this appeal to our great Example to be

followed immediately by a reference, not to the right which He *claimed*, but to the dignity which He *renounced*. The dislocation of thought caused by this interpretation is apparent; 'Be ye humble and like-minded with Christ, who partaking of the divine nature claimed equality with God.' The mention of our Lord's condescension is thus postponed too late in the sentence. (2) And again this interpretation wholly disregards the connexion with the words following (*Philippians*, p. 134).

This second part of his argument, however, I slightly adapt, as it is bristling with Greek. In the expression, 'He did *not* think it a prize (ἁρπαγμός), but emptied Himself' (in the Westminster Version, '*rather*, He emptied Himself'), the particles '*not* . . . *but*' (οὐχ . . . ἀλλά) obviously correspond: *not* the one *but* the other. Hence 'He emptied Himself' must contain the idea which contrasts directly with 'He did not think it a prize' (ἁρπαγμός). If, however, we were to adopt the translation, 'He did not think it an act of usurpation (*or*, a thing usurped) to be equal (*or*, equivalent) to God', we should really have to change the simple 'but' (ἀλλά) into 'but nevertheless' (ἀλλ' ὅμως): 'but nevertheless He emptied Himself.' We should thus be sinning against the original Greek. And besides being unnatural in itself after the 'not' (οὐχ), this rendering fails entirely to explain the emphatic position of ἁρπαγμόν—the key-word, in the correct translation, to the whole of Christ's double humiliation.

'Rather, He emptied Himself by taking the nature of a slave, and becoming like unto men.' At this point I remind myself not to enter into unnecessary detail, because of another paper to follow. The words, 'He emptied Himself,' represent the Greek ἐκένωσεν; it is in a perverse emphasis upon this word that modern

so-called 'kenotic' theories have their rise, with which Father Ronald Knox is to deal more at large. Merely as a matter of strict exegesis, I may now point out that the translation is not an entirely happy one. This verb is only used by St. Paul in the New Testament, and by him only five times, never in the literal sense 'to make empty,' but always in the applied sense, 'to make futile,' 'to make of no account.' Again, the corresponding adjective is used twelve times by St. Paul, once by St. James, and once in the Acts, always in the applied sense of 'futile,' 'of no account'; elsewhere in the New Testament it is used thrice in St. Luke and once in St. Mark, and that in the phrase, 'to send away empty,' which approaches somewhat nearer to the literal sense, but is still, in reality, an applied meaning. Considering the usage of these two words, it seems fairly safe to say that for the Apostle the word 'He emptied Himself,' had practically lost all trace of metaphor, and was just an ordinary word for 'to make of no account,' *etc.* Hence it may well have been a delicate feeling for the sense of the original Greek, no less than of the Latin, that led the authors of the Rheims New Testament to have recourse to the rather uncouth word (not, however, one of their own coining), 'He *exinanited* Himself.'

This exinanition, this 'emptying,' this debasing Himself, this making Himself of no account, consisted precisely in the Incarnation. 'He emptied Himself,' says St. Thomas in his commentary, 'not by laying down the divine nature, but by assuming the human nature.' That is certainly the meaning of St. Paul, and it is false exegesis to explain it otherwise. 'He emptied Himself by taking the nature of a slave.' The

Greek is not really quite so explicit as that, simply presenting us with two participles: 'He emptied Himself, taking the nature of a slave, coming to be in the likeness of men.' But the participles, like the verb, are aorists, representing point-time, a single action, evidently coinciding with the time of that verb and explaining it, for 'the form (or nature) of a slave' is now contrasted with the form (or nature) of God; He who was in the nature of God debased Himself by taking the nature of a slave, and this latter action is to some extent explained still further by the following words, 'becoming like unto men,' literally, 'coming to be in the likeness of men.'

'Coming to be in the likeness of men.' It will be observed that this expression falls short of a full statement of the reality of the human nature of Our Lord, which however had already been clearly asserted in the words, 'taking the nature of a slave.' Found in a later ecclesiastical writer, this subsequent expression would almost render him suspect of Docetism (the heresy which denied the reality of the human nature), especially if followed by such an expression as, 'after He had appeared in outward form (or shape) as man,' more literally, 'after He had been found in (more literally still, *through, by means of*, the dative being apparently instrumental) outward form or shape as man.' For this second word, 'outward form (or shape),' in Greek σχήματι, refers primarily and very definitely to mere outward appearance.

I may notice in passing that some prefer to make this clause 'and being found in outward form as man,' end the previous sentence, instead of making it begin the following sentence, but this latter construction

seems upon the whole preferable. I may notice also that the danger of this Docetism, of making the human nature of Our Lord mere appearance, is clearly indicated by St. John, for example in his second epistle: 'many deceivers have gone forth into the world, who confess not the coming of Jesus Christ in the flesh.' Truth to say, in the earliest days the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ seems to have been already so firmly established that it was rather the Humanity that was liable to be called in question. That St. Paul, however, was quite free from such Docetism, that he fully admitted the reality of Christ's human nature, is perfectly clear, and generally admitted; thrice, for instance, he actually calls Christ 'man' (1 Cor. xv. 21, 47: 1 Tim. ii. 5). Even in the present passage, indeed, the doctrine of the Incarnation is as a matter of fact clearly stated. For it is only after he has predicated of the one Person, of the one subject of the sentence, *firstly*, that He was in the Nature, that He possessed the Nature of God, and *secondly*, that He took the Nature of man—one Person, therefore, with two natures—it is only after all this that he goes on to employ expressions which at first sight may seem to depreciate the reality of the human nature, but which we see upon closer examination to have a far deeper purpose.

It is in truth this very language of reserve, of apparent unreality, that most serves our present purpose. The Apostle is exerting himself to keep before our minds the fact that there was *more* in Christ than this mere outward garb of humanity, that the uttermost reality in Him was not, in truth, this manhood, but that Divinity, that form or shape of God, that equality with God or equivalency with God, whereof he has already spoken.

It is, in fact, essential to his purpose to keep steadily before our eyes (if I may put it in our later theological language) the unity of the Person in the two Natures, the truth that it is precisely He who is truly God that humbles Himself, first unto the taking of the form or nature of a slave in the Incarnation, and then yet again unto the Crucifixion. Thus only could there be any point in the motive which he brings forward for our own humility and humiliation: 'let that mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus.' He realized (how could he fail to do so?) that it was only by laying tremendous emphasis upon the full and unmitigated continuation of the Divine Nature in one and the same Person that he could bring out the full force of Christ's example; and to accomplish his purpose, here as in some other cases, he uses langugage that almost staggers us by its audacity. But this audacity lies in the apparent obscuring of our Lord's *human* nature; the audacity of the modern rationalist, as others will tell you, is of a very different type. In St. Paul, at all events, they have no lot or part.

Even thus Christ, that one same pre-existing Person, 'being rich, for your sakes became poor' (2 Cor. viii. 9). There is no time to mention the many other passages that might be used to prove or illustrate St. Paul's doctrine of the Incarnation. Nor is it necessary to dwell upon the accomplishment of the second humiliation, the Cross, since it is evidently once more the same Person, still remaining God, that humbles Himself, becoming obedient unto death. We may compare the passage in the Acts of the Apostles wherein St. Paul tells the Ephesian priests to 'shepherd the Church of God, which He acquired by *His own Blood*' (Acts xx. 28),

where I cannot think any interpretation at all likely save that which interprets, 'God's own blood.'

But now the Apostle turns to the subsequent glorification of Christ, implicitly encouraging the Philippians to believe that if they share in the humiliation they will also share in the reward: 'if', as he writes elsewhere, 'we suffer with Him, that with Him we may also be glorified' (Rom. viii. 17). 'Wherefore God hath exalted Him above the highest,' or more literally, has 'super-exalted' Him, has exalted Him even to the Godhead itself. It is 'God' who acts, the Holy Trinity which effects what is here envisaged primarily as the glorification, even in a sense the deification, of the Sacred Humanity. St. Paul, that is, his heart and soul full of the Christ such as He was for him, the Human Nature enthroned in all the glory of the Risen Life, receiving worship itself by reason of its unity with the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity—St. Paul, overwhelmed for evermore with the dazzling splendour of that Damascus-vision, and desirous here to impress some conception thereof upon the minds of his Christians, fastens their attention upon the risen and glorified life of Christ, as the time when God in the very fullest sense 'exalted Him above the highest' in reward of His double humiliation, and bestowed upon Him also in the very fullest sense the style and title of Jehovah, His own position and worship, so that to Christ seated at the right hand of God is paid a full-hearted and explicit adoration of which He received but little before He became obedient even unto death. It is in this sense also, if I mistake not, that we must understand such a remark as that made at the beginning of the Epistle to the Romans, that Christ, to quote the

Westminster Version, made from the Greek, 'by an act of power in accordance with the holiness of His spirit was marked out Son of God by resurrection from death,' or as the Rheims version has it, translating the Latin Vulgate, 'was predestinate the Son of God in power, according to the spirit of sanctification, by the resurrection of Our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead' (Rom. i. 4). But upon this rather difficult passage I had best not delay.

No, it was not after the Resurrection that God 'bestowed on Him the name which is above every name,' but rather the fulness of all that it entails, even that 'every knee should bow.' St. Thomas, who himself thus explains the words in his commentary, goes to the root of the matter when he explains that 'in Sacred Scripture something is said to be done, when it becomes known.' But what *is* 'the name which is above every name'? Opinions are many, though it does not appear to make much difference to the general sense whether we take it to be the Holy Name of Jesus itself, or 'Son,' or 'God,' or the like; for my own part I had rather understand it of the supreme name of God in the Old Testament, 'Jehovah,' which I shall immediately be explaining. In any case it is the holder of the name of 'Jesus' that is to receive divine adoration.

'That at the name of Jesus *every knee should bend* in heaven, on earth, and under the earth, and that *every tongue should confess* that "Jesus Christ is Lord," to the glory of God the Father.' The Greek construction practically excludes the rendering '*in* the glory of God the Father,' which is taken from the Latin; and to say that 'the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of God the Father' really takes the point out of what is for the

Apostle the crucial confession of faith, 'Jesus is Lord.' To understand this, we must remember that in order to avoid all danger of blasphemy the Jews never spoke the proper name of God, 'Jehovah,' or more accurately 'Yahweh,' but spoke the word for 'Lord,' *Adhonai*, instead. On account of this Jewish usage the translation of *Adhonai*, viz., 'Lord,' is found in Greek, Latin, English and other bibles, where in the original Hebrew God's proper name, 'Yahweh' or 'Jehovah,' is used; and the New Testament writers, St. Paul among them, followed this practice in what they wrote, accustomed as they were to it in actual speech. We must therefore be prepared without difficulty to give the word 'Lord' the sense of 'Jehovah' whenever the context requires it; and there can be no doubt that it does so here. Here we have the super-exaltation of Christ, the giving of the name which more than any other would be said by St. Paul to be 'above every name,' and a confession which is as overwhelming as it is precise.

This is the confession by which the Apostle was prepared to test the working of the Spirit of God, at all events in general, and in a somewhat rough and ready way; for 'no one can say, *Jesus is Lord*,' he tells the Corinthians, 'save in the Holy Spirit' (1 Cor. xii. 3). Nay, this confession is one of the two articles of faith which he names to the Romans as being necessary for salvation: 'if thou confess with thy mouth Jesus for Lord, and believe in thy heart that God hath raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved' (Rom. x. 9). We must not of course, lay any stress here upon the distinction between 'confessing with the mouth' and 'believing with the heart'; it is common Hebraic parallelism, the repeating in the second half of the

verse, often in rather stronger terms, what has been said in the first. But of the stress which the Apostle lays upon the doctrines themselves there can be no doubt; would to God that certain would-be ministers of Christ were in less of a hurry to throw them both overboard, that they were better able to pass the Apostle's test, to fulfil his conditions!

Returning to the passage immediately under consideration, we note a further confirmation of the strong sense given to the confession, 'Jesus is Lord.' For the words, 'every knee should bend,' 'every tongue should confess,' are a very significant quotation from Isaiah xlv. 22–23, which in literal translation from the Hebrew runs as follows:—

> For I am God, and there is none other:
> by Myself I swear:
> Truth goeth forth from My mouth,
> a word which shall not return:
> That unto Me every knee shall bow,
> every tongue shall swear.

That is to say, 'shall swear fealty,' homage, as in Isaiah xix. 18 and elsewhere; some manuscripts of the Greek Old Testament, however, rendered this word 'shall confess,' and it is this rendering which St. Paul quotes. The sense is not seriously affected; nor need we consider the rest of the divine oath. But it must be evident how significant it is that the Apostle should apply to Christ words spoken by God with the solemnity of an oath, asserting the adoration to be paid to Him alone. The homage which Jehovah swears shall be His, that is the homage to be paid to Christ; and naturally enough, seeing that Jesus Christ is Lord, that Jesus *is* Jehovah.

Such, then, is the magnificent passage wherein St. Paul—only incidentally, it is true—propounds his doctrine of the Incarnation. I have chosen it for fuller treatment because it sets forth clearly not merely the Divinity of Christ, but the unity of the divine and human natures in the one Person. The Divinity of Christ has already been confirmed by two other passages wherein the doctrine is laid down, that 'Jesus is Lord.' It is also explicitly asserted in a discourse of St. Paul's in Acts xx. 28 (already quoted), and in Titus ii. 13, with which (in its use of the actual word 'God') may be compared 2 Pet. i. 1, and also John i. 1: xx. 28. I cannot stop to press the argument from these verses home, but must give something more than a mere mention to the emphatic assertion of Christ's Godhead in the Epistle to the Romans. St. Paul, having explained his doctrine of justification, turns to consider the most formidable objection to his argument, the position of the Jews in the Old Testament. Coming of necessity to speak of their partial reprobation, he shows how greatly it pains him to treat of such a theme, and further, how fully aware he is of the favours and privileges bestowed upon them by Almighty God. They had been adopted by God to be His peculiar children; theirs the Divine Presence shining in cloud above the mercy-seat, theirs the covenants made by God with the patriarchs, theirs the Mosaic Law, theirs the glorious liturgy of the Temple, theirs all the promises, theirs the patriarchs and the forbears of Israel, theirs, finally, in St. Paul's words, 'was Christ according to the flesh, who is over all, God blessed for ever' (Rom. ix. 5). It was the supreme privilege of the Jews, that when God Himself took flesh, He took flesh as a Jew. Such is the tremendous

climax urgently demanded by the sense; and attempts to break off the last few words and make of them a separate doxology—'God be blessed for ever,' or the like—are as futile in interpreting the Apostle's thought as they are inept in grammar.

This indeed, is sufficiently clear from the well-known commentary of Sanday and Headlam (in the *International Critical Commentary*), but I much regret that this work should misrepresent the textual evidence upon so important a verse. 'The strongest evidence against the reference to Christ,' we read, 'is that of the leading uncial MSS.' (p. 234). In *The Expository Times* for April and October, 1923, I have made it sufficiently clear. I venture to think, that this supposed opposition of the leading manuscripts is something of a mare's nest. I should add in justice that these editors, even while labouring under such a misconception, confess to 'some slight, but only slight, hesitation' in adopting the traditional view here put forward.

An immense amount of further evidence in proof of Christ's Divinity might be adduced from St. Paul's writings, and most of all from their general tenor; for Christ is spoken of again and again in a manner which is inconsistent with the notion that the Apostle looked upon Him as a mere creature. To develop this argument worthily, however, would require much time, nor, truth to tell, do I much deplore the omission, for I feel that if any one can seriously consider the passage in *Philippians* and still doubt or deny that the writer of it thought Christ to be God—well, he is beyond the reach of merely human reasonings, and I leave it to the Lord to enlighten him.

This passage is supreme in Holy Scripture in its

statement of the Christ's Godhead, supreme in its emphasis upon the unity of the Person, supreme also in setting before us the mind of Christ. 'Let that mind be in you.' It is therefore yet again supreme as an example of the admirable manner after which St. Paul builds his explanations and exhortations upon the accepted truths of faith. Subvert the foundation, deny or explain away the Incarnation, repudiate in some explicit or implicit way the Catholic doctrine that Jesus Christ was and is true God and true man, and the whole glorious edifice of Pauline doctrine, both in regard of doctrine and practice, comes crashing to the ground; more especially the passage which I have been explaining loses all meaning, nay, it becomes blasphemy and idolatry. But hold firm to the Godhead of Christ, which is the very foundation of the Apostle's teaching, and then, reading and pondering over this passage, you will feel more and more the full force of that practical and powerful appeal, 'Let that mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus.'

## Select Catholic Bibliography.

1. *Christus in seiner Präexistenz und Kenose, nach Phil.* 2. 5-8, by Fr. Heinrich Schumacher, Associate Professor of New Testament Exegesis at the Catholic University of Washington (Biblical Institute, Rome: 2 vols., 1914 and 1921: valuable collection of materials, but to be used with some caution).

2. *La Théologie de S. Paul,* by Fr. F. Prat, S.J. (Beauchesne, Paris: 2 vols.; many editions; a very important pioneer work in biblical theology, a subject commended by Pope Pius X, *Acta Sanctae Sedis,* vol. XXXIX, 1906, p. 79).

3. Various commentaries on the Epistle to the Philippians, chief among them those of St. John Chrysostom, St. Thomas Aquinas, Fr. Knabenbauer, S.J. (Lethielleux, Paris, 1912: in the monumental *Cursus Scripturae Sacrae*), Fr. Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (*Further Notes on St. Paul,* Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1911.)

4. *The Westminster Version of the Sacred Scriptures,* a new translation of the original Greek and Hebrew texts. The Epistle to the Philippians, edited by the Most Rev. A. Goodier, S.J., Archbishop of Bombay, is in Vol. III of the New Testament (*St. Paul's Epistles to the Churches*).

5. *The Divinity of Christ in the New Testament,* by J. H. Williams (London: John Murray, 1923.)

6. *St. Paul,* by Fr. C. C. Martindale, S.J. (in the *Household of God* series, published by Burns, Oates and Washbourne. 1924.

7. *Christ the Life of the Soul,* by the late Abbot Marmion, O.S.B. (English Translation, Sands, 1922; a valuable spiritual work, here mentioned because written so largely after the mind and spirit of St. Paul).

## VII.

# THE FATHERS AND COUNCILS.

By the Very Rev. Canon Myers, M.A.

### Part I: The Historical Setting

#### (1) *Introductory*

The central truth of the Christian religion, the truth that differentiates Christianity from Judaism and all other non-Christian beliefs, is the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, the doctrine the Church never allows her children to forget. Beginning her functions 'In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,' concluding her Psalms with 'Glory be to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Ghost,' praying the Father 'Through Our Lord Jesus Christ, Thy Son, Who with Thee in unity of the Holy Ghost liveth and reigneth God for ever and ever,' administering sacraments in the name of 'Father, Son and Spirit,' proclaiming her belief in the Creeds and the *Gloria*, the Church never wearies of emphasizing that central truth. The great Trinitarian conflict preceded the Christology conflict. The doctrine of the divinity of the Word of God was impugned by Arius, was vindicated by the Council of Nicaea in 325, and for long years the epic struggle in defence of the defined truth was waged, with Athanasius as the protagonist of Orthodoxy against all comers. The Christology controversy arose when the divinity of the Word was considered in the Incarnation.

Christ was indeed truly God; Christ was indeed truly Man. As He appeared in this world He was something unique, and the difficulty which led to the Christology controversies was occasioned by the uniqueness of Christ in this world. The obvious questions which would occur to the mind of a man to-day are precisely the questions which occurred to the man of the fourth, fifth and sixth centuries. Accepting the divinity of Our Lord, they were led to ask themselves in what precise sense Our Lord was Man, and the Apollinarian, the Nestorian, and the Monophysite heresies all embodied attempts to solve the problem. It will be seen at once that the range of Christology is a very wide one. It involves the analysis of all that constitutes Christ's human nature, it is concerned with Mariology, with the knowledge and will and power of the Word Incarnate, with the hypostatic union, and with the adoration of Christ Our Lord. Every single one of those points has at one time or another been the subject of discussion in the Church. Normally we learn of them in the great scholastic synthesis of revealed doctrine, which embodies the simple teaching of Scripture, the teaching of the Councils, the teaching of the Fathers, analysed, sifted, digested and expounded, with a wealth of metaphysical and psychological learning, by the great thirteenth century theologians and the great theologians of the Church since their day. Our task is of a different character. We are to go back to pre-scholastic days, we are to go back almost to pre-technical days, and leaving aside for the moment the rich and deep analysis of all that is implied in the idea of Nature and of Person and of Hypostasis, we are to try to understand the problems in their incipient stage, the answers given in

that incipient stage, and to share in the anxieties of the great Christian Fathers as they did battle for the cause of Christ.

### (2) *The Patriarchates*

We have been told that any one who would study foreign affairs should take the precaution of arming himself with as large a map as he can command. If that is true of foreign affairs to-day, with our multiple sources of information and our ease of inter-communication, it applies still more to any attempt to reconstitute the conditions under which the Christological dogmas were hammered out. In the list of names of councils with which we are concerned stand out the names of Alexandria, Antioch, Ephesus and Constantinople. It will be noticed at once that they all centre round what we call the East. How did that come about? The historical background to the subject-matter we are to consider is one of the most fascinating that can well be imagined. We see the Roman Empire of Augustus tottering to its ruin under the successive blows of anarchy, and rescued by the genius of Diocletian, who endowed it with a new and efficient administrative machinery, regrouping the provinces and the dioceses and the prefectures, subdividing responsibility, but concentrating supreme power in his own hands. His great work was taken up by Constantine the Great, who further consolidated that centralizing organization, and set the seal of State favour on the Christian Church. The price paid was a very heavy one. For the first time the protection of the State was experienced, and the risks involved for the freedom of the Church at once stood out clearly. Constantine and his bureaucracy and his

successors were anxious for peace—an external peace would satisfy them—and the Church was anxious for peace, but on conditions involving rights and doctrines of which a Prince is not a judge. State interference in Church affairs looms large in the history of Arianism, Nestorianism and Monophysitism. The Empire was surrounded by foes. In the East they had to face the strong and organized power of Persia, in the North and in the West they were face to face with the great Barbarian pressure. The need of a centre from which efficient control could be organized against Persia was one of the great factors in the choice of Constantinople as a centre of government, and the foundation of Constantinople was the beginning of the division of the Empire into Eastern and Western, which leads to the linguistic division of the Greek-speaking portion of the Empire from the Latin-speaking portion, and with the agelong misunderstandings which follow therefrom. The Eastern portion of the Empire stood firm under Barbarian pressure, but the Western succumbed, and eventually the kingdoms of medieval Europe arose on its ruins. It is well that before we turn to the more dogmatic aspect of our subject-matter some slight allusion should be made to the trouble, the unrest, the worry and the anxiety which pervaded the minds of the whole of the civilized world during the period with which we are concerned. The great names of Jerome, Augustine, Damasus and Leo the Great have all of them a very turbulent historical setting. Jerome saw the Fall of Rome into the hands of the Barbarians (410), Augustine died in his episcopal city besieged by the Vandals (430), and some of the most outstanding features of the life of Leo the Great are bound up with

the invasions of Italy; and in the East the life-history of Athanasius and Epiphanius, and the great Cappadocians, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, and of Cyril of Alexandria are all bound up with trouble and conflict. Each of the localities to which our attention will be directed has its own story of trouble, conflict and rivalry—generally misunderstood through the tendency of writers to read back into the past the conditions of a later period.

In the West and dominating the whole history stands, of course, Rome. In the East we have what were later known as the Patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem and Constantinople. There is nothing primitive or sacrosanct about the Patriarchal system. When the Council of Nicaea met in 325 and formulated the practical principles of ecclesiastical provincial organization in the East and the rights of Metropolitans, it recognized (Canon VI) that a privileged position had accrued to the Bishop of Alexandria, whose authority was effective not only over the Bishops of Egypt, but also over the Bishops of another Imperial province—that of Libya, subdivided into the two provinces of Higher and Lower Libya by Diocletian. Established customs, including the right of consecrating Bishops, were to continue to be followed: after all, extra-provincial authority was exercised by the Bishop of Rome, so there was no reason why—where precedent justified it—authority should not be exercised by a Bishop outside the limits of the civil province to which he belonged. At Antioch, again, a practical primacy of honour had come to be attached to the Bishop; his prerogatives indeed were not comparable to those of Alexandria, but as they stood Nicaea ruled that they

should be respected. The same respect of acquired rights was to hold wherever they were found. The rights of the Bishop of Aelia (Jerusalem) were to continue, without prejudice, however, to the rights of the Metropolitan of the province of Palestine, the Bishop of Caesarea. Before the Constantine transformation of Byzantium, the locality was dependent on the Bishop of Heraclea, in Thrace. Licinius was defeated at Adrianople in 324, the beginnings of the new city date from August, 325, and it was inaugurated by Constantine on 11th May, 330. The presence of the Imperial Court gave importance to the local Bishop, who enjoyed ready access to the ruler and his high officials, and soon became the intermediary between the Emperor and the Bishops. The position was a difficult one, for in spite of the Bishop's overwhelming influence, the Metropolitan took precedence on all official occasions. Hence the story of Constantinopolitan ambition. Constantinople gradually extends its influence in the purely political and anti-traditional confusion begotten of Arianism. The anti-Apollinarian Council of 381 was held within the walls of the city, and the Bishop was strong enough to venture to assert rights for his see against his Metropolitan of Heraclea, and to formulate the principle that the importance of a see follows the standing of a town in the civil order. Hence the third Canon of Constantinople—'The Bishop of Constantinople is to have the primacy of honour after the Bishop of Rome, because the city is *New Rome*.' Effectively from that moment it exercises jurisdiction over Thrace, the eleven provinces of Pontus and the eleven provinces of Asia. Antioch, as the result of a long local schism of eighty years, was unable to resist.

Alexandria was stronger, and occasionally resented the usurpation of her agelong precedence. Three times the See of Constantinople had to submit to Alexandrian sentences and see her Patriarchs deposed, until the terrible reversal of 451, when the Egyptian Patriarch sat accused before the Fathers of the Council and deposed by the Pope. When in July, 421, Constantinople encroached, by a decree of Theodosius II, on the province of Illyricum, hitherto attached to Rome, Pope Boniface immediately protested. The crowning success of Constantinople's efforts is reached in the twenty-eighth Canon of Chalcedon, on the other side of the Bosphorus, which set a seal on the encroachments in Thrace, Asia and Pontus, with a right to consecrate the Metropolitans and the Bishops for their subject Barbarian races; and the reason given was that Constantinople was the capital of the Empire, the habitual residence of the Emperor and Senate, even as had been the case with Old Rome. That Canon of Chalcedon met with an immediate protest, and was never recognized by the Holy See. Historically speaking, it will be seen then that the aggressive factor in the relations between the Patriarchates is to be sought in the late-comer Constantinople. It is noteworthy that all three cities are seaports. The Orontes assured Antioch's communication with the Mediterranean. Furthermore, they are Greek-speaking. The Greek language was the language of trade in the East. It is important in considering the history of Christology to keep in mind the very different linguistic conditions prevalent in the various centres. Alexandria was indeed Greek-speaking, and the Bishop was at the head of the Egyptian Church; but the Egyptian Church was not

Greek-speaking, and furthermore occupied a position apart in the Empire. The power of the Patriarch was very great indeed; the power of the Emperor varied, and for practical purposes one may almost say that the Emperor's writ did not run in Egypt. Hence in Monophysite troubles it is to Egypt that the prelates from Syria flee for refuge. There they are safe. The mentality of the Egyptian population has been set forth for us by the late Jean Maspero, and the picture he gives us of the mentality of the Egyptian in Imperial days is curiously familiar to us to-day with our knowledge of the Egypt of Zaghlul—supreme self-confidence, self-satisfaction, and a lofty disdain for all that is not Egyptian. From the Christian point of view Alexandria occupies, of course, an outstanding position in consequence of the prestige of the great school of Alexandria. At times we hear of Christological controversies being grounded on the opposition between the schools of Alexandria and of Antioch. The phrase needs very careful explanation. There never was a school at Antioch in the sense in which there was a school of Alexandria. Up to the middle of the third century there was no Antiochene theology or Antiochene Christology, and until about 250 Antioch remained outside the main currents of doctrinal research. It had had no great theologian, no really outstanding personality since the days of Ignatius. Alexandria had had Clement and Origen, Rome had had Hippolytus, Carthage Tertullian; at Antioch there was no one to compare with them. 'The School of Antioch,' then, simply means a trend of mind common to certain theologians of Syria, the boldest being Diodorus of Tarsus (d. 394), Theodore of Mopsuestia (d. 428),

followed intellectually at a long distance by St. John Chrysostom (347-407), and Theodoret of Cyr (386–457). The leading characteristics of the group are (1) devotion to textual studies, (2) a care for the literal interpretation of the text in preference to an allegorical interpretation, and (3) the stress laid on Our Lord's human nature. Antioch has in common with Alexandria the fact that it is a Greek-speaking seaport. Once outside the walls of Antioch, however, the whole countryside spoke Syriac, and here we have a key to not a little of the confusion in the matter of terminology which beset the Christological discussions. The West was Latin-speaking. It had the good fortune from the first to have been blest through the genius of Tertullian with a clear statement of Christological teaching. It was familiar from the first with the terms 'two natures and one person.'

### (3) *The Terminology*

Tertullian (c. 160–240) may well be termed the Father of Latin Theology. Down to the end of the second century Western theological writing was in Greek. Tertullian uses the Latin language, and endows it with a wealth of clear and definite terms which we still continue to use to-day. We are at once at home in his writings. When treating of the mystery of the inner life of God he differentiated Father, Son, and Spirit; he designated the terms of the eternal activity of God as '*persons*.' From the Unity flows the Trinity (*Adv. Hermogen.* 3): Unity of substance, Trinity of persons. The standard Trinitarian formula of the West: *una substantia, tres personae,* stands out clearly a hundred years before Nicaea. His Christological

formulae are equally definite, *una persona, duae substantiae,* and the ideas underlying them are quite clear: 'Thus does the Apostle also teach respecting His two substances, saying: *Who was made of the seed of David* (Rom. i. 3); here will He be Man and Son of Man; *Who was marked out the Son of God, according to the Spirit* (Rom. i. 4); here will He be God and the Word —the Son of God. We see the twofold state, which is not confounded, but conjoined in one Person, Jesus, God and Man' (*Adv. Prax.* 27). There is then no transformation of divinity into humanity (*ibid.*), no fusion of two substances into a third new one; each remains what it is, each retains its own proper operations. 'Forasmuch, however, as the two substances acted distinctly, each in its own character, there necessarily accrued to them severally their own operations and their own ends' (*Adv. Prax.* 27). 'This property (*proprietas*) of the two states—the divine and the human —is distinctly asserted (*dispuncta est*) with equal truth of both natures (*naturae utriusque*) alike, with the same belief both in respect of the Spirit and of the Flesh. The powers of the Spirit proved Him to be God, His sufferings attested the flesh of Man' (*De Carne Christi,* 5).

The terminology of St. Leo and of the Council of Chalcedon in 451 is anticipated by Tertullian in 210. The clear-cut terms: *una substantia, tres personae*; *una persona, duae substantiae,* or *naturae,* rendered the very greatest service to the orthodoxy of the West, and paved the way to St. Augustine's setting out of the doctrine of the Trinity, which is so familiar to us in our English Act of Faith: 'I firmly believe that there is one God, and that in this one God there are three Persons, the Father,

the Son, and the Holy Ghost,' and which has ever been a firm shield of the doctrine of the Divinity of Our Lord.

The Greek terminology remained undecided and vague for centuries: that indecision was a potent element in the various heresies from Arianism onwards: and even after the Trinitarian terminology was fixed, its application to Christology was long delayed. The Western set forth one God, and in one God three Persons; the Eastern proclaimed God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and reached the conclusion that they were one God. The designation God was applied emphatically to the Father, the essence of Arianism was the question of the sense in which the Son could be designated as God, and when the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son had been defined, the question again arose as to the Holy Ghost. Historically, that is the way in which the Christian Revelation was made. Christ Our Lord spoke to us of His Father, God in Heaven; He made known also the Spirit.

To this day the Church in her prayers speaks the same language: *Deus* in her Collects is the Father, to whom we pray, *Per Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum filium tuum, qui tecum vivit et regnat in unitate Spiritus Sancti Deus, per omnia saecula saeculorum.* The *Gloria in Excelsis* and the *Credo* both enshrine the old Greek presentation of the persons first. That very simple fact will explain why the East seems to be more a prey to Trinitarian error than the West, and how seemingly endless discussions throve there more than in the West.

The Eastern portion of the Empire, even after the

discussions on Arianism, was not in agreement as to the meaning of the terms employed in technically describing the Humanity of our Lord, and the confusion was certainly not lessened by the fact that the Syrian Bishops, whose native tongue was Syriac, used certain Greek words to express Christological teaching, and the words they chose did not always coincide in meaning with the Greek words chosen by the Coptic-speaking Bishops, who also sought Greek equivalents for their technical terms, without choosing the same Greek equivalent. Add to that the confusion we shall see spring from the prevalence of ideas associated with Nestorianism; add to that, the ignorance of Latin; and we have the key to not a little of the confusion in terminology with which we shall have to deal.

In describing the rise and development of the Christological heresies, Harnack stresses almost exclusively what one may speak of as the political factor: Rome sought the alliance of Constantinople to crush Alexandria, or Rome played off Alexandria against Constantinople as a matter of political convenience. Even taken at its face-value, the explanation is a poor one, though one can quite see why it is that such a meagre explanation of events of such consequence should be given. If you do not believe in the Divinity of Christ, if you do not believe in the doctrine of Grace, or the prerogatives of Christ's Church, the obvious explanation for any big movement involving whole races of men is clearly a political or an economic one. Duchesne again explains the rise of the controversy in terms of a conflict between the rival philosophies of Antioch and Alexandria.

There seems to be a suggestion of topographical or

geographical unity which is not supported by the facts of the case. The real founder of Monophysitism, Apollinaris of Laodicea, was a Syrian. It was in Constantinople that Eutyches dogmatized. When the Symbol of Union was signed, St. Cyril had to furnish explanations to Acacius of Melitene in Lesser Armenia, and to Succensus of Diocaesarea in Isauria. Armenian monks were as anti-Nestorian in sentiment as Egyptian monks. When the Council ended, there was in Jerusalem a party strong enough to set up Theodosius against Juvenal, who accepted Chalcedon. Severus of Antioch, Julian of Halicarnassus, James Baradaeus, Monophysite leaders, were Syrian. Nestorianism disappeared from the Empire: the Faith of Chalcedon became the Faith of the Greeks, especially in Constantinople. Monophysitism stands for the opposition of crowds of Coptic and Syrian monks. In any case, no Egyptian was ever a Nestorian.

The real explanation is, I venture to think, a much more simple one: all the protagonists in the great struggle, heretics equally with Orthodox, firmly believed that Our Lord was God, and when they saw others setting forth teaching which—rightly or wrongly—appeared to them to overthrow the fundamental truth of Our Lord's divinity, they put forth every energy they could command, whether in action or in suffering, to resist the impiety they detected.

### (4) *The Use of the Fathers*

We are familiar with the truth that the Christian Revelation, the care of which was committed to the Church, is contained in Sacred Scripture and Tradition. Keep clearly before you the difference between Dogmatic

Tradition and Historical Tradition. By Dogmatic Tradition is meant the divinely-safeguarded witness to revealed truth borne by the divinely-appointed teacher. That tradition is authoritative, and equally authoritative at every period of the Church's history. Historical Tradition is dependent upon historical records, which may perish and undermine its basis. Many points of Dogmatic Tradition are corroborated by historical tradition, which testifies that a particular truth was held at a particular period of the Church's history; where such historical 'proof' is forthcoming we gladly welcome it, although we are well aware that the authoritative character of the teaching derives not from the historical record as such, but from the divinely safeguarded teaching of the Infallible Church. So that if all the writings of the Fathers were to disappear in the course of a world-revolution, the authority of the living Church would suffice to guide us aright. The historical argument derived from the study of the works of the Fathers was quite currently used, as we can see from the pages of Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History*. Both St. Athanasius and St. Denis made considerable use of the argument; but it is in connexion with the rise of Monophysitism that the proportions reached by collections of passages from the Fathers fill us with wonder. One of the most interesting collections of patristic passages is to be found in the three books of dialogues published by Theodoret of Cyr under the enigmatic title *Eranistes*. Book I is entitled 'The Immutable,' and sets out to establish that God the Word is immutable; Book II, 'The Unconfused,' shows that the 'Union' was without confusion; Book III, 'The Impassible' established the truth that the

Divinity of Our Lord is impassible. Each dialogue comprises a theological discussion and a series of quotations. In the first book no less than thirteen authors are quoted; in the second, twenty-one; in the third, eighteen. Moreover, in the first Book there is a short series of seven authors quoted on the 'Word was made Flesh.' Professor Louis Salter's studies on the sources of Theodoret's quotations (*Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, Vol. VI, 1905: pp. 289, 513, 741) show that they were (1) the patristic memorandum drawn up in 450 by St. Leo the Great; (2) the memorandum of the Antiochene Bishops drawn up against St. Cyril at the end of the Council of Ephesus (Sept.–Oct., 431); (3) the personal research of Theodoret.

The importance of the use of the patristic argument in theological discussions will justify some attention being paid to St. Leo's documents. It will be remembered that the Dogmatic Letter to Flavian was sent on 13th June, 448, and it had no supporting quotations from the Fathers. It was after the 'Robber Synod' of Ephesus in August, 449, that he added the testimonies taken from Greek and Latin Fathers, and sent them to Constantinople by his legates Abundius, Asterius, Basilius and Serretos, so that the texts were known in Constantinople before the Council of Chalcedon was held.

The method was no new one in Rome; when the Roman Council of 430 condemned Nestorius as heretical, Pope Celestine in his address to the Bishops quoted St. Ambrose, St. Hilary and St. Damasus in support of St. Cyril's teaching. And on the proposal of the Archdeacon Leo (afterwards Leo the Great) Cassian's dogmatic treatise, *De Incarnatione*, was set before the

Council (Migne, *Patrol. Lat.* Vol. 50, col. 250–269). In the course of his work, Cassian quotes St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. Jerome, Rufinus, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Athanasius and St. John Chrysostom. And when twenty years later Leo himself was faced by the Eutychian error, he utilized five passages of St. Hilary, four of St. Ambrose, three of St. Augustine, two of St. Gregory Nazianzen, three of St. John Chrysostom and three of St. Cyril. St. Leo's collection of quotations made in 450 was added to by him in his letter to the Emperor Leo (Migne, P.L., vol. 54, col. 1173); there is an additional text of St. Hilary, one of St. Ambrose and one of St. Cyril. Moreover, he quotes three new authors: a passage of St. Athanasius, two of St. Theophilus of Alexandria and one of St. Basil (Migne, P.L., vol. 54, col. 1173–1190). If we bear in mind the wide range of patristic literature and the very considerable difficulty presented by their bulk, both as regards collecting and consulting them, the importance of St. Leo's documentation will be obvious.

A moment ago attention was drawn to the importance of the distinction between dogmatic and historical tradition. We are familiar with the confusion between the two in Anglican controversy, and it is sad to see that at the root of not a little of the Monophysite trouble was the failure to realize the distinction between the two. Eutyches took his stand firmly on the teaching of the Fathers, and not a few of the later Monophysites followed in his footsteps. Julius, Felix, Athanasius, Gregory Thaumaturgus were quoted in support of specifically Monophysite doctrine. Unfortunately, the documents were spurious; they were

all written by Apollinarian sectaries. The unveiling of the trick had not to wait until modern times; that work was done by Leontius of Byzantium, in the sixth century.

### (5) *Communication with Rome*

There is another interesting aspect of the Eastern discussions, and that is the intervention of Rome. This is not the time to deal with the question of appeals to Rome; but when one considers the question of the relations between Rome and the Oriental sees with the help of a big map, one is left with a feeling little short of amazement. Remember that the journey of an Imperial courier from Rome to Constantinople took twenty-four days, that the journey overland from Rome to Alexandria took a minimum of 54 days. By sea the journey from Rome to Alexandria was much quicker. It was possible to take ship at Puteoli, near Naples, and sail directly to Alexandria, favoured by the prevailing westerly winds, and it would be a bad voyage that would be longer than twenty-five days; but if the traveller wished to return from Alexandria to Rome by sea, he would need not less than fifty days. Furthermore, the perfectly safe period for sailings only extended from 26th May to 14th September, and no mariner would put to sea between 10th November and 10th March. Consequently it was the overland journey that under normal circumstances presented the maximum of safety and of quickness. Ramsay calculates that 'fifty Roman miles a day was the post rate for the Imperial couriers.' The quickest overland route from Rome to Alexandria occupied five days in minor sea-crossings, to which was to be added 2420

miles on land, which gives us fifty-four days from Rome to Alexandria, forty-six days to Caesarea in Palestine, thirty-nine days to Antioch, twenty-four days to Byzantium and seven days to Brundusium. If in the light of these figures you think of a doctrinal struggle such as Nestorianism or Eutychism taking place at such a distance from Rome, the conflict taking place in Greek, Syriac, Coptic, and the Latin-speaking Bishop of Rome intervening with peremptory decrees, one cannot but wonder at the amazing hold the authority of the Holy See had over those distant nations. Those distances will explain why it was that when the heresy of Nestorius was manifest, Pope Celestine delegated his full authority to Cyril of Alexandria to carry out his decrees; and the distance and the hazards of travelling help us to understand the late arrival of the Pope's legates at the Council of Chalcedon.

## Part II: The History of the Doctrine

### (1) *Introductory*

The Word was made flesh, therefore Christ is truly God. That is the revealed truth and a Mystery. Christ is God: that is the fact. *How* did it come about? I do not know: but it is a revealed truth, and so I believe it. Now although we cannot explain *how* it is, we have to study the conditions in which it is, so as to keep free from error in a matter of such importance. How then are we to conceive of a God-Man? We shall not understand the Mystery; but we shall recognize clearly what we are obliged to believe—the mistaken efforts of early heretics may be of assistance to us.

Apollinaris had opposed Arius: he believed that Christ was God, he believed that Christ was Man, he believed that Christ was *One*. He sought to reconcile these ideas. If Christ has a complete human nature, then He must have a human person; then Christ would not be one, but two persons. Therefore as Christ is God and is a divine person, there must be lacking something to His human nature, which, were it there, would be a human person. That something he declared to be a rational soul.

Nestorius believed in the Divinity of the Word, he believed that the Word was made flesh, that the Word was truly God, that Christ was truly Man. He stressed Christ's Manhood—its completeness and its concomitant personality. If Christ were Man, if He had a complete human nature, then He must be a human person. Then in Christ there must be the Divine person of the Word and the human person of Christ united in the union-person of the Word made flesh.

EUTYCHES had striven against Nestorius; Nestorius had asserted duality of persons consequent upon duality of nature; Catholics had emphasized unity of person in duality of nature; Eutyches stresses unity of person to a consequent unity of nature.

### (2) *Apollinaris*

In order to understand the rise of Nestorianism you must grasp Apollinarism. Earlier theologians had studied Christ in *relation to God*. Apollinaris is original in that he raises the Christological question and studies Christ IN HIMSELF, the inner constitution of His Divine-human nature. The divinity of the Word made Flesh is beyond discussions. Being God, the Word is immutable. Therefore He must have retained all His properties, He must have remained Perfect God. But how could that Perfect God be united to a Perfect Human Nature while constituting only one individual, one person, one subject?

For Apollinaris the terms Perfect God, Perfect Man, One Person, were philosophically quite irreconcilable. Didn't experience show him that every complete human nature was a person? Apollinaris supposes as an indisputable axiom that 'person' and 'nature' are correlative. And so in order to safeguard the Oneness of Christ's Person he does not hesitate to sacrifice the integrity of His human nature—and deprive it of the higher faculties of intelligence and freedom. Apollinaris arouses strong opposition in East and West, but especially in the neighbourhood of Antioch where he taught.

We have already seen some of the characteristics of the Antiochene School: positive and somewhat

rationalistic, it favoured Aristotelianism in philosophy, literal exegesis in Scripture, and eliminated mystery as far as possible in theology. In Christology they anathematized indeed Paul of Samosata, but some of them were still under the influence of similar ideas. Thus Theodore of Mopsuestia (350–428) distinguishes two subjects, two persons in Christ: (*a*) the Word, Perfect God, born of the Father from all eternity; (*b*) the son of Mary, perfect man like us. This son of Mary has been united to the Son of God since His conception—but the union is moral, not substantial, and allows the two individual subjects to subsist. Hence that union could and did progress. It is a closer union than that of God and the just, and in a certain sense we may say that in Christ God and Man form only one person, one *prosopon*, even as husband and wife are one flesh. That was the system they opposed to Apollinaris, and notice, they do not reject the philosophical principle which formed Apollinaris' starting-point, 'every complete nature is a person'; they accept it without discussion, and proclaim two nature-persons in Christ, δύο φύσεις, in opposition to the one nature-person, μία φύσις, of Apollinaris. Apollinaris saw and exposed this heresy at once, and showed the unreality of their fictitious 'one person.' But as he was a heretic himself, the Orthodox paid little attention to what he said against the Antiochene teachers, who continued their anti-Apollinarian campaign.

That was the state of things when a disciple of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Nestorius, was called by the favour of the Emperor Theodosius II to be Archbishop of Constantinople. He preached his master's Christological system. Its heterodoxy was at once clear, and the

defence of the traditional faith was taken up—not by a heretic like Apollinaris, but by St. Cyril of Alexandria. In reading Nestorius' sermons, he saw the fundamental flaw of the Antiochene theory, and to refute it he had only to use the arguments and even the very formula of Apollinaris, while of course rejecting the negative element of his system, and restoring to Christ's human nature what Apollinaris had denied. Thus corrected, Apollinarianism became the expression of Orthodoxy: in Jesus Christ one single nature-person, the person of the Word, Son of God, μία φύσις, united substantially to a complete human nature, but a human nature which is not a person. In the Man-God—and here is really the Mystery—there is a complete human nature which is not a human person, a distinct individual subject, but which is under the complete domination of a superior personality, the Person of the Word.

Our Lord has a body and soul even as we have. Nevertheless, Our Lord's human nature, *like to* every other one in its essential constitution, *differs* from every other one in this: the human nature of Christ does not belong to itself, it is not a human person. Each one of us is a person, because each one of us belongs to himself; in saying 'I,' each one of us marks off his individual human nature in the inviolable circle of his personality.

The human nature of Christ does not belong to itself, it cannot say 'I'; from the very first moment of its existence it belonged to, it was taken possession of, appropriated to, impregnated by a Being distinct from itself, which imposed upon it, by an intimate possession, by a true and substantial union, its very own personality. That Being is God Himself: it is the Second Person of

the Blessed Trinity, the Person of the Divine Word. Christ, God and Man, is one single hypostasis—that is to say—one single person, that of the Word, possessing two natures.

Let us suppose for a moment that there were two persons in Christ. What would follow? There would have been no Incarnation properly so called. The very essence of the Incarnation consists precisely in this, that the Word of God made human nature His own. If the human nature had subsisted in itself, existed independently, there would have been in Christ two subjects, two persons, morally united perhaps, but only accidentally, not substantially. There would have been no Redemption: for neither of these persons could redeem us in the way in which God, as His Revelation teaches, willed us to be redeemed. The Divine Person could neither suffer nor die; the human person would have lacked that infinite value in his satisfactory works required by the Divine decree. The Divine and Human Natures are united in Christ, according to the teaching of the Council of Chalcedon, *without mingling or confusion*.

That is a brief statement of what Theology calls the Mystery of the Hypostatic Union. The precision of the terms comes to us from the theological language of the later Middle Ages: the reality itself and the belief dates back to the Gospels. Jesus Christ was the Son of the Living God from the first moment of the Incarnation; He is neither less God, nor more truly God, because His Divinity and His Humanity are set out with more clearness, more technical precision dictated by the needs of the moment, by the negations of innovators.

In Voisin's *L'Apollinarisme* (Louvain, 1901) we have

a new and more precise explanation of the heresy than has hitherto been available. The chief objective of Apollinaris was not, as has hitherto been thought, Arianism and its doctrine of the mutability of Christ, but rather the opinions he found current among his neighbours at Antioch; there the comprehensible side of the Incarnation was stressed by preference, the duality of the human being and the Divine Being: Christ is as truly Man as the Word is truly God. The reiteration of the stress on the Manhood of Christ alarmed Apollinaris. He combated such Christology, and for that deserves credit. But in order to explain the Unity of Christ, he sacrificed, as they had done, the teaching of faith to the demands of his philosophy, by substituting the Word for the human mind of Christ. It would be true to say that Monophysitism is the fundamental error of Apollinaris, and we may go further and say that he is the only one who held that doctrine in its fulness. The Word who possessed the Divine nature united Himself to a human body without a rational soul. He is therefore a composite nature (*φύσις σύνθετος*), only one single nature (*μία φύσις σεσαρκωμένη*). There is in Him only one will, only one operation; all the functions of the human soul of Christ are assigned to the Word.

This Apollinaris (the Younger) was born at Laodicea in Syria, about thirty miles from Antioch, about 310. He became Bishop of Laodicea in 362. He had suffered the Arian persecution under Constans (337–361) before elaborating his heresy in the days of Julian (361–363), at a time when he was, however, writing to prevent by his works the evil effects of the measures of the Apostate against Christian education. After passing

unnoticed through the short reign of the orthodox Jovian (363–364), he carried on his propaganda under the persecutor Valens (364–378), and his teaching ended by being the object of repressive legislation under the Emperor Theodosius (379–395).

Attention was at the period of Apollinaris' early work (362–374) concentrated on Arianism and Macedonianism. He was prominent in defence of *Homoousios*, and of St. Athanasius; his Trinitarian work and his exegetical work was apparently sound. Hence his Christological work would be favourably interpreted. The terms 'flesh' (σάρξ) and 'body' (σῶμα), were consecrated by scriptural usage and familiar to all ecclesiastical writers, and it would not be known that the Bishop of Laodicea *did not take them in their ordinary sense, but absolutely literally*. So skilfully is his teaching set out in many of his treatises, that St. Cyril makes no difficulty about their being the work of St. Athanasius or of the Roman Pontiffs, and uses them against the Nestorians without in the least sharing in the errors which they contain.

St. Epiphanius, in 374, first draws attention to the erroneous ideas circulating in many quarters, and about that time Apollinaris from being a dichotomist becomes a trichotomist. Gradually Apollinaris becomes aggressive, and in 377 Epiphanius published a refutation of his errors. In that same year, at the request of St. Basil, Pope Damasus at a Council in Rome deposed Apollinaris and condemned the doctrine 'which attributes to the Son of Man an imperfect humanity, even as the Arians attributed to the Son of God an imperfect divinity.' A whole series of synods followed and condemned Apollinaris, who persisted in considering

himself in communion with the Church and his doctrine orthodox. He died about 382.

### (3) *Nestorius*

Nestorius was consecrated Bishop of Constantinople on 10th April, 428. He was deposed from his office in the first Session of the Council of Ephesus on Monday, 22nd June, 431. It is between these two dates—a short period of three years—that the whole of his active career took place. Nestorius had many friends, and their instinct was to assume his orthodoxy. They soon came to realize, however, that although they objected very strongly to the terminology of his opponents, nevertheless his orthodoxy could not be maintained. The devotion shown to his cause by men such as John of Antioch and Theodoret, men who had a first-hand acquaintance with the problem and the terminology used by Nestorius, might well have made later apologists for the heresiarch hesitate; they eventually realized the heretical character of his teaching. It is interesting, however, to note that, particularly since the time of Luther, Nestorius has never lacked friends nor St. Cyril enemies. To-day the partisanship is as active as ever. The orthodoxy of Nestorius was proclaimed by Professor Bethune-Baker, and when the work translated into French as *Le Livre d'Héraclide*, sometimes spoken of as *The Bazaar of Heraclides*, was made known to the world in 1908, we were face to face with the extraordinary phenomenon of our sceptical generation immediately taking the book at its face-value, and proclaiming that now we possessed Nestorius' long-lost apology of his own unhappy career, and the vindication of his orthodoxy against the wiles of Cyril of

Alexandria. The authenticity of the work, however, although generally assumed, is by no means beyond criticism, and consequently in dealing with Nestorianism that *caveat* must be entered. At the same time we may at once say that, admitting for argument's sake that the book is what it purports to be, a careful study of its contents furnishes as perfect a vindication of the doctrinal soundness of St. Cyril and of the Fathers of Ephesus as we could wish for. The line then we shall take in dealing with Nestorius is that, first of all, his errors are known to us from his own letters to Pope Celestine and to St. Cyril, from the letters of St. Cyril, from the letters of Pope Celestine, and from the condemnation contained in the Acts of the Council of Ephesus; that testimony is clear. His teaching is irreconcilable with Orthodox Catholic teaching, and his contemporaries fully realized how the matter stood, in spite of whatever personal feeling may have entered into the discussion. In the second place, even supposing we had not our other sources of information, the book which has come to us as his apology fully and completely justifies his condemnation.

Jugie's analysis (pp. 91–94) of the Nestorian teaching in the *Livre d'Héraclide* will help us to grasp the Nestorian idea of the Union of the Two Natures in Jesus Christ.

1. As there is no complete nature without personality —Nestorius says 'without natural *prosopon*'—and as the Word united Himself to a complete human nature, it follows that in Jesus Christ the human nature is a real person, a subject of attribution of operations proper to it, and which must not be referred to the Word. This nature subsists in itself. In other words: there is in Christ a man, a human *ego*.

2. The Union of the Person of the Word and of the human person is *voluntary, i.e.*, takes place by the will, by the loving interpenetration of both, so that there is only one moral will. There is a mutual giving of each person to the other, a sort of lending and exchange of personalities (*prosopons*). This exchange allows us to assert that the two natural personalities result in a single moral personality, which Nestorius terms the *prosopon of union.*

3. This artificial and purely nominal personality, this *economic prosopon,* this single 'mask' covering the face of God the Word and the man Jesus, is designated by the terms: Son, Christ, Lord. Hence Nestorius often asserts that there is only one Christ, one Lord, one Son: but in the Nestorian mind each of those terms awakens the idea of two persons, the divine and the human, remaining distinct and unconfused.

4. Given then that there are two subjects of attribution, two *egos,* it follows that we may not attribute to God the Word the properties and actions of the human person, and *vice versa.* We must not say of God the Word that He was born of the Virgin Mary, suffered and died. We must not call Mary θεοτόκος in the strict sense of the word without considerable reservations. In a word, the 'Communication of Idioms' is not allowed as regards the Word, nor as regards the man as such.

5. But it is allowed as regards the terms designating *the prosopon of union, i.e.,* Christ, Son, Lord, and so we may say that Mary is χριστοτόκος, because the name 'Christ' recalls the two persons which are united, and the mind naturally attributes (in this case) the birth to the human person.

6. As Nestorius had no idea of an abstract 'nature,' but always understood the term of a concrete individual nature endowed with personality, it is easy to see why his statements constantly confuse concrete and abstract terms—which for him are the same. Occasionally this leads to his language being quite orthodox, but you must not be led astray by that; it is a merely verbal orthodoxy.

St. Cyril has a bad press. Non-Catholics invariably belittle him. The modern tradition began with Luther, and one wonders how far his vindication of Our Lady's title as Mother of God, his brilliant exposition of the doctrine of sanctifying grace, his unswerving devotion to the See of Peter, his clear setting forth of the doctrine of the Real Presence, are not all factors in the dislike his name inspires. In this matter of Nestorius he has received less than just treatment even at the hands of some Catholic historians. That treatment is most unfair. If ever there was a subject consideration of which demanded constant attention to a large map and careful chronology, it is St. Cyril's treatment of the Nestorian trouble. Let me recall once more the circumstances. Nestorius was a monk in Antioch. He was brought to Constantinople by the Emperor Theodosius and made Bishop. From the very first moment he showed an extraordinary lack of self-control. He immediately began a persecuting campaign against the Arian remnants in Constantinople, against the Novatians, against the Quartodecimans. By the law of 30th May, 428, he obtained from Theodosius II severe penalties against all the heretics in the Empire. In a letter he wrote to John of Antioch he gloried in

the enmities his vigour against the heretics brought upon him; and in fact in that same letter he expresses his indignant surprise that any suggestion of heresy should be made against one so active in his efforts to suppress heresy.

One of the priests he had brought with him from Antioch exclaimed in a sermon preached in the presence of Nestorius on 25th December, 428, 'Let no one call Mary Mother of God, for she was a woman, and it is impossible that God should be born of a human creature.' Immediately there was serious trouble in Constantinople; but Nestorius, far from condemning his friend, took his side and insisted that Mary was properly speaking not *Theotokos*, but rather *Christotokos*. The opposition met with in Constantinople did not cause him to hesitate for a moment about his own orthodoxy. Pamphlets were circulated containing his doctrine, and many of them reached Rome itself. They were anonymous, but their authorship was more than suspected, and from Rome an enquiry went to St. Cyril asking for information on the subject. He delays answering until April, 430. In the meantime Nestorius himself wrote (about Easter 429) to Pope Celestine, and after dealing with the question of Pelagianism soon reached the real object of his letter. He writes: 'Hence it is that having found a considerable deviation from the true doctrine in some of the inhabitants of this city, we daily employ both gentleness and severity with a view to their cure. The malady is one very much resembling that of Apollinaris and Arius; they in a manner confound the doctrinal elements relating to Our Lord's Incarnation, and say that God the Word, Who is consubstantial with the Father, was built up simultaneously with His Temple and buried along with His flesh, as if he had

derived His origin from the Virgin, the Mother of Christ (*Christotokos*): and they affirm that this His flesh did not remain such after the Resurrection, but passed into the nature of the Deity. They are not afraid to call the Virgin the Mother of God (*Theotokos*), although the Nicene Fathers (those holy men transcending all praise) only said that Our Lord Jesus Christ was incarnate of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary; not to mention the Holy Scriptures, which everywhere call her the Mother of Christ and not of God the Word. I suppose that rumour has already informed Your Holiness of the contests we have been involved in on this subject; time has shown that these were not without their use; for many have been reformed and have learnt from us to see that the Child must be of the same substance as the Mother, that there is no mixture of God the Word with Man, but a uniting to It of Our Lord's created humanity, which, now joined to God, was at first produced from the Virgin by the Holy Ghost. If any one makes use of the term *Theotokos* to express the conjunction of the Humanity to the Word rather than any quality of her who brought it forth, we say that the term is improperly applied to her: for a true mother must be of the same nature with that which is born of her: but at the same time it may be tolerated on the ground that the Temple of the Word, which is inseparable from Him, was taken from her: not as implying that she is the Mother of the Word, for one cannot bring forth what is older than one's self.'

News of the feeling in Constantinople very soon reached Alexandria, and when, early in January, 429, St. Cyril wrote his seventeenth Paschal Letter, he chose as his subject the Incarnation, and put the faithful on their guard against the new error, asserting the

personal Unity of Christ and vindicating for Mary the title of Mother of God. (Once and for all, on the authority of St. Cyril himself, let us stamp out the alleged difference of meaning which controversialists try to set up between Mary *Theotokos* and Mary the Mother of God.) In this Paschal Letter of St. Cyril, written with a full realization of the heresy involved in Nestorius' teaching, he writes with the greatest tact and discretion; he mentions no names; he avoids even the term *Theotokos*; he vindicates for Mary the title 'Mother of God,' μήτηρ θεοῦ (Migne, *Patrol. Graeca*, vol. 77, col. 777).

About Easter, 429, St. Cyril sent an Encyclical Letter to the monks of Egypt, warning them of erroneous ideas circulating on the Incarnation. Again no names are mentioned. This letter reached Nestorius and angered him. It was a masterly exposition of the theology of the Incarnation of the Word. Nestorius accepted an appeal from three criminous clerics of Alexandria, and rejoiced at the opportunity of putting a stop to the activity of Cyril by citing him before a tribunal. It was at this moment, June, 429, that Cyril sent his first letter to Nestorius, and suggests the ending of the scandal concerning the doctrine of the Incarnation by the simple admission of the term *Theotokos*. Nestorius' reply was scornful and curt. In January, 430, St. Cyril wrote his eighteenth Paschal Letter, refuting the errors of Nestorius. In February he sent his second letter to Nestorius, a most important document from the dogmatic point of view—approved as it was by Pope Celestine and the Council of Ephesus. He begs Nestorius as a brother to reform his doctrine, and by adhering to the doctrine of the Fathers to put an end to the offence he has caused. He goes on to give an exposition of the Mystery of the Incarnation. Cyril takes his

stand on the implications of the teaching of the Creed of Nicaea: 'The holy and great Council says that the "only-begotten Son" Himself, by nature begotten of God the Father, "true God of true God," "light of light," "by Whom the Father made all things," came down, became incarnate and was made man, suffered and rose again on the third day and ascended into Heaven.' That is Cyril's fundamental position: One and the selfsame is the only-begotten Son of the Father and is Incarnate. There is continuity, there is identity of personality of the Word even when He is made man. 'We say that the Word, having in an ineffable and inconceivable manner really[1] (*καθ ὑπόστασιν*) united

[1] Ἕνωσις *καθ'ὑπόστασιν*: *unio secundum hypostasim*: *unio hypostatica*. St. Cyril tells us that he coined the phrase on purpose to refute Nestorius. According to his own explanations it is synonymous with *true, real* union. So that, here,the word ὑπόστασις is not used in the sense of person (*πρόσωπον*) but in the sense of reality, *πρᾶγμα*.

Ἕνωσις *καθ'ὑπόστασιν* means then for St. Cyril *union in reality, union in truth, κατὰ ἀλήθειαν*, as he often expresses it.

The phrase does not *directly* signify 'hypostatic union' in the sense in which it has since been understood, i.e., *personal union* or *union in person*. It is only indirectly that it is brought to that meaning, inasmuch as the *true union*, the *real union* is in fact the union of the Divinity and the Humanity realized in the person of the Word.

St. Cyril tells us why he used the epithet *true, real*, to characterize the ἕνωσις; ἕνωσις *καθ'ὑπόστασιν* is opposed to ἕνωσις *προσώπων* of Nestorius. St. Cyril unifies Christ in the order of concrete, physical, individual existence. Nestorius places the unification in the order of moral relations between persons: ἕνωσις *προσώπων*. He thus leads up to a single *πρόσωπον*, but that *prosopon* is merely a 'mask'; the unity is artificial, apparent, a shadow without reality.

To that empty shadow St. Cyril opposes the true, real ἕνωσις, which makes Christ, the Word Incarnate, a single subject, at once God and Man, one single true person, one single individual. That will make you realize the force of the phrase: it is a standing challenge to the theological fiction of the Nestorian 'single *prosopon*.'

to Himself flesh animated by a rational soul, became Man and was called the Son of Man—not by mere will or favour, nor by the taking to Himself of a mere person (*prosopon*)—and that distinct as were the natures (φύσεις) before being brought together in that real union, there is of both (ἐξ ἀμφοῖν) One Christ and Son: not as though the distinction of the natures (τῶν φυσέων) is taken away by the union, but rather that both the Godhead and the Manhood perfected for us One Lord and Christ and Son, by their ineffable and inexpressible concurrence in the Union. And thus, although before all ages He had existence and was begotten of the Father, He is declared to have been born also, according to the flesh, of a woman: not as though His divine nature Itself received a beginning of existence in the Holy Virgin, nor as though It needed necessarily on its own account a second generation, after Its generation from the Father (for it would be both foolish and absurd to say that He who existed before all ages and is coeternal with the Father, needed a second beginning of existence): but since "for us and for our salvation" the Word really (καθ' ὑπόστασιν) united to Himself a human nature (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον) and came forth of a woman—therefore it is that He is declared to have been born after the flesh (σαρκικῶς). For He was not first born a common man of the Holy Virgin, and then the Word came down upon Him, but having been made One (ἑνωθείς) from the very womb, He is declared to have submitted to a birth according to the flesh, making His own the birth of His very own flesh.'

And then again: 'It is in this sense that the Fathers have ventured to call the Holy Virgin "Mother of God";

not that the nature of the Word or His divinity received the beginning of His existence from the Holy Virgin, but because in her was formed and animated with a rational soul that sacred body to which the Word really (καθ' ὑπόστασιν) united Himself, which is the reason of its being said that He was born according to the flesh.'

This time Nestorius took Cyril's letter very seriously and replied to it in Lent, 430, at considerable length, suggesting that all was well in Constantinople and he had better mind his own business. It was then that Cyril wrote to the Emperor and to the Princesses and to Pope Celestine, and in writing to Pope Celestine he enclosed translations of his correspondence with Nestorius, and a series of propositions countering the errors of Nestorius. Celestine decided to call a Council of the Bishops in Italy, and when it met at the beginning of August, 430, it examined the letters and homilies of Nestorius, which had reached Rome before St. Cyril's representative had arrived, and also the documents sent by St. Cyril. Nestorius was condemned. That condemnation was based on a careful consideration, not only of St. Cyril's accusations, but of the statements Nestorius himself had sent to Rome. On 11th August, 430, Pope Celestine writes to St. Cyril, to Nestorius, to the clergy of Constantinople and to John of Antioch, and gives a severe condemnation of Nestorius, and informs him of his excommunication and deposition unless he retracts within ten days of the notification of the sentence by St. Cyril. In the letter to St. Cyril the Pope says, 'The Authority of Our See is communicated to you by Us in Our stead for the strict carrying out of that decree.' St. Cyril wrote to John of Antioch, who

wrote to Nestorius and begged him to take heed and submit. 'Ten days indeed,' he says, 'is a short notice, but it does not require so much time as that; a day or an hour is quite enough, for all you have got to do is to do as the Fathers before us have done and use the word *Theotokos*, which no Doctor of the Church has ever rejected.' It is quite clear that John thought that his friend Nestorius was orthodox at heart. It was only on 3rd November that Cyril wrote his third letter to Nestorius, embodying the decision of the Council he had called at Alexandria, and to that he added twelve propositions—the anathematisms which were to be the source of considerable subsequent difficulty. It will be seen that there was no undue hurry in communicating the sentences.

It is worth remembering that if Pope Celestine's letters came to Cyril by direct sea-route, without any delay, they may have reached him in twenty-four days. September 3rd was, then, the earliest date on which Celestine's commission could have reached Cyril (if the letters had come by land couriers, the earliest day of arrival at Alexandria would have been 3rd October). Allowing fifteen days, Cyril's letter might have reached John of Antioch on 18th September; allowing sixteen more days, John of Antioch's letter reaches Nestorius on 4th October. On 20th October Nestorius' answer reaches John, and it arrives at Alexandria about 3rd November, when the Synod of Bishops was held, and Cyril's third letter—the Synodal letter—was sent to Constantinople. It was on 6th December that Cyril's official intimation of the ultimatum reached Constantinople. Meanwhile on 19th November Theodosius caused a General Council to be

summoned at Ephesus to meet on Whit-Sunday, 7th June, 431. Cyril writes for and receives further instructions from Rome, while John of Antioch and his friends, offended at Cyril's anathematisms, got two of the most learned Bishops of the Province to answer them, for 'they savoured of Apollinarianism.' Immediately after Easter Day, 19th April, Cyril and Nestorius set out for Ephesus, Nestorius with sixteen Bishops, Cyril with some fifty Bishops. Nestorius arrived first, Cyril arrived on 2nd June. The Council had been convoked for 7th June. On 6th June, the Eve of Pentecost, Cyril received a cordial letter from John of Antioch, announcing his arrival in five or six days. Shortly after, two of his suffragans arrived, and declared that John had told them to say that the Bishops were not to wait. After waiting a fortnight, they decided to begin, and on Monday, 22nd June, 431, at the first Session of the Council, lasting all day, the deposition of Nestorius was signed by 198 Bishops present. The following day, 23rd June, official intimation was conveyed to Nestorius, to the clergy of Constantinople, and to the Emperor. On the following Friday arrived John of Antioch. He holds a meeting of forty-three Bishops, and deposes Cyril and Memnon, the Bishop of Ephesus. On 29th June the Emperor writes from Constantinople refusing to recognize what had taken place at the session on 22nd June. When the Papal Legates arrived on Friday, 10th July, having been delayed by bad weather, the minutes of the first Session were put before them in a second Session. On the following day, 11th July, the third Session was held, and the Legates approved of what had been done. Furthermore, in the fourth Session, held on

Thursday, 16th July, the deposition of Cyril and Memnon was declared uncanonical.

When the news of the vindication of Mary's title of 'Mother of God' spread abroad in the city of Ephesus on 22nd June, the people gathered together and escorted the Bishops to their homes in a torchlight procession.

We have little knowledge of what happened between 27th June and 10th July, except that the people of Constantinople at the beginning of July, 431, manifested violently in favour of Cyril, *Theotokos* and the Council. Into the details of the subsequent negotiations, which eventually led in 433 to the symbol of union being signed by St. Cyril and John of Antioch, there is no time to go; suffice it to say that Cyril was ready to recognize the orthodoxy of the teaching of John, although at first sight his formulas would not have recommended themselves to him. Nestorius' friends dropped away as soon as his real attitude was recognized, and he died in exile at a period subsequent to the Council of Chalcedon.

Unfortunately, the condemnation of Nestorius did not mean the end of Christological controversy. There still remained a suspicious tendency on the part of not a few Easterns to see Nestorianism everywhere. That difficulty culminated eventually in the opposition to the Council of Chalcedon, and the separation from the unity of the Church of the vast bulk of Oriental Christians.

### (4) *Eutyches*

On Monday, 8th November, 448, Eusebius, Bishop of Dorylaeum, at a Constantinopolitan Synod of about thirty Bishops, accused Eutyches of erroneous teaching.

He was condemned on Monday, 22nd November. He admitted the consubstantiality of Christ with us, that Christ was 'complete God and complete Man,' but he insisted that after the Union there was only one nature. Pope Leo the Great acquiesed in the summoning of a Council at Ephesus in August, 449, and on 23rd June sent his famous *Tome* to Flavian. The proceedings at Ephesus were so violent that for all time the Synod has been stigmatized by Pope Leo (29th Sept. 499) as 'The Robber Synod.' A revision of its wrong-doings was called for, and hence the Council of Chalcedon, 8th October—1st November, 451. The Definition of Faith was made in the fifth Session on 22nd October in these terms: 'Following therefore the Holy Fathers, we confess one and the same Son, Jesus Christ Our Lord, and with one accord we all teach the same perfect in Godhead, the same perfect in Manhood, true God and true Man, the same consisting of a rational soul and a body, co-essential with the Father as touching the Godhead, the same co-essential with us as touching the Manhood, like to us in all things except sin; begotten of the Father before all ages as to His Godhead, the same in these latter days, for us and for our salvation, according to the Manhood, born of the Virgin Mary, the Mother of God: one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, confessed in two natures (*ἐν δύο φύσεσιν*) without confusion, without change, without division, without separation. The difference of the natures being in no wise destroyed by reason of their union, but rather the characteristic property (*ἰδιότητος*) of each nature being preserved, and meeting (*συντρεχούσης*) in one person and one hypostasis (*εἰς ἕν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν*);

not parted or divided into two persons (*πρόσωπα*), but one and the same Son and Only-begotten, God, Word, Lord, Jesus Christ, even as from the beginning the Prophets spoke of Him, and Our Lord Jesus Christ Himself has taught us, and the symbol of the Fathers has handed down to us.'

The Decree was drawn up by orthodox Antiochenes and Alexandrians, and sacrifices part of the terminology of both. It justifies St. Cyril (1) by reproducing that part of the Symbol of Union of 433 which clearly proclaims the unity of subject in Christ, and the divine Maternity of Mary; (2) by teaching that in Christ there is one single *hypostasis*, one single person, one single subject, *God the Word*. But it demands that *φύσις* should be used in a different sense from *ὑπόστασις*: henceforth, after the Union, we must not speak of *μία φύσις* but of *μία ὑπόστασις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη*. As regards Nestorius, the *una persona* of St. Leo might be confused with his *prosopon of union*, but the *μία ὑπόστασις* of Chalcedon is not reducible to his system, and effectively bars the way to the two 'physical *prosopons*.' God the Word is, for the Council, the very same (*τὸν αὐτόν*) as Christ, the Son, the Lord, the Only-begotten, the Only-begotten of the Father before all ages, and begotten in time of the Holy *Θεοτόκος*.

Theodoret may no longer speak indifferently of *δύο φύσεις* and *δύο ὑποστάσεις*, he must make *ὑπόστασις* the synonym of *πρόσωπον* and only speak of one hypostasis.

No more fascinating work has been done of recent years than the patient analysis of Monophysitism[1]

[1] To be checked in certain points by the work of Jugie.

by Monsieur Joseph Lebon, Professor of Theology at the University of Louvain. The practical outcome of the work brings out the inadequacy of all former statements of Monophysite Christology. The simple schematic form of an alleged Monophysitism founded on manuals needs drastic revision. As has already been stated, Apollinaris is a Monophysite before his time, Eutyches is a Monophysite only in name; but his condemnation was a foregone conclusion.

The violence of the opposition to the masterly *Tome* of St. Leo the Great, with its majestic exposition of Catholic teaching in terms which have rung down the ages and drawn a chorus of admiration from all, and the opposition which crystallized around the definition of Chalcedon, are all unfortunately rooted in a similarity of terminology, detected by the opposition, between those documents and the teaching of Nestorius. Leo wrote in Latin. The 'two natures and one person,' when translated into Greek and Syriac, suggested to the Eastern mind the two 'nature-persons' of Nestorius and the *prosopon* of union. A similar misinterpretation was given to the decrees of Chalcedon, with the result that the Monophysite position gradually drifted into schism and heresy, suffered persecution and exile, thinking all the time that they were fighting the battle for the Divinity of Our Lord against the impious, who sought to divide Christ as Nestorius had done.

In point of fact neither the *Tome* nor the Definition were Nestorian in their exposition of Diophysite doctrine. No less sincerely than their opponents did Catholics teach the absolute individual unity of Christ, the Divinity (in the strict sense of the word) of Our Lord. They did not *divide* the one Lord; union in *person*

was not a mere moral adhesion, an extrinsic relation of the Son of Mary to the Son of God. Both Catholics and 'Monophysites' confessed one and the same Word Incarnate, true God and true Man, co-essential with the Father and with us, without mixture, without confusion, without essential transformation of constituent elements, without separation of God and of Man in individual existence. Both rejected with horror the impiety of Nestorius and the folly of Eutyches. The difference between them was entirely and exclusively in the dogmatic and scientific exposition of Christology. The quarrel sprang from a huge misunderstanding of the formulas 'One Incarnate Nature of God the Word' and '(in) two natures after' the union. Time will not allow even a brief analysis of the divergent lines of development which led Alexandria and Antioch to divergent Christological formulas. The term *phusis* led to well-grounded dissensions between them, because the majority of both parties understood by 'nature' in Christology the concrete being, considered in his individuality. At the time of Ephesus and Chalcedon few of the Eastern Christologists drew a firm and unvarying distinction between nature and hypostasis. Alexandrians detected in the Antiochene position real Nestorianism, and in fighting against it Cyril and his followers were right. If the nature is the hypostasis —that is to say, *the individual*—Christ is one single nature: the Word, even made flesh, is one single nature (incarnate nature no doubt, composed with the flesh), theandric if you like, but strictly one: it is God, although made Man. Now in *that* sense two natures after the union implies duality of hypostases, of Christs, of Sons, between which there is only room for the moral union

of the Nestorian theory. Unfortunately, Western theology used a formula strangely like that of Nestorius and the Antiochenes, the only difference being in the assertion by Catholics of one single *hypostasis*, and that point is, of course, fundamental. But the Council of Chalcedon taught the unity of person (*prosopon*) and of hypostasis. The Monophysites read that to mean that the terms hypostasis and person were equivalent. They interpreted *prosopon* in the Nestorian sense, and so likewise hypostasis—when they did not consider the assertion of the one hypostasis as an illogical statement, or a trick, on the part of the Chalcedonians. And so again the simple statement of 'two natures after the union' could only stand in their eyes for the two Nestorian nature-persons.

A further series of circumstances accentuated the Nestorian appearance of the definition. There was not merely the duality of natures, but furthermore the preservation of the *property* of each one of them. The attribution of activity proper to the Word and to the flesh, the assigning of scriptural data to each of the two natures—all these elements of the Christology of the Tome and of the Council were a source of great scandal to the opposition. Then stress was laid on the duality of the *energies*, and the solemn definition of the two *wills* seemed to them a new though inevitable step along the road of the heresy which separates and divides Christ. Add to that suspicions of dissimulation and hypocrisy: the Easterns who had attacked St. Cyril found favour before the Fathers of Chalcedon, Theodoret and Ibas were restored to their sees, and their condemnation of Nestorius never carried conviction with it.

### (5) *Conclusion*

The whole story is a pathetic one—in one sense a mere matter of terminology; but it is more than that. The Church is the Society of the Faithful, who receive from a recognized authority the setting-forth of the truth. The Christian West, under the guidance of its infallible teacher, developed without changing the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation of the Word. The Western Christology—even as Christ Himself—yesterday and to-day is the same and for all ages. The East, by concentrating its attention on one particular aspect of the great truth, lost all sense of proportion in the living of its Christian life, and soon, as it drifted away from the principle of living unity placed by Our Lord in His One Church, presented the spectacle of isolated Christian groups, hypnotized by the barren memories of a glorious past.

## Part III: Bibliography of Recent Work

In the following brief list no indication has been given of the ordinary classical text-books and manuals dealing with the doctrine of the Incarnation, nor are the ordinary books on Church History mentioned. Any one who would deal historically with the doctrine of the Incarnation in English should not overlook Cardinal Newman's *Development of Christian Doctrine*, noting particularly his sketch of the Church of the Fourth Century (pp. 248—273), and his sketch of the Church of the Fifth and Sixth Centuries (pp. 273—322), where Section 2 is devoted to the Nestorians (pp. 284—297), and Section 3 to the Monophysites (pp. 297—321). In his volume *Tracts: Theological and Ecclesiastical*, he deals with the heresy of Apollinaris (pp. 303—329), and writes on St. Cyril's formula: μία φύσις σεσαρκωμένη (pp. 331—382). In his *Historical Sketches* the characterization of Basil and Gregory in *The Church of the Fathers* is well-known, and the *Trials of Theodoret* deserve attention. Much useful information too will be found in his work on *The Arians of the Fourth Century*. Historical details here and there will need correction in the light of later work; but for a good general idea of the subject Newman's work holds its own.

On the general historical background Batiffol's great historical series on *Le Catholicisme: des Origines à St. Léon* (5 vols.) will render very great service, and

Tixeront's *Histoire des Dogmes* (3 vols.) ought to be at hand. (An English translation is published by Herder.)

On the early history of the Church in Antioch, Henri de Genouillac: *L'Église Chrétienne au Temps de St. Ignace d'Antioche*, Paris, 1907:

Cavallera: *Le Schisme d'Antioche (IV^e et V^e siècles)*, Paris, 1905.

A most important work is that of Gustave Bardy on *Paul de Samosate*, Louvain, 1923. In view of the importance which has been attached to the career of Paul of Samosata, M. Bardy's lengthy historical study, extending to almost 600 pages, has come very opportunely, the

more so because of Professor Bethune-Baker's verdict that 'Paul of Samosata had behind him a genuine historical tradition, to which in our reconstruction of doctrine we must return.' M. Bardy on the contrary establishes that Paul was an isolated phenomenon in the Church of Antioch, that his teaching was the very negation of Christianity, and that behind him there was no solid tradition in favour of a doctrine which reduced Christ to the condition of a man adopted by God. The book is indispensable to students who would understand the Christology of the end of the third century, and simply viewed from the historical and documentary point of view, it is superior to F. Loofs' *Paulus von Samosata*, published at Leipzig in 1924.

On Apollinarianism the classical authoritative work remains that of Voisin: *L'Apollinarisme: Étude historique littéraire et dogmatique sur le début des controverses Christologiques au IV^e siècle*, Louvain, 1901.

The recently published work by Dr. C. E. Raven: *Apollinarianism : an essay on the Christology of the Early Church*, Cambridge, 1923, need not be taken too seriously by any Catholic scholar. The recipe carefully followed by Dr. Raven seems to be: 'Omit the teaching of the Evangelists and of St. Paul, never fail to depreciate the intelligence of the Fathers and Theologians of the Church, always praise the heretic even when you reject his opinions.' The volume, full of learning as it is, is useless and misleading as an exposition of the Christology of the past, whatever light it may shed on contemporary mentality.

On Nestorianism the best and safest guide will be found to be Jugie, *Nestorius et la controverse Nestorienne*, Paris, 1912. A very sound analysis of Nestorian teaching in the light of recent discoveries, and a very useful corrective to the hasty conclusions of—

Professor Bethune-Baker's *Nestorius and his teaching : a fresh examination of the evidence*, Cambridge, 1908. It will be remembered that the author maintained the thesis of the orthodoxy of Nestorius on grounds which will not bear a careful scrutiny. The book, however,

retains considerable value because of the English translation of numerous passages from *The Bazaar of Heraclides*, taken from an unpublished translation of that work made by Dom Connolly, O.S.B., who is also the author of the very valuable appendix on the history of the Syriac terms.

Loofs' *Nestorius and his place in the history of Christian Doctrine*, Cambridge, 1914, contains four quite interesting lectures given in London in 1913.

The best available translation of the newly-recovered 'Apology of Nestorius,' *Le Livre d'Héraclide de Damas*, is that published by Nau, Paris, 1910.

On Monophysitism the capital work is Lebon: *Le Monophysisme Sévérien: Étude Historique Littéraire et Théologique sur la résistance Monophysite au Concile de Chalcédoine jusqu'à la Constitution de L'Église Jacobite*, Louvain, 1909. This work has certainly renewed theological interest in the problem of Monophysitism, and the result of M. Lebon's work would appear to be that, whatever may have been the perverseness of a few Eutychians, the Monophysite theologians, when you analyse their real meaning, taught fundamentally the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation, and not a little of their opposition to Chalcedon was based on a misunderstanding of Western terminology.

Further light on the Monophysite problem is to be obtained from Draguet: *Julien d'Halicarnasse et sa controverse avec Sévère d'Antioche sur l'incorruptibilité du Corps du Christ*. Hitherto Julian has been looked upon as a typical Monophysite extremist because of his supposed teaching concerning the incorruptibility of Christ. Draguet's examination of his teaching makes it clear that what Julian was concerned with was not any Monophysite thesis at all, but the doctrine of Original Sin, and the extent to which the consequences of Original Sin were to be considered as affecting the human body of Christ Our Lord.

The later history of Monophysitism has been recently dealt with in Maspero: *Histoire des Patriarches d'Alexandrie depuis la mort de l'Émpereur Anastase jusqu'a la Réconciliation des Églises Jacobites* (518-616), Paris, 1923.

A valuable series of studies on St. Cyril of Alexandria by PÈRE MAHÉ, S.J., appeared in the *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* of Louvain, vol. VII (1906), pp. 505-542: *Les Anathématismes de St. Cyrille d'Alexandrie et les Évêques Orientaux du Patriarchat d'Antioche*, vol. VIII (1907), pp. 677–696 (*L'Eucharistie d'après St. Cyrille d'Alexandrie*): vol. X (1909), pp. 30-40, 469-492 (*La Sanctification d'après St. Cyrille d'Alexandrie*).

A valuable grouping of the elements of the Christology of St. Cyril will be found in A. REHRMANN'S *Die Christologie des heiligen Cyrillus von Alex. systematisch dargestellt* (Hildesheim, 1902):

A. EBERLE: *Die Mariologie des hl. Cyrillus von Alexandrien*, Freiburg, 1921.

## VIII.

# THE SCHOOLMEN.

By the Rev. M. de la Taille, S.J.

### Part I: The Dogmatic Truth

In the words of our Catechism, familiar to us from early childhood, there is in Jesus Christ one person in two natures. The person of the Son of God in the nature, coeternal with Him, by which He is God, and in the nature, assumed in time, by which He is man. This is the kernel of Catholic dogma. The same is God and Man. God is man. The object of these lectures will not be to add anything to the knowledge conveyed to our minds by this brief formula, but to investigate it, to explore it, to analyse it, and to discuss the problem which it raises: avoiding, however, all technical terms, if not all abstract speculation, but keeping the latter, as we hope, within such limits as are accessible to any man who will take the trouble to check his imagination in order to set free his intellect.

In the first place then, what is Christ? A man-God. Not indeed a man made God, but a God made man; true man, as He is true God; but true God, before becoming true man. Not merely therefore a God dwelling in man, nor a man clothed with God; not a mind with something divine in it, not a mere saint associated ever so closely with the Godhead.

It is true that, by the very fact of the two natures being united together in one person, there is God living in man: because He *is* man, and certainly lives in Himself. It is true that there is a Man containing God; because He *is* God, and certainly contains Himself. And thus is Christ a Temple, as well as the indweller of the Temple. But others too may be called temples; in fact, are actually so called by the Apostle, who says: *Ye are the temple of God* (1 Cor. iii. 16), *the temple of the living God* (2 Cor. vi. 16). And in others too is God said to abide, and indeed He abides in all the just, as it is written, *because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you*; and not the Spirit of God only, but the Father and the Son as well, according to the divine promise: *My Father will love him* (that keepeth My word), *and we will come to him, and will make our abode with him.* To reduce therefore the comparison between Man and God in Christ to those terms, is merely to bring Christ's condition down to the level of our own; and even if you say: what we are, He is, but in higher degree, nay more, in the highest possible degree: even then, you are turning your back on Christianity, and going over to Antichrist, as it is written: *Every Spirit that denieth Jesus, is Antichrist* (1 John iv. 3); or, as the Vulgate has it, in a phrase which yields the true sense and import of the divine oracle: *every spirit that dissolveth Jesus*, that divideth Jesus, *is Antichrist.* It is dividing Jesus, dissolving Jesus, denying Jesus, to set apart the Man and the God, and to link them together (as if in a mutual embrace), like one sanctified and one sanctifying. They are not two: they are one. The Man *is* the God; and the God *is* the Man. And being one, they cannot be *united.* You cannot make into

one what is one of itself: and there is in this case *unity* unmade, uncreated, *unitas increata*, as St. Thomas calls it[1], the divine unity of the Word, of the Second Person of the Trinity, who is the Son of God and the Son of Mary: the Son of God by virtue of His divine nature, the Son of Mary by reason of His human nature; but in each case one Son, the same, the one and only Son of either and of both.

In other words, there is no room for union, except between such terms as are *really distinct* from one another. If you can say: the Man is not the God: then unite them. But if that is blasphemy, then do not speak of union between the God and the Man. You may unite England with Scotland, but you cannot unite England with England, although you may unite the various parts of England with one another, because they are distinct from one another; but for the sum total of those parts to be united with England is meaningless. Again, body and soul may come together into a composite substance, so as to form a complete human nature. But then the body is not the soul; and therefore we can speak of a combination of the two. But we cannot combine the soul with its own substance, because between the substance of the soul and the soul itself there is no real distinction. Again, between Cicero and his eloquence we conceive a kind of association, because, however natural eloquence to Cicero, yet it was only a quality of his, not he himself.

[1] *Summa*, III. 2, 9 ad 1. — *Uniuntur naturae in unitatem divinam simplicissimam et incorruptibilem* (Billuart, *Dissert* 4, *art.* 4). *Ista unitas est irrecepta, scilicet divina persona* (Toletus *in Summam* III. 2, 9). *Habent ad invicem habitudinem* (istae naturae) *per aliquid quod est simplicissimum et maxime unum*, id est, *per unitatem infinite simplicem* (Gregorius de Valentia, *Disp.* 1, *qu.* 2, *punct.* 6).

Therefore let Cicero by all means coalesce with his eloquence into a great orator, which without the addition of his eloquence he would not be. But Christ, the Son of Mary, is not added to the Word. Christ is the Word. The Babe of Bethlehem, however frail, is no other but the Only-Begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father; and the Victim that hung from the gibbet on Golgotha was the very Lord of glory, whose sight fills with the joys of eternal bliss the angelic choirs in heaven. If you add the one to the other, you *dissolve* Christ.

The truth of the mystery of Jesus is not a duality of a Son of Adam and of the Son of God, brought together in a union however close and intimate; it is the identity, the personal identity of God and Man. And therefore we cannot account but as a slip of the pen what may be read in a popular book written on the Continent by a well-known theologian, who happens even to hold high rank in the Hierarchy of the Church. Christ, he says, by means of the beatific vision, which never failed Him, could, from the very first, contemplate His hypostatic union with the Word of God. A hypostatic union between Christ and the Word is a theological monstrosity; it contains, in a more illogical form, the proper essence of Nestorianism, which consisted fundamentally in uniting the Man and the God, as other and other (ὡς ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρᾳ: eighth Anathema of Cyril). Let then this slip of the pen, and of a very honourable pen, be mentioned only as an illustration of what is *not* our faith. Our faith is not a hypostatic union between Christ and the Word.

And yet there is a hypostatic union. Our faith implies it, our faith asserts it most distinctly. But

what are the terms to be united? Not God and Man, but God and a human nature. What is heresy of the Man, is true of the nature, of the concrete and individual nature, body and soul, taken unto Himself by the Son of God, on becoming Man. The problem therefore before us is to find out what is meant by a hypostatic union, not of the Man, but of the manhood with the Word of God.

A hypostatic union in the first place is a union of substances. But in this regard it does not differ yet from a house, which is also an aggregate of substances, of bricks. The difference comes in with this second consideration: that the hypostatic union is not an accidental complex of substances, but a substantial compound, that is, the casting together of two elements into a substantial unit, into something substantially one, into one being, purely and simply such, to the exclusion of any aggregate of various existences.

But again, this is not all. The union of body and soul is also a substantial union: the association of two elements into one human nature, into the one substance of some individual humanity. And yet this is not what our faith understands under the name of hypostatic union. Body and soul are united together as two *incomplete* substances into a complete one, as two parts of a nature into the resulting whole: not so the terms bound together in hypostatic union. They are *complete* substances—each of a different nature—and fully equipped both of them with all their natural properties, and faculties, and qualities. Their coming together is therefore not calculated to give rise to a new nature, to some third substance, different from the first two and better than them; as is the case with a human

nature, made up of body and soul, and certainly better, richer, fuller, than either of its two components. The Word and the human nature make up Christ, but Christ is not better than or in Himself different from the Word. He is the Word. Nothing assuredly could be more perfect or more complete than God; and God, God the Son, entered into combination with this particular human nature to form Christ. The resulting Christ could therefore not be more complete or more perfect than the dominant of the two. This distinction differentiates profoundly a hypostatic union and a natural union. The natural union of two incomplete substances effects a complete substance or nature. The hypostatic union does not effect a nature, does not effect a new substance. There is not a new kind of perfection, made up of divinity and humanity; nor a new person springing up from the union between the Word and His body and soul.

And yet the hypostatic union must issue into something one, into something substantially one, into one substantial being, into a substantial unit. Into what unit? Into the Word Himself, but incarnate; into the same person as before, but subsisting in the subordinate nature which He has taken to Himself to make His own, as truly His own as yours is yours, or mine is mine. And therefore, He is a man, which He was not before. Before He was only God; now He is God and Man. Yet, by no means is He enriched, any more than impoverished. Not enriched; because the addition of the human nature does not make Him any better, or more perfect, or more complete, after the fashion in which the reunion of the body with the soul improves the condition of the latter. The Incarnation is no

improvement of the Word. Nor is He impoverished, because He is now of human nature, without ceasing to be of divine nature as well, by virtue of His eternal generation from the Father. Indeed He is what we are, while remaining, however, what His Father is. Only He has been brought nearer to us. He is now one of our poor struggling race. He has espoused our woes and sorrows. He knows by experience how great the cost of obedience to the law of God, and He can sympathize. But who is He that has acquired these new potentialities? He is not the Word with the addition of a man. He is the Word made man; He is the Word of God, as possessor of a human nature.

Now we have to bear in mind the difference in this case between the possessor and the thing possessed. In the case of a created nature, the *divine* Possessor is different from His possession. Not so, if compared with His uncreated nature. Christ owns Divinity; but the owner is then not really distinct from what is owned. Every divine Person is the Divine Nature itself; and reciprocally the Divine Nature is at once Father, Son and Holy Ghost; there is an absolute identity between the Godhead and each one of the three divine Persons. Christ, who is the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, the Son of God, is, therefore, not only a holder of what is Godhead, but He is Godhead itself. He is by identity His Divine Nature, as we shall hear in a while from St. Thomas.

Is He His human nature? He might be that, were He a mere man. A mere man, as will be shown later on, is his human nature itself, as existing on its own account. But a Divine Person cannot be the created nature that He has assumed: and this precisely because He

is His Divine Nature. Being the Godhead, He cannot be His humanity, since the humanity is not the Godhead. Christ *has* a human soul, Christ *has* a human body; but that Body is not Christ, that Soul is not Christ; it is Christ's own. Body and Soul are the human nature; the human nature is not that Man, who is Christ: it is His own. I remember reading many years ago in the correspondence columns of a Catholic weekly, a letter on the adoration of the Eucharist, which, to the best of my memory, elicited no comment from any quarter, editorial or otherwise. It was to the effect, that between Catholics and Protestants, there was this difference: 'Of course,' the writer said, 'to us Catholics, the Body of Christ in the sacrament is God.' It would be very sad if such were the faith of the Catholic Church. Our faith could not then be divine. God with all His omnipotence cannot make or teach such a monstrous thing as the identity between the created and the uncreated. A body is something created, a soul is something created, a human nature is something created; God is Something uncreated: and therefore no human nature or soul or body can be God: it is enough for it to be God's own. None the less Man can be God, and is God. But then it follows that such a Man is not His Body, or Soul, or Human Nature. To identify the *human nature,* or any part of it, with the *Divine,* would be running into Monophysitism; but Monophysitism would follow just the same from any identification between the *Man* born of Mary and the *human nature,* for which He is indebted to His mother. That Man is His Divinity: a humanity identified with Him, would be necessarily identified with the Divinity itself.

But, strange to say, the same confusion between Man and manhood may very well have been at the root of the opposite error, which Monophysitism set itself to destroy, namely of Nestorianism. Suppose the Man born of Mary to be His human nature: what follows? It follows, Nestorius says, that this man is not the Word: since the Word is Godhead, and Godhead is not humanity. Therefore, not being the Word, this Man will be united to the Word, as closely as you may desire, but united; and the union of the two will be that composite agent and character which goes by the name of Christ, or Emmanuel (God with us); an assemblage (a companionship or partnership) of two individuals, subsisting severally, each one within His own self and on His own account, but with a common purpose, to be pursued jointly, in due subordination of the inferior to the superior. The Company is called Emmanuel, or Christ; and the Company being responsible for any assets or liabilities of either of its members as such, Christ the Emmanuel will be called God and Man, Son of the Virgin, and Son of God, Creator and Crucified, Priest of the Most High, and Most High Himself in the highest. Christ will be styled by all those names and titles, on behalf of the two individuals to whom they respectively belong by right. It will be correct, therefore, to speak of God the Father of Christ, and of Mary the Mother of Christ; but speaking not of the Company, which is Christ, but of the two individual associates or partners, the Word and the Man, then it will no longer be true to say that this Man is the Only-begotten Son of the Father: he is only the Son of Mary; nor will the Word then be the Son of Mary, but only of the Father. And

thus it comes that Mary (according to Nestorius) is the Mother of Christ, or of the Emmanuel, but not the Mother of the Word, or of God. A conclusion which condemns the principle, even with those less attentive or trained minds which, like the populace of Constantinople or Ephesus, might otherwise have let the original fallacy pass unheeded. The fallacy was: the supposed identity of the man under consideration with the nature—the concrete nature—through which He is a Man.

To combat Nestorius while retaining his principle seems to have been the fatal mistake in Eutyches' mind. Mary must be the Mother of God: and therefore the Man borne of her is God. Whoever is God, is the Godhead. And therefore that Man is the Godhead. But to speak of a man, or to speak of his concrete humanity, body and soul, makes no difference. Therefore, seeing that this Man is the Godhead, it follows that the human nature and the divine are in Him indistinct. The one is nothing else in reality beyond the other, after the union; after the union, there is no room in the Man-God for two physically distinct natures; one, and one only is the nature of the Incarnate Word: and we are Monophysites for the same reason which a little while ago had made us Nestorians. Now, we speak of *one nature*, as before we spoke of *two individuals*. The principle admitted in common (as it seems) by both extremists could yield but either of their heretical conclusions.

False then is the principle; and however strange the thing may seem at first sight, we are to say that Christ, whereas He is His Godhead, is not His humanity. *Filus enim Dei est sua deitas, sed non est sua humanitas,*

as St. Thomas puts it is the *Summa* (III. 3, 7 ad 3).[1] And again, in the *Compendium Theologiae:* 'In other men the union of soul and body makes the person or subsisting individual, because [in their case the person] is nothing but those two [elements: body and soul]. But in Our Lord Jesus Christ, besides body and soul, there comes into consideration a third substance, namely, the Godhead' (*Compend. Theol.*, 211: cf. *Summa* III. 2, 5 ad 1).

Those three together make the Man-God; the complex of them is the Man-God; but in such wise, however, that the *upper substance* alone *subsists* in the other two, and thus *alone* is the Man (because a Man is one *subsisting* in a human nature); although He could not be a man without the concurrence of the other two

[1] The opposite doctrine was taught by Wyclif, many passages from whom have been collected by THOMAS WALDEN in his *Doctrinale*, lib. 1, art. 3, cap. 39–42. Apparently from Wyclif it passed to Hus, who built upon this identity of Christ with each one of His two natures a curious theory of Christ's relation to the Church. Christ was Head of the Church in two different ways. First, in His Divine Nature, He was the Head *above* the Church; secondly, in His human nature, He was the Head *within* the Church; the latter Head being subordinate to the former. This duality of headship within and without would leave no room for the Pope as head of the Church inside the Church.

Against Wyclif, Walden made this appeal to the unanimity of Catholic Doctors: *Semper ecce clamant Doctores solum Verbum humanitati unitum esse Christum. Vel semel inducas aliquem dicentem humanitatem unitam Verbo esse Christum* (cap. 42). After those days, however, the view banned by Walden was unfortunately held by Vasquez (*Disp.* 67, 9: disp. 67, 6 *et* 22: *disp.* 68, 7, et *disp.* 89, 83–88).

As for Hus, his identification of Christ with the two natures was condemned by the Council of Constance and Martin V (see Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, 630, and Hefele-Leclercq, *Histoire des Conciles*, vol. vii, p. 317. It was expressed in the following words: *Duae naturae, divinitas et humanitas, sunt unus Christus.* This sentence would be perfectly orthodox, if meant in the same sense as we see it used by a number of Holy Fathers,

elements (because no one is a man without a human nature). So that, in fine, you have Christ only when you have the three substances: Word, Soul and Body; and yet Christ *is* only one of the three: the one that owns the other two. He *is* the Word, as His very person, His very Self; but He *has* a human nature, Body and Soul, as His own manhood.

We may therefore realize how great Christ, the Babe of Bethlehem, how great Christ, the Victim of the Cross, how great Christ, the Wanderer on this earth, how great this Member of our race, how great that Brother of ours is: Creator and Lord of the world in very truth! Majesty and Holiness without end! The Sovereign Good in person! This is exactly what this Man is.

that is, if the natures (*a*) instead of being taken singly, as is the case with Hus, were taken in their complex, and indeed (*b*) so as not to form a whole, different from both component parts. But the Council, as appears from the context of the proposition in the works of Hus, laid stress not on (*b*), but on (*a*).

Therefore, it does not seem that D'Argentré, in his *Collectio Judiciorum* (*tom.* 1, *lib.* 2, *p.* 169) has rightly interpreted the meaning of the Council, when he says that the reason for the condemnation was the false conclusion to which the words might lead, namely: *Christum ex divina natura Verbi et assumpta natura hominis constare tanquam ex duabus partibus unum totum facientibus.* It is quite true that this conclusion would be false; but it could hardly follow from the words of Hus, meant as they were of each nature individually, not of the two together.

The meaning thus ascribed by D'Argentré to Hus may be found, however, in John of Bâle, as recorded in a manuscript of some adversary of his, quoted by D'Argentré (*tom.* 1, *lib.* 1, *p.* 380). He taught apparently that Christ was two natures forming a whole, in the same way as body and soul form the human nature.

Scholastics commonly have interpreted the condemned proposition of Hus as opposed not to (*b*) but to (*a*); and some of them with direct reference to the teaching of Wyclif, as criticized by Walden. See Lugo (*Appendix ad Disput.* 10), Joannes a S. Thoma (*in Summam* III. v. 17, 1), Billot *De Verbo Incarnato* ed. 5, p. 293).

Greatness of our race, exalted to God's throne in the person of a true Man. Greatness of God's 'philanthropy' (Tit. iii. 4), that moved Him to become one of us! Not by any figure of speech is this Man a God. Not only, as St. Thomas (*Summa*, III. 16, 1) remarks, because *one common denominator*, say Christ, happens to cover both departments of His activities and powers; but because, as truly as the Word is the Word, so too is the Word incarnate the same that was in the beginning with God, the same that is God. This is our Catholic Faith.

It once assumed an expression which startled many well-meaning critics, and yet was best calculated to do away with all attempts to dissolve Christ, to multiply His personality, or personify His humanity. The phrase was this: 'We confess that . . . the One Son is not two natures, . . . but the one nature incarnate of the Word of God' (*Defence of the Twelve Chapters*, Migne, *Patrol. Graeca*, vol. 76, col. 349, and *First Discourse to the Queens*, Migne, *Patrol. Graeca*, vol. 76, col. 1212). These words came from the pen of St. Cyril of Alexandria; and although by him unwittingly drawn from a spurious source, showed themselves admirably suited to the defence of the Catholic Faith against Nestorius. St. Cyril's meaning was never that Christ had only one nature. In the very places where he asserts the 'one nature incarnate,' he brings in most distinctly the two natures to be noted in Christ, each one, as he remarks, remaining within its own proper sphere, ἐν ἰδιότητι τῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἑκατέρου [that is, the human and the divine] μένοντος (*Epist. 2 ad Succensum*, Migne, *P.G.*, vol. 77, col. 241). And again (*Adv. Nestor 2, prol.*: *P.G.* 76, 60-61): 'One

[indeed] should be understood the Word's own nature incarnate'; but yet 'it may not be amiss to add,' he says, 'that with the Divine Word other is the Flesh by reason of its own nature, other is by essence the nature of the Word Himself.' Again (*Epist.* 40 *ad Acacium*, *P.G.* 77, 193): 'One most certainly is the Word's nature; but we know it to be incarnate and made man (literally *enmanned*) according to what is written: *He took the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men.*' 'And from this alone,' Cyril goes on to explain, 'does appear the difference of the natures (τῶν φύσεων) or substances (ἤγουν ὑποστάσεων): because Godhead and humanity are not alike in their natural qualities.' Two natures therefore, are maintained, while one is emphasized. Why is one emphasized? Because, in the case of the Man-God, the two natures together, human and divine, combine into one Christ, the Word Incarnate, who, being the Word, cannot be the created element, but only the uncreated one: and therefore must be said to be one only of the two natures, but incarnate in the other. In other words, the divinity alone can stand for Him, as identical with Him (or, as Scholastic say, *in recto*); the humanity is implied, but only by connotation (or *in obliquo*), as belonging to Him. And thus in fine the phrase, 'Christ is only the one nature incarnate of the Word of God' is perfectly, literally, rigorously true, without any appeal to such subterfuge as translating φύσις by 'person'; which is untenable for two reasons: *first*, because in the very same sentences in which we read of Christ as one φύσις, allowances nevertheless are made for two φύσεις within Him, the human and the divine: which duality,

in the doctrine of Cyril, clearly excludes the sense of 'person' (*Adv. Nestor.* 2: *Epist. ad Acac., P.G.* 76, 60-61 *et* 77, 193); and *secondly*, because more than once in those same sentences φύσις is given as equivalent to ὑπόστασις, and the ὑπόστασις again is explicitly asserted to be twofold. Manifest, Cyril says, manifest in Christ is 'the difference (ἡ διαφορά) of the natures (τῶν φύσεων)—ἤγουν ὑποστάσεων—or of the *substances*' (*Epist. ad Acac., P.G.*, 77, 193. Cf. *Apologet. contra Theodoretum pro* 12 *Capit., P.G.*, 76, 401 A).[1] 'Substance,' and 'substance' only, is in the above sentences the correct translation for ὑπόστασις: not 'person,' which Cyril was by no means inclined to duplicate.

There is no doubt, therefore, as to what was meant by nature (φύσις) in the case of the 'one nature incarnate of the Word.'

Now this doctrine of Cyril, and not only the meaning of it, but the very expression which he gave to it, has been canonized by the fifth Ecumenical Council (Denzinger, § 220); again by the Council of the Lateran, under Martin I; again by Pope St. Agatho, in his dogmatic letter to the Sixth Ecumenical Council; and finally by the Council of Rheims, under Eugene III

[1] The same duplication of ὑποστάσεις occurs in many other places, including the Third Anathema (*Denzinger*, § 115) and its defence against Theodoretus: 'Wherefore we maintain that the coalescing into one of the form of servant and the form of God did not take place without involving the substances (δίχα τῶν ὑποστάσεων)' (*Apologeticus contra Theodoretum pro* 12 *capitibus*, *P.G.* 76, 401 A). Here we have two ὑποστάσεις, as above, while φύσις is once more identified with ὑπόστασις (ἡ τοῦ Λόγου φύσις, ἤγουν ἡ ὑπόστασις), and besides, the human nature (ανθρωπείᾳ φύσει) clearly and definitely asserted over and above the divine, which nevertheless is itself said to be the 'one Christ, at once God and man.'

(Denzinger, § 392), to which we shall have to come back later on. St. Thomas naturally embodied it in his *Summa* (*Summa* III. 3, 2); and only of late have people begun to seem somewhat bewildered by its wording.

To a modern mind it seems strange that the Nature, the Divine Nature of the Word, should be spoken of as incarnate. We are accustomed almost exclusively to other forms of language, like the Person incarnate; and possibly, to a certain extent at least, we are apt to be persuaded that the incarnation of one Person *only* of the Blessed Trinity is exclusive of the incarnation of His nature. The nature is common to Father, Son and Holy Ghost. To make it incarnate would mean, it might seem, an incarnation of the three Divine Persons in common. And therefore, at times, we hear it stated that the Person of the Word is truly incarnate, but not His nature; or again that flesh was assumed by the Word's personality alone, to the exclusion not only of the other two Persons, but also, as it were, of the Word's own Nature or Divinity, or uncreated life and existence. To this view we find an emphatic denial in the words of the Council of Rheims just mentioned.

The definition of the Fathers of Rheims, under the Pope, against Gilbert de la Porrée, ran thus: *credimus et confitemur ipsam divinitatem, sive substantiam divinam sive naturam dicas, incarnatam esse, sed in Filio*: 'we believe and confess that the Godhead itself, whether you call it divine substance or nature, is incarnate, but in the Son.' The Son *in Himself* contains His nature. The Son *is not* Himself without His nature. His personality is not something apart from His Godhead.

His Godhead makes all the *reality* and *substance*, and *perfection* of His personality. What is verified therefore of the Person of the Word, must be verified of the divine nature *as it stands in the Word*. If the Person is incarnate, so too is the Person's nature. If He who is born of the Father is true Man, so too is the Divine Nature as *inherited from* the Father.

Far from conflicting with the incarnation of the Person, the mention of the Person's own nature as incarnate, is part and parcel of our Creed as interpreted by the Catholic Church.

Thus are we far removed from all modernist views, rampant in our days outside the one fold. Speak of a divinely gifted man, speak of one filled above his fellows with the precious substance of knowledge and sanctity, speak of the most perfect among the children of men, the most heroic, the most single-minded, the nearest to God; speak not of God, pre-existing before His birth from Mary; of the Creator with His little hands playing on a Mother's lap, or later fastened to a cross; of the Most High at His disciples' feet, or of the Word of God rising from a tomb. Speak not of what our fathers have believed, of what has gladdened the hearts of countless generations of Saints down to the present time, speak not of the Church's ancient faith, except as a fragrance lingering behind after the phial is broken and the contents have dissipated themselves through the air. Then you may gain a hearing from this infidel generation, and even be accounted as a master of contemporary thought. Not so, if you remain a belated adherent of the theological system of the Church of Rome, of Aquinas, of Cyril, of John or of Paul: of the men who naively thought that they had

handled with their hands the limbs of the Word of God, or heard the voice of Him who *is before all, and by Him all things consist, for in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporeally.*

Now against all those voices of Antichrist we Catholics maintain the absolute unchangeable truth of the faith once delivered to the Saints. We will have nothing to do with any dissolving, with any denying of Christ. To the voice that asketh to-day, as it did of old: '*And thou, who sayest thou that I am?*' To this we reply in the words taught by Peter: '*Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God.*' A God like Him, and a man like ourselves; co-essential with Thy Mother and co-essential with Thy Father; Heir to Divine Nature, wrapped, however, in a nature frail and stricken; likened to a servant, yet verily the Lord of all, the Lord above all Lords, the one Lord of heaven and of earth. Thou art the Lord God. This is our answer to the query of that Man.

## Part II: The Scholastic Problem

A problem arises at once from the mere statement of the Christological truth, God is Man. This unity of the two terms, God and Man, this identity of the Word and the Man, implies, as we have said, a union between this concrete humanity, body and soul, and its Divine Possessor. The problem then is the following: how can a human nature be united substantially to a pre-existent person? In the first place, the human nature thus united must itself be lacking personality. But how can a compound of body and soul, of a human body and a human soul, fail to be *a Man*, and therefore a subsisting individual, such as we call a person? And secondly, supposing even the possibility of such an anomaly, how can a pre-existing person become substantially one with an additional nature? Especially, when the person is of such perfection that it cannot be improved or completed, neither as a substance nor as a nature, nor as a person? Which is the case with the Word of God, all-perfect, all-complete, all-supreme, in every respect of personality, nature or substance.

Two parts then in the problem: one about the condition of the nature liable to be hypostatically united, and the other about the conditions of hypostatic union itself. The solution of the second part will be found contained in the solution of the first.

### (1) *The condition of the nature hypostatically united*

Above all, let it be clear that in point of fact Christ's human nature was never in existence except in Christ Himself. Not a single moment was it somebody else's nature before becoming Christ's own. There was

no change of ownership about it, nor will there ever be. The Holy Ghost created that Soul and formed that Body as the Body and Soul of the Divine Word, to be *His* for evermore. And yet the very fact of a hypostatic union, even though meant to be unending, necessarily implies a possibility, an intrinsic possibility, of separation between the natures thus united. The union *cannot* be *necessary to the Word*, who is in no need of it, nor stands either to lose or to gain by it. It *cannot* be *essential to the human nature*, in respect of which it always remains a grace, and therefore something not due. Consequently, it might go, and the humanity remain; and remain in all its essentials exactly what it is now; only, instead of being the Word's own, it would be the nature of some mere man, whether you call him Peter or Paul or John: that is, of some new man, that would spring up at once from the separation between humanity and deity. And thus we come to conceive of a nature *successively* vested in two different holders, one divine and the other human: with the conclusion that there is no *indissoluble* link (in regard to God's omnipotence) between this human nature and either of the two alternative possessors, divine or human. That being so, any human nature appears to me as separable, in some way or other, from the person to whom it actually belongs: from the Divine Person, as leaving it unaffected by the parting; from a human person, as surviving it in case of assumption to God.

Of course, the very idea may seem absurd, of such a separation, of such a transfer from one person to another, of such a change of ownership in respect of one and the same individual nature. But there are practical

absurdities, that is to say suppositions perfectly certain never to be verified in the present order of things, for lack of any reasonable purpose on the part of Him whose power they involve; and yet they are no theoretical absurdities: that is to say, they do not involve contradiction. On the other hand, they have this advantage of figuring out before our eyes in a graphic manner the philosophical implications of some revealed mystery.

Now from that eccentric supposition of ours, once viewed as theoretically correct, this conclusion follows immediately: that some difference, some *real* difference, must be found between the case of a humanity in Paul's dominion and the same humanity otherwise tenanted. A real difference must be found; because although the *same* humanity, *numerically* the same, is supposed to pass through those two stages, yet something certainly has changed, namely, in the one case there was Paul, and in the other case Paul is no more; and Paul is not nothing, no more than he is nobody. And therefore, something in the world of fact has changed; and something not merely accidental, because Paul's personality, which is gone, cannot be accounted in itself as a mere accident. I am a substance. My person is not only substantial, but subsisting. The removal of my personality would affect me most substantially. Therefore the change that is bound to take place in the transference (the supposed transference) of my nature to a divine Person, or vice versa, that change is of a substantial order. And yet the supposition is (a supposition countenanced as such by dogmatic truth), the supposition is that the humanity in its migration has not been affected in any of its

essentials: that it is, in its substance, identically the same as before.

On the one hand, therefore, no change of the substance; and on the other hand, the necessity of some change in the field of reality, of some change of a character not merely accidental, but *substantial*. That is the antimony or paradox, which scholastic theologians have set to work to elucidate.

One way out of the difficulty might be perhaps to explain the *difference* between one state and the other of the same humanity by the presence or absence of a mere negation. On this theory, my humanity is something positive; but the fact that it is mine means only that it is not taken up by God. My personality combines with the nature as a negation of divine ownership, and nothing else. The moment God steps in, to assume to Himself what was mine before, the negation vanishes, and with it my personality: I am no more, although my nature (which is no more mine) continues to flourish in God's tenure. This is, broadly speaking, the view of Duns Scotus and, outside the Scotistic school, of the Jesuit Tiphanus, and of many modern followers of each.

It is open to some serious difficulties. We were in search of a real difference. And what is offered to us is a mere negation: a negation not founded on anything positive beyond the nature itself. It is therefore no real addition to it: and therefore its disappearance is no real disappearance. We were looking for a real change: no real change has taken place, if nothing positive has accrued to or receded from the nature under consideration.

Again, to say that Paul and the nature without Paul

differ only by a negation, and not by any thing positive, seems to be introducing a merely verbal difference between a concrete humanity and a man; and therefore, in truth, if not in words, Christ's human nature would be a person: which is against the faith.

Lastly, there is this principle, equally insisted upon in the present case by St. Thomas and by Suarez, and as it seems, self-evident, namely, that a negation has no actual reality, except what may be implied in some positive affirmation as exclusive of its contrary. For instance, if a coloured gentleman is not white, the reason is because he is black, or yellow, or something else. And if a thing is colourless, the reason is because it is either transparent or spiritual: which are both positive characteristics. The only thing to distinguish itself from other things by a mere negation is nought. And therefore, if not distinguished from each other by anything positive, the case of the nature in Paul and the case of the nature without Paul turn out to be indistinguishable. In the latter case, then, the nature is no less a person than it is in the former; and the Incarnation collapses.

Therefore, let us try to find out, in the case of Paul, the *positive* element of difference that will be missing in Paul's absence.

A positive element must be an addition to the nature. According as this addition is located either after, or before, or within the nature's *existence*, there are three different roads open before us, leading to three solutions, each of which has been maintained by some theologian or other. According to Suarez, personality is consequent upon existence. According to Cajetan, it is antecedent; neither antecedent nor consequent, but precisely

identical with the possession itself of a connatural existence, according to the solution of Capreolus, revived in our days by Cardinal Billot. In point of time, Suarez came last, Cajetan in between, and Capreolus first: nearest of all to St. Thomas, of whom he is generally the most reliable interpreter, not perhaps because of superior power of mind, but, may be, on account of greater pliancy and deeper devotion to his Master.

Suarez starts with his well-known theory that no existing thing can be distinct from the formal principle of its existence. Therefore, an existing humanity must be the very actuality of its own existence. Impossible, therefore, to look upon the existence as an addition to the nature. Impossible, too, and even more so, to wedge in anything between nature and existence, if the two are but one. Therefore there is no room left for any addition to the nature, but as something consecutive to its existence. The conclusion, then, is obvious: personality will have to follow upon all other substantial elements, whether existence or nature. There can be no difficulty, then, in admitting it to be a *real* and *positive* addition to both nature and existence. The only difficulty will be to vindicate its *substantiality*. It seems to be quite an evident truth, that any new manner of being, coming on top of the substantial existence of some concrete nature, cannot be a substantial reality, but only an accidental one, even should it affect immediately the substance of the thing, as is the case with sanctifying grace in our souls. We conceive of an accident, as something meant to reside in a fully constituted nature already existing. It seems that this definition will apply with full force

to the modality introduced by Suarez as consequent upon the nature's existence. But then, if Suarez' modal addition fails to verify the conditions required, we are thrown back on the duality which he wanted to avoid, of nature and existence. Unable to safeguard the substantial character of what comes after existence, we must, for that addition to nature, implied in personality, find room either within substantial existence, or between existence and nature.

The latter solution is that of Cajetan, who makes the personal modality not a sequel, like Suarez, but a prerequisite to substantial existence. In his view, existence corresponds to the nature, as the actualizing principle to the potential element. An existing substance is an actualized potency. So far, so good. But, he goes on to say, the personal factor is an intrinsic element of any being that happens to be a person. Not so, on the contrary, the formal principle of existence. Only in God is the *actuality of* existence to be found on the side of the subject himself. Therefore, in all created beings, the personal factor will have to be accounted as something to be *actualized* by existence: as something, therefore, on the side of the potency; not indeed to be confounded with the potency, which is the nature or substance; but modifying it so as to fit it for the reception of a substantial existence all its own. Prior, therefore, to existence, and thus unquestionably substantial, although distinct from the substance itself; such is the mode of personality according to Cajetan. The theory is brilliant, and the argument is specious; but, perhaps more specious than cogent. It is quite true that the personal factor is an intrinsic element of the person, *in this sense*, that

you cannot have the person without having the personal factor. The one enters into the definition of the other: this is indispensable to that: and being indispensable, it is intrinsic to its notion. Does it mean that it will be an intrinsically constitutive element of the physical reality called Peter? Perhaps not. Take a rich man: wealth is indispensable to the notion of a rich man. But the wealth, that is the bank-notes and securities, or land, or fisheries are no internal element, no physical portion of that man whom you call a rich man. They are indispensable to the notion of a rich man, but not as something of him: only as something of *his*. Likewise whiteness is indispensable to the notion of a white man; and yet (mark, this is an example given by St. Thomas, and in the present matter) although Peter and his whiteness go to make up the white man, yet the white man is not his whiteness, but only Peter. To be *possessed by* Peter is enough for the quality of whiteness to make him white. It need not be an intrinsic element of him who is the white man.

But you may object that these are cases of accidental qualities or compounds, whereas in the case of personality we are confronted with something substantial. Here is an example taken from the substantial order. Human nature (the complex of body and soul) should apparently be called intrinsic to any one who is a man. No one can be a man without a human nature. And yet we know that in the case of Christ the human nature is united to the Man, *as something different from* that Man. He who is the Man-God is the Word, and no one else: and the Word has no other constitutive elements of Himself but His Divinity and His eternal birth from the Father. Assuredly, to make Him a man, the

humanity must come in, but it comes in as something owned by Him: as His own; not as Himself, or as a physical portion of His very Self. It is then quite possible for a thing to be included in the definition of another, and yet to remain outside its physical essence. Why? Because in the definition something may be found to be involved by connotation. In that case it will do for such an element to be possessed by the thing defined, without finding room among the internal elements that constitute its physical reality. Now, when you say that the personal factor is necessarily intrinsic to the definition, to the notion, of the person, you are expressing a great truth. But when you take it to mean that the personal factor must, therefore, enter into the physical constitution of that created person (with the result that it will be different from the existence, which must remain outside): then you are begging the question, by assuming that there is only one way for a thing to be contained in the notion of another: which is untrue.

Again you say: the notion of a person must be found no less in Paul, as merely possible, than in Paul, as actually existing.

We admit that.

But Paul, as a mere possible, you observe, does not include actual existence; and therefore the notion of a person is prior to that of existence.

Then we beg to bring in a distinction. A possible person does not include present actual existence—I agree. A possible person does not include actual existence as prospective—I deny. Prospective actual existence, that is, a possible existence, is clearly enough to characterize a possible personality, if (as your adversaries

suppose) the actual presence of a created existence is the characteristic of created personality.

Thus it does not appear that Cajetan's view is proven. On the other hand it is open to objection.

It seems to be in conflict with sound principles on the relation between nature and existence. Given the real distinction between these two terms, existence and nature, it remains that a nature is precisely by its very essence a definite and complete power of reception in regard to the actuality of existence. In this it differs from an incomplete substance, like undetermined matter, which is not a fit subject for existence, unless some form makes it fit, constituting it a completely determined measure and capacity of being. Once the determination has come, existence may set in without anything intervening. Should anything come in between to modify the nature in its regard to the actual existence, this would amount, by the very fact, to a change of the nature as such, that is, precisely as a potency to existence. The human nature would not, in that case, be the same, as a nature, with or without this intermediary modification, which is against the positive *data* of the problem before us.

Now then is the chance of Capreolus, *princeps thomistarum*, senior to Cajetan, as Cajetan was senior to Suarez. If the personal factor is neither antecedent nor consequent to the substantial existence, it must be found within it; Capreolus thinks that in truth, as well as in St. Thomas' mind, the difference between a human nature that is a person (as in the case of Peter) and a human nature that is not a person (as in Christ's case) is reducible to this: in the one case the nature exists through an existence of its own, in the other, through the

existence of an uncreated Being. In the first case, then, the complex of body and soul, the potency, will be endowed with existence by a formal principle of being, commensurate and connatural; there will be absolute proportion between act and potency. In the other case, the formal principle of being, the act, will transcend the potency infinitely. And thus the existence of the nature will be supernatural, not connatural; not on a par with the nature, but far surpassing it. Thus, in the first case (the case of Peter) the humanity is possessed of an existence all its own; it exists, not only as a substantial power of action, but as an agent, with its own initiative and its own ends; it exists, in a word, for its own sake, because it exists independently of any one existing, except the Creator as such. Clearly it does not exist of itself, or without cause: that is God's exclusive privilege. But it exists *by* itself, apart from any companionship or partnership in existence; it is *self-enclosed*: which is the definition of a person.

Should, however, that humanity come to be deprived of such autonomous existence, and, instead, be maintained in being by union with the existence of the Word, then the humanity is no longer a man, no longer a person, because no longer self-contained, no longer the autonomous owner of being; but it is owned itself by One, who, being His own existence, imparts to the lower substance fellowship in being with Himself. Thus, if we compare the human nature and its manner of being, two cases are possible: either the human nature is the possessor, and existence is the possession; or the human nature is held by the personal existence of one of the Trinity. Of the two terms, humanity and existence, the one that holds the other is the person.

And, therefore, human nature is a person in our case; and, therefore, human nature is not a person in the case of Christ.

Such is Capreolus's solution of the problem. Its force comes from the exclusion of the other two solutions, but also from its internal coherence.

What do we call a person, or a subsisting individual, in opposition to a mere nature? We mean one that exists as a complete whole: not as a part of a whole, like my hand; nor as an associate only, like my body; nor as a mere belonging or dependency, like Christ's humanity. We mean one existing separately as well as independently: self-governed no less than self-contained. All that is verified at once when you have, in the created sphere, a complete nature fitted with *what is required* to make it exist by itself and for itself. What then is required for this? Nothing more than the ordinary connatural existence of a human nature. Have that, I would say to the nature, and at once, you are a man, you are somebody: because to exist in such manner, is to subsist as a whole, as an independent unit. On the contrary, failing such existence, the nature depends at once on the higher One, who by union with Himself can associate to His existence the humble consort of Divine Majesty.

Thus the two sides of the fundamental problem, raised by the Incarnation: our side of it, the personality of our concrete human nature; and Christ's side, human nature without human personality: both sides, I say, receive at the hands of Capreolus satisfactory solutions, drawn from one principle only: namely, the *equation* between *created personality* and *ownership of created being*.

(2) *The conditions of hypostatic union itself*

This, so far, is a success. But against this success there is a double menace. And first of all, the critic may ask, how can an uncreated existence be the existence of a created thing, like body and soul? Secondly, if, in the case under consideration, there is nothing before us, but the humanity and the personal existence of the Word, then where is that new positive element supposed to be brought into being by the Incarnation? The uncreated Being was in existence before, just as it is now; the human nature is said to be, in all its substantials, the same now as it would be outside hypostatic union: shall we then say that the Incarnation consists only of an amputation, the amputation of a created existence, without the introduction of anything beyond the unchanged reality of those two terms: human nature, and the personality of the Word? But then, if that were so, there would be no difference between the incarnation of the Word and the incarnation of any other Person of the Blessed Trinity. *As a happening*, as a created event, one case would be exactly like the other: the same removal of a finite existence; the same finite human nature, unchanged; the same unchangeableness of whatever is infinite, Father, Son, or Holy Ghost. So that the incarnation of one Person could not take place, without the incarnation of the other two being also verified. Which is heresy with a vengeance.

These are the two difficulties against Capreolus' theory. Indeed they might be urged also against the view of Cajetan. But let us see how they can be met in conformity with Capreolus' own principles. This will show us in what consists the reality of the hypostatic union.

In the first place, when it is said that the humanity assumed by the Word exists by His own uncreated existence, what is meant by such uncreated existence is not the divine existence *as common* to Father, Son and Holy Ghost, but as personal to the Word, as inherited from the Father: *as relative*, therefore, to its originating principle, no less than absolute in its substance. As such, the personal existence of the Word is by no means the personal existence of the Father nor of the Holy Ghost.

Secondly, and this is of paramount importance, when it is said that the humanity exists by that divine existence, the meaning is that to this humanity the divine existence is communicated as an actual principle of being, instead of the formal principle of existence which normally ought to be its own. We speak therefore of an actualizing principle, uncreated and eternal, but communicated in time on a certain day, which was that of the Annunciation. The communication, therefore, is not eternal; it had a beginning: it might, if God willed, have an end. And, not being eternal, it is not uncreated, but created: while, of course, absolutely supernatural. There is a difference, therefore, between the thing communicated and its communication. The one is not the other: no more than the uncreated Gift of Grace is the communication of it made to us. The communication is the created gift: habitual grace, as it is called, or sanctifying grace; by which we possess the uncreated Gift, the Holy Ghost.

Again, God's essence will be given to us in heaven as the uncreated object of our intellectual gaze. But the reception of the object in the faculty and the soul will not be God's essence: it will be the light of glory.

Again, the soul communicates itself to the body, to quicken it and make it human. What is communicated is incorruptible, is immortal, being spiritual; the communication is frail, perishable, shortlived, because corporeal. Generally speaking, in every case when the *actualizing principle* is of a kind to exist by itself, its communication (natural or supernatural) to a *receptive power* will partake of the conditions of the latter, and therefore, be different from the former.

So then, the communication of the Word's own being is something created, although the being of the Word is uncreated. And *there* is the new element introduced by the Incarnation; new, no less than created; truly positive; no mere amputation; new and positive, but also substantial: and this is what we now have to note. It is substantial, forasmuch as the communication of the Word's existence to the soul and body is the actualization (supernatural, of course) of the human nature as a potency in regard of being. The actualization of such potency is something in the substantial order; not anything that could be reduced to mere accident. Indeed, it is the most substantial actuality of all; although it is no part of the nature thus actuated: but it is what we call substantial existence.

Thus it appears that when we speak of the *existence* of Christ's humanity, there may be two meanings to the word. We may mean the actualizing principle: the *esse*. In that sense, we say that there is only one existence (one *esse*) of the Word and His humanity: the existence of the latter is the existence of the former; is the former Himself. But we may mean also by existence of the humanity not the actuating principle, but the actuation by it. In that sense, the existence

of the humanity is not the Word, nor His divine existence; it is something belonging to the created order; and, in the created order, it has two different aspects: it is absolute, as a substantial actuation; and it is relative, essentially relative to the Word's personal existence. And thus there is an intrinsic difference between a hypostatic union with the Word, and a hypostatic union, if the case should arise, with the Holy Ghost or the Father. The relation would differ with the difference of the terms; and with the relation, the absolute itself, which is one with it. Such is the answer for Capreolus to the objections against his thesis.

No, Capreolus is not confounded. He seems to have understood St. Thomas best of all; especially the famous *Quodlibetum* on Angels and their personality.

Capreolus does not say that human personality is existence: which would be mere nonsense. He says that human personality is ownership of commensurate existence. The human person, Peter or Paul, is the nature, as a subject of the existence to which it is entitled of itself.

If then it is said that the connatural existence is the personal factor, it must be taken in this sense, that it is the element, the possession or connotation of which turns a nature into a person. Between the nature and its connatural existence there is no room for anything. Between the human nature of Christ and His Divine existence there is room for a communication of the latter to the former: a *created* communication, which is in fact the hypostatic union; in other words, as it is called by theologians, the created grace of union; which at the same time may be said to be the sacred humanity's substantial and supernatural existence;

but an existence not to be taken for the act of being, but for an association, a created association, of the potency with the uncreated act. And thus is it lawful to speak, as St. Thomas does, either of *two* existences or of *one* existence of the Word Incarnate: one act of being, in common for the two natures; but a created actuation for the human nature, besides the uncreated one in the Godhead.

On this foundation may be reared all that is best in the teaching of Scholastics on Christ's grace and knowledge: a grave problem, which we cannot deal with now; but must be satisfied to take note of it in connection with what has gone before.

Sanctifying grace must in Christ be strictly proportioned to the grace of union. There is a natural proportion in every being between the perfection of existence and the quality of the operative powers; for this reason that operation is at once the outcome and the aim of the being: and therefore between the two there can be no inequality. The effect is not superior to the cause; nor on the other hand is the means superior to the end. Now the manner of *existing* for Christ's humanity is hypostatic union: no manner of *operation* can be proportionate to that, except the most intimate conjunction between the intellect and the uncreated Truth. Therefore the highest possible degree of beatific vision must exist in Christ's soul, as Cajetan, after St. Thomas, has right well observed. But beatific vision is in strict proportion to sanctifying grace. Therefore, the highest possible sanctifying grace has its domicile in the soul of Christ. Thence it may pour itself out into our souls; and of the fulness of it we have all received, and grace for grace:

participated grace, instead of the grace unparticipated, which in Christ's humanity is the natural accompaniment of hypostatic union. Thus does sanctifying grace in us entail imitation and participation of Christ's Sonship, forasmuch as it makes us share in Christ's birthright, in the beatific vision.

Supreme as the vision may be in Christ, yet it would not do for Him as a basis for any revelation whatever to either angels or men. What is seen *of* God or *in* God by beatific vision is, as such, unutterable, and therefore incommunicable. God may be seen, He cannot be told as He is seen. He is seen as He is; He cannot be told as He is, except by Himself, to the exclusion of any creature whatsoever: be it even His own human soul. On the other hand, beatific vision, as previously observed, is conditioned by the light of glory. And the light of glory is itself, and in itself, an object of knowledge, of direct and immediate knowledge (Suarez, *De Incarnatione*, disp. 29, sect. 4), to the soul possessed of it; one, of course, far inferior to the object of beatific vision, which is God Himself, and the rest in God; but far superior none the less to any other object under God: seeing that the light of glory is, as we have already noticed, the created communication of the uncreated light to the soul's intellect. As a reflex therefore of that self-subsisting Truth which discloses itself in vision, it reflects also to the eyes of the mind, better than any other representation or mirror could do, the contents of the higher and incommunicable revelation; but it reflects them translated, so to say, into intellectual forms of the created order, purely spiritual indeed, and thus baffling our present modes of thought and expression, but fit to be used by the soul for its direct intercourse with other souls or spirits.

There is then to be found in Christ (as a result, St. Thomas says, of beatific vision) a secondary knowledge,[1] infused and supernatural, by means of which Christ's soul is in a position to reveal to Angels and to the spirits of men, what the beatific vision shows to Him, over and above His fellows. This supernatural infused knowledge does not prevent Christ from having also, as a man should, an acquired knowledge: a knowledge based on sense-experience, and developed by means of the rational principles common to all children of men; a knowledge therefore expressible, like ours, in human language. Not only does the infused knowledge not hinder the acquired, but it prompts and enriches it, by associating with it a number of *data* which, as circumstances may require, find themselves transfused from the higher into the lower sphere of this one soul's manifold, and yet strictly individual conscience: thus enabling Christ to communicate to mortals by the ordinary channel of human conversation the hidden mysteries which no mortal eye could fathom.

Such then was in this world the equipment of Christ's intellect. At the summit, beatific vision; under it, the necessarily resulting knowledge, supernaturally infused; and down below, ordinary knowledge of the type specifically human, whether acquired or derived from above. According to the amount of information, of supplementary information, thus vouchsafed to the lower knowledge by the higher, or by them withheld, Christ might be said to 'know' or 'not to know' the

[1] *Summa*, III. 9, 3 ad 2: Infused knowledge in regard to vision is a disposition, not as leading towards it (*sicut via ducens ad perfectionem*), but as flowing from it (*sicut effectus a perfectione procedens*).—We leave out of account here the infused knowledge, of a natural order, common to all souls after death.

divine secrets about which people might enquire. Supposing the locks between the levels to be opened, then He would 'know' in every possible way. Should they remain closed, then He would 'not know,' by knowledge specifically human, by knowledge humanly communicable; He would 'not know' for all the purposes of social life; although it remained true, even then, that He did know, not only as God, but also as Man, both by beatific vision and by the consequent infused science.

Thus does the anomaly disappear of a profession of ignorance in Christ, regarding the last day, the day of Judgment. He says He did not know it; and the Church says that there was nothing He did not know. And the Church is unerring; and He is Truth itself. Yes, Truth made Man; and in Man, self-perceiving; and perceived, all manifesting; but not necessarily to all parts of the soul: that is, during the time of His self-annihilation; during His mortal life, when He denied to Himself the prerogatives, which He now enjoys in His glory.

## IX.

# OUR LADY IN THE EARLY CHURCH.

By the Rev. Thomas E. Garde, O.P., S.T.M., Lic. S. Script.

The object of this paper is to set forth the teaching of the early Church regarding Our Blessed Lady. It is therefore confined to the domain of positive theology.

We have no pretension of finding the whole of Catholic teaching about the Virgin Mary fully developed and explicitly formulated in the early centuries. At the close of the Apostolic age the Church had in her possession written records and oral traditions about the Mother of Jesus. As these were handed down, they gained in clearness and precision. The false teaching of Jews and heretics compelled the defenders of the faith to state explicitly truths contained implicitly in the sources of Revelation. One will seek in vain for certain terms in the literature of the second century, which are now an essential part of Catholic Mariology. But the ideas expressed by such terms are found from the earliest times. They merely awaited the genius of a Tertullian, a Basil or an Augustine to crystallize them, as it were, into one short word or phrase, which henceforth became the normal expression of the Church's teaching.

It will be helpful to determine the limits of the period which we intend to study, the various sources of our information, as well as the special points under consideration. Our investigation is confined to that early

period of the Church's history, which extends from the close of the Apostolic age down to the Council of Ephesus in 431. This period is of supreme importance for the student of Mariology. To many outside the fold of the Church, Catholic teaching about the Mother of Jesus is a stumbling-block and a scandal. Many of them are sure that the Catholic Church, in this as in other matters, has departed from the pure traditions of the infant Church. Hence the necessity for the Catholic apologist of studying the records of these early times with a view to proving the substantial unity of the Church's teaching on this important point of Catholic theology.

The sources of information may, roughly speaking, be classed under four heads: (1) the official teaching of the Church, as set forth, for instance, in the Creed; (2) the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers; (3) the apocryphal and anonymous Christian literature; (4) paintings and inscriptions, especially the mural paintings in the Roman catacombs.

We shall consider the following special points which will also serve as a division of our lecture: (i) the divine Maternity of Mary in the teaching of the early Church; (ii) her perpetual Virginity; (iii) her Sanctity; (iv) her co-operation in the work of Redemption; (v) devotion to Mary in the early centuries.

### (1) The Divine Maternity

According to the teaching of the Catholic Church, fixed by an Ecumenical Council, Mary is really and truly the Mother of God. Of her many glorious prerogatives this is the highest. It is the cause of her sanctity, the origin of her greatness. Did this high title form part

of the rudimental teaching of the early Church? This is the question which claims our attention. An impartial examination of the early records leaves no doubt as to the answer. We find there, clearly set forth, first the doctrine of Mary's divine Maternity, and then the wondrous title itself, 'Mother of God' (*Theotokos; Deipara*).

Our first witness is St. Ignatius of Antioch, who suffered for the faith in Rome about 107. In order to understand the value of his testimony, we must remember that he was one of the early successors of St. Peter in the See of Antioch, that he was a disciple of the Apostles. Hence his teaching represents, not merely his own personal opinion, but the tradition of a great church—a tradition very probably Apostolic in its origin. In his seven epistles this great champion of the faith refers frequently to the Incarnation. He especially insists on the reality of the Sacred Humanity of Jesus against the Docetic heretics. It is in this connection that he speaks of Mary as truly the Mother of God. Here is what he writes to the Christians of Ephesus: 'There is one physician, who is both flesh and spirit, born and yet not-born, who is God in man, true life in death, *both of Mary and of God*, first passible, and then impassible, Jesus Christ Our Lord' (chap. vii). Again more explicitly in the same epistle: 'For our God, Jesus Christ, *was conceived by Mary*, by the dispensation of God' (chap. xviii). To the Church of Smyrna he writes thus: 'Being fully persuaded regarding Our Lord, that He is in truth of the family of David according to the flesh, *God's son*, by the will and power of God, *truly born of a Virgin*' (chap. i.). Therefore, according to this great Father, the Son of God was truly

born of the Virgin. It clearly follows from this He was the Virgin's son, and that she was the Mother of God.

Towards the end of the second century we meet with yet more remarkable evidence for the doctrine which we are considering. About the year 180 St. Irenaeus wrote his monumental refutation of Gnosticism, commonly known as the *Adversus Haereses*. Few were better fitted than he to bear witness to the teaching of the early Church. His early years were spent in the school of Polycarp at Smyrna. Passing thence to Gaul, he became bishop of Lyons. He was in close communication with the Church of Rome. In the third book of his great work, he lays down as the rule of faith the Apostolic tradition. Moreover, his special attention to the mystery of the Incarnation has won for him the title of first theologian of the Redemption. He may with equal justice be called the first theologian of the Virgin-Mother. Irenaeus not only affirms, but proves the union of the two natures in the one Divine Person—from which union the divine Maternity of Mary logically follows (*Adv. Haer.* III. 19. 1). Could he express this more clearly than when he writes: 'The angel announced to Mary that *she should bear God*' (*Ibid.* v. 19. 1)? And again: 'The same, who was born of God the Father, and none other, was born also of the Virgin; and the sacred Scriptures bear witness to both these births. Son of God, Our Lord is at one and the same time the Word of the Father and the Son of man' (*Adv. Haer.* III. 19. 3). Such was the belief of Christian Antiquity in Asia Minor and in Southern Gaul.

It would be easy to continue this line of witnesses in the third and fourth centuries. One or two must suffice. Tertullian will speak for Africa and Rome,

Origen for the great Church of Alexandria. Tertullian (who died about 220), though in some points he gravely erred, has been justly praised for the precision of his theological terms. Speaking of Our Lady he does not, it is true, use the title 'Mother of God.' But many equivalent expressions are found in his various writings. In his work *De Carne Christi*, he speaks of the Son of God being born of a Virgin (chap. xvii). In another place we read the pithy phrase, *Nasci se Deus in utero patitur matris*—'God suffered Himself to be born in the womb of a mother' (*De Patientia*, III). He triumphantly proves against Praxeas that Mary brought forth, not merely a man, but God. 'That which she conceived, she brought forth; but He who is born is God' (*Contra Praxeam*, XXVII: *Quod concepit, id peperit . . . Sed ille, qui natus, est Deus*).

The dignity of divine Maternity is frequently attributed to Our Lady in the works of Origen which have come down to us. Mary is called by him 'the Mother of the Lord' and 'the Mother of the Saviour' (*In Luc.* hom. VII, VIII). He says of her that she bore in her womb the Son of God (*Ibid.* VII). And again that she brought forth Emmanuel, God with us, as became a Virgin pure and without stain (*Contra Celsum* I. 35).

A doctrine held by such eminent witnesses of the faith, living at different times, and in regions far apart, must surely represent the traditional teaching of Christian Antiquity. Fortunately a document of the very highest value puts this point beyond all reasonable doubt. The Creed in its earliest form, which dates at least from the second century, proclaims belief in the divine Maternity. It runs thus: 'I believe in God, the Father Almighty, and in Jesus Christ, His only Son,

Our Lord, who was born of the Holy Ghost and of the Virgin Mary' (Denz. *Enchir. Symb.* 2). If the only Son of God was conceived and born of the Virgin Mary, does it not immediately follow that she was the Mother of God?

Before passing on to the next division of my paper, I wish to refer to the origin and early use of the title 'Mother of God' (*Theotokos*). It can easily be proved that the term was in use long before the Council of Ephesus. It is, however, impossible to determine with certainty the author of this glorious title. If we can believe the historian Socrates, Origen was the first to use and explain it in his Commentary on *Romans* (*Hist. Eccles.* VII. 32). Unfortunately there is no trace of this in the Latin translation of this Commentary, due to the pen of the unreliable Rufinus. However this may be, it seems beyond all reasonable doubt that the term made its first appearance in the Church of Alexandria. A writer of the fifth century, Philip of Side, ascribes to Pierius, head of the Alexandrian School at the beginning of the fourth century, a sermon or homily on the Mother of God (Cf. De Boor, *Texte und Untersuchungen*, V, ii, pp. 165-184). Also from a text of Peter of Alexandria (died 311), extant in Syriac, it seems certain that the original Greek contained the word *Theotokos* (Pitra, *Analecta Sacra*, tom. IV. *Trad. lat.* p. 406, fragm. D). Henceforth its use becomes more and more frequent, until the Council of Ephesus adopted it as the consecrated expression of Mary's divine Maternity.

### (2) Mary's Perpetual Virginity

The Catholic Church holds as a dogma of faith the virginity of Mary in its fullest and most absolute sense.

Not only was her Divine Son conceived miraculously in her chaste womb; moreover, He was born miraculously, and her first-begotten was also her only-begotten Son. To use the technical language of the Church herself, Mary preserved her virginal purity *ante partum, in partu et post partum* (Denz. 880). Let us examine what was the mind of the primitive ages of Christianity on this three-fold virginity of Our Lady.

(*a*) *Ante partum.* It was in connection with and because of her divine Maternity that the early Christian apologists had occasion to speak of Mary's virginal purity *ante partum.* The chief opponents of this truth were, first of all the Jews, and then the heretical sects that made their appearance in the second century, such as the Gnostics and Ebionites. It was these attacks which led the early Fathers to proclaim their belief in the supernatural conception of Jesus. Among the three mysteries, which St. Ignatius of Antioch wished to be proclaimed aloud, one was the Virginity of Mary. This beautiful passage occurs in his epistle to the Ephesians: 'Hidden from the prince of this world were *the virginity of Mary* and her giving birth, and likewise also the death of the Lord—three mysteries to be cried aloud, which were wrought in the stillness of God' (chap. XIX).

Towards the middle of the second century, the great apologist St. Justin (who died about 165) in his *Dialogue with Trypho* gives special prominence to the miraculous origin of Our Lord. Not only does he repeatedly affirm that He was supernaturally conceived, but he proves it from several texts of the Old Testament, especially the famous prophecy of Isaias: *Behold a virgin shall conceive.* He undertakes to prove against

his adversary 'that this prophecy was not spoken of Ezechias, but of my Christ' (chap. LXXI). The true meaning of the sign is this: 'that through a virgin's womb the First-born of every creature should take flesh and be truly made man' (chap. LXXXIV). All through the *Dialogue* the Virginity of Mary is inseparably bound up with the mystery of the Incarnation. Perhaps the title 'Virgin' had already become a proper name for the Mother of Jesus. It appears in the pages of St. Justin even when there is no special reason for mentioning it (*cf.* chap. XLIII, XLV, *etc.*).

In perfect harmony with the teaching of St. Justin is that of St. Irenaeus. This great theologian does not hesitate to say that 'they die impenitent in the thraldom of the primeval disobedience, who deny the supernatural conception of Jesus. . . . Those who know not Emmanuel born of the Virgin have no share in the blessings of everlasting life' (*Adv. Haer.* III. 19 ff). Such is the teaching of the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers in the third and fourth centuries. Such was the common belief of all the faithful, so much so that it is found in all the Creeds of this early period.

(*b*) *In partu.* Our Lady's virginity *in partu* was certainly denied by Tertullian (*De Carne Christi*, XXIII), perhaps also by Origen (*In Luc.* hom. XIV). Is it not remarkable that of all the Christian writers of the first centuries only these two not always trustworthy witnesses denied the miraculous birth of Jesus? A long array of arguments can be brought forward to prove that Tertullian and Origen are out of harmony with the opinion commonly received in the early Church. Nor did this common belief owe its origin to the false teaching of the Docetic heretics, as some non-Catholic

critics erroneously suppose. An impartial examination of the early records proves quite the contrary. Few, if any, of the Fathers have insisted so strongly on the reality of Christ's humanity as did Ignatius of Antioch. And yet according to him one of the mysteries hidden from the prince of this world was the birth of our Lord (*Ad Ephes.* XIX). Far more explicit is the evidence of certain apocryphal writings, notably that of the so-called *Gospel of St. James*, or *Protevangelium*. In the earlier portion of this, which dates from the second century, Mary's virginity *in partu* is clearly affirmed. St. Irenaeus has been triumphantly claimed as an opponent of the virginal birth (G. Herzog: *Revue d'Histoire et de la Litt. rel.* 1907, p. 484). But is it not remarkable that in the text in question Irenaeus lays such stress on the purity of the birth of Jesus? (*Adv. Haer.* IV. 33. 11: 'Filius Dei filius hominis *purus pure puram* aperiens vulvam.') In the fourth century and early fifth, there is no longer room for doubt, so clear is the teaching of the Fathers on this point. St. Ephrem bears witness for the Church of Syria in the well-known text in his *Sermo adv. haereticos* (*Opera graeco-latina*, tom. II, pp. 266-267). In the West St. Ambrose (*In Luc.* II, 57), St. Hilary (*De Trinitate*, III, 19), St. Jerome (*Adv. Pelagianos*, II. 4) are equally explicit. We may appropriately end this section on the virginal birth with the beautiful words of St. Augustine: *Concipiens virgo, pariens virgo, virgo gravida, virgo feta, virgo perpetua . . . Deum sic nasci oportuit, quando esse dignatus est homo* (*Sermo* CLXXXVI, *in Natali Domini*, III. 1).

(*c*) *Post partum.* On this point there was little room for doubt in the minds of the early Christians. It

was in the highest degree becoming that she, whose privilege it was to bear in her chaste womb the Word made flesh, should always remain pure and immaculate. The specious difficulties drawn from certain texts of Scripture (Matt. xii. 46-50; xiii. 54-57) had little or no effect on the faith of the primitive Church. Tertullian's discordant voice remains without an echo in the Ante-Nicene period. When certain heretics in the fourth century dared to call in question Mary's perpetual Virginity, they elicited the indignant protest of great writers like St. Epiphanius and St. Jerome. Owing to his profound knowledge of the Sacred Scriptures, St. Jerome was especially fitted to refute the arguments of his opponent Helvidius. His work: *De perpetua virginitate B. Mariae adversus Helvidium* (383) is the first treatise by a Father of the Western Church devoted exclusively to Our Lady. In it the holy Doctor, all on fire with zeal for the honour of the Virgin-Mother, examines carefully and refutes conclusively all the arguments against the perpetual Virginity of Mary. In so doing he merely gives expression to the traditional teaching of the Church. The title *Ever-Virgin* is found already in the writings of St. Athanasius (*Or.* II *Contra Arianos*, LXX). It is also used by Didymus the Blind, another doctor of the Alexandrian school (*De Trinitate*, I. 27). In the year 390, a Roman Synod condemned the false teaching of Helvidius, which had been renewed by Jovinianus and Bonosius. Henceforward the perpetual Virginity of Our Lady becomes part of the explicit teaching of the Catholic Church.

### (3) Mary's Sanctity

Down through the centuries the idea of Mary's personal holiness came to be more and more deeply realized by succeeding generations of Christians. One so closely united as she was to the Source of all holiness, must have surpassed all other creatures in sanctity. In the Council of Trent the Church proclaimed her belief in her freedom from all actual sin. In 1854, her Immaculate Conception became a dogma of Catholic faith.

Turning now to the teaching of the writers of the first centuries, it is interesting to note the gradual unfolding of the fundamental principles, which form the basis of this sublime teaching. The third Gospel forms the starting-point. The angelic salutation—'Hail, full of grace!'—contains hidden beneath its apparent simplicity, profound conclusions. Throughout the Gospel of the Infancy, St. Luke in his own inimitable way delicately outlines the humility of Mary, her obedience, her faith, her loving contemplation of the mysteries accomplished by God through her instrumentality.

A development of this rudimental teaching is found in the *Gospel of St. James*. Here we find Our Lady —especially her conception, birth and childhood—surrounded with an atmosphere of transcendent purity. A certain reading in a very ancient MS. of this Gospel seems to suggest the doctrine of her Immaculate Conception (cf. *Dict. de Théol. Cath.* tom. VII, col. 876). However this may be, the author, following St. Luke, gives special prominence to Mary's profound humility. It is his evident intention to represent Our Lady as a

model of all perfection. In common with other writers of this period, he considers the holiness of the Mother of God as an extension of her virginal purity. Once granted that she was a moral, conscious and free instrument, and not a mere physical instrument, in the mystery of the Incarnation, her purity could no longer be restricted to the specific virtue of virginity. It came to mean the purity of her whole person. Hence we find in the early writings the epithet 'holy Virgin' more frequently than that of 'holy Mary.'

The question of Our Lady's sanctity is closely connected with that of her Immaculate Conception. The student will search in vain for explicit testimony to this wonderful privilege during the Ante-Nicene period. But the mind of the faithful is clearly tending towards the express acceptance of this doctrine. It seems to follow logically from certain principles commonly held at this time, such, for instance, as the consideration of Mary as Second Eve. If the first Eve was pure and holy in her origin, what shall we conclude of the second and greater Eve? Does not St. Hippolytus of Rome seem implicitly to admit the Immaculate Conception, when he says: 'The Lord is sinless, being according to his humanity *of incorruptible wood*, to wit, *of the virgin* and of the Holy Ghost' (*περὶ τοῦ Ἀντιχρίστου*, viii)? True, the direct intention of this Doctor is to prove the sinlessness of Christ; but his reasoning supposes the immaculate purity of Mary.

If the Ante-Nicene period affords no explicit testimony on this point, not so the period which immediately follows. The words of St. Ambrose and St. Augustine are known to all. The former calls Mary 'a virgin immune from every stain of sin' (*Exposit. in Ps.* CXVIII,

*Serm.* XXII). Refuting Pelagius, St. Augustine declares that all the just have truly known sin, 'except the holy Virgin Mary, of whom, for the honour of the Lord, I will have no question whatever, where sin is concerned' (*De Nat. et Grat.* XXXVI). If there be some room for doubt as to the extent of Mary's sinlessness in the mind of these Fathers, there can be no such hesitancy as to the meaning of St. Ephrem. This great Doctor of the Syrian Church (died 373) merits the very special attention of the student of Mariology. Perhaps no other Father, with the exception of St. Bernard, has sung so sweetly the glories of Mary. Certainly no Father, before or after, has taught so clearly the doctrine of her Immaculate Conception. He compares the sinlessness of Mary to that of Christ Himself. 'Thou alone (O Lord) and Thy Mother are *under every aspect all-beautiful,* because in Thee, O Lord, there is no stain, *and in Thy Mother there is no spot*' (*Carmina Nisibena,* Edit. Bickell, p. 122). Comment on this text seems superfluous. It is evident that St. Ephrem held Our Lady to be free, not only from actual, but also from original sin. This is her unique privilege, which she alone shares with her Divine Son. Here is yet another example of the sublime language in which this devoted lover of Our Lady sings of her transcendent holiness: 'Most holy Lady, Mother of God, alone most pure in soul and body, alone exceeding all perfection of purity . . . My Lady most holy, all-pure, all-immaculate, all-stainless, all-undefiled, all-incorrupt, all-inviolate . . . spotless robe of Him who clothes Himself with light as with a garment . . . flower unfading, purple woven by God, alone most immaculate' (*Opera graeco-latina,* III. 524-37). In the mind of St. Ephrem, Mary was as

innocent as Eve before the fall, a virgin most estranged from every stain of sin, more holy than the Seraphim, the sealed fountain of the Holy Ghost, the pure seed of God, ever in body and mind intact and immaculate (*Carmina Nisibena*, Edit. Bickell, p. 122).

Time does not permit us to dwell further on the question of Mary's holiness. If I have not mentioned the few during this period who admitted some slight fault or imperfection in Our Lady, it is not through a wish to evade a difficulty so frequently brought forward by our adversaries. The voices of these theologians are certainly out of harmony with the general chorus of Christian tradition. In this matter I would much prefer to follow the instinctive reverence of all the faithful towards the Mother of God, rather than the subtle reasoning of a Tertullian or an Origen.

### (4) Mary's Co-operation in Redemption

The mystery of Redemption is fundamental in Catholic theology. In this mystery the Sacred Humanity of Our Lord was instrumental. Therefore she, from whom He took human nature, had her share in working out the salvation of mankind—and this all the more as she was a moral, conscious agent in the divine plan. In the Gospel narrative, this active co-operation of the Virgin Mary is clearly set forth. Only after carefully weighing the angel's message does the Virgin of Nazareth consent to become the Mother of God. 'Behold the handmaid of the Lord; be it done unto me according to Thy word' (Luke i. 38).

First among the Fathers to give more definite shape to this teaching is St. Justin. In his *Dialogue*, Mary appears as Co-redemptrix, or, to use his own expression,

as Second Eve. After him we could cite a score of writers in the early centuries, who repeat this doctrine. In the fourth century the contrast between Eve and Mary has become proverbial. *Mors per Evam, vita per Mariam*, writes St. Jerome (*Epist.* XXII. *ad Eustoch.*, § 2). By no one, perhaps, is it more richly developed than by Irenaeus. His presentation of it is all the more important, as he is rightly considered the most faithful representative of the theology of the second century, and his work *Adversus Haereses* became a sort of manual for the succeeding generations. In it we find Mary's *rôle* as Second Eve thus described: 'With fitness, Mary the Virgin is found obedient, saying: *Behold Thy handmaid, O Lord; be it done unto me according to Thy word.* But Eve was disobedient; for she obeyed not, while she was yet a virgin. As she, having indeed Adam for a husband, but as yet being a virgin. . . becoming disobedient, became the cause of death both to herself and the whole human race, so also Mary, having the predestined man, and being yet a virgin, being obedient, *became both to herself and the whole human race the cause of salvation* . . .; and so the knot of Eve's disobedience received its unloosing through the obedience of Mary; for what Eve, a virgin, bound by incredulity, that Mary, a virgin, unloosed by faith' (*Adv. Haer.* III. 22. 34). Again later on he says, 'As Eve by the speech of an angel was seduced, so as to flee God, transgressing His word, so also Mary received the good tidings by means of the angel's speech, so as to bear God within her, being obedient to His Word. And, though the one had disobeyed God, yet the other was drawn to obey God; *that of the virgin Eve, the Virgin Mary might become the advocate.* And as by a virgin the human race had

been bound to death, *by a virgin it is saved*, the balance being preserved, a virgin's disobedience by a virgin's obedience' (*Ibid.* V. 19: some MSS. in place of *salvatur* read *solvatur*; but the sense is the same). There is no doubt as to the traditional nature of this doctrine. What is its import and its consequences ?

First of all it is abundantly clear that, in the mind of these early witnesses of the faith, Mary was not merely the physical instrument of the Incarnation, but the moral, conscious, responsible cause of it. As Eve by her disobedience brought about the ruin of the human race, so Mary by her faith and obedience had a share in its restoration. Irenaeus does not hesitate to call her the *cause of salvation* to the whole human race. As Cardinal Newman rightly observes, 'no one, who acknowledges the force of early testimony in determining Christian truth, can wonder, no one can complain, can object, that we Catholics should hold a very high doctrine concerning the Blessed Virgin, unless indeed stronger statements can be brought for a contrary conception of her, either of as early, or at least of a later date' (*Letter to Dr. Pusey*, new impression, London, 1920, pp. 38-39). Such, however, is not the case. The testimony on her behalf grows stronger with each succeeding century.

I can merely suggest to your thoughtful consideration the great sanctity and high dignity of Mary as Second Eve and Co-redemptrix of the human race. In the letter from which I have just quoted, Newman does not hesitate to infer from this traditional teaching of the primitive Church the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception (p. 46). And it is only by reflecting on the honour which would have accrued to Eve had

she been steadfast in the hour of trial, that we can realize the exaltation which is Mary's due as Second Eve. On Holy Saturday the Church in a transport of joy sings of her Divine Redeemer, *O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem*! Considering the high prerogatives of the Virgin Mary as Second Eve, it seems quite in keeping with the spirit of the early Fathers to sing joyfully of her also, 'O fortunate fault, which gained for us such and so great a Co-redemptrix!'

We shall now pass on to the last section of our paper, which deals with devotion to Our Lady in this early period.

### (5) Devotion to Mary

In this respect, the first thing which strikes us is the apparent absence of special devotion to the Mother of Jesus during the first centuries. In order to explain this, it is necessary to bear in mind some important considerations. First of all, there is the distinction between *faith* and *devotion*, on which Cardinal Newman insists so strongly in the letter already referred to. Faith is always the same. Not so with devotion. Here there is ample room for change and progress. There is little need to stress this point, which is evident both from history and our own experience. Moreover, the greatest among the saints were not necessarily the first to become the object of special devotion. Those in particular among them, who were most intimately associated with the mystery of the Incarnation, were not, for that very reason, venerated by a distinct and special *cultus*. Lastly, liturgical prayer, in its earliest manifestations, is intimately connected with the

memories of the martyrs—those heroes, who had shed their blood for the faith, whose mortal remains became the object of a loving veneration, and whose *dies natalis* was inscribed in the annals of the Church. None of these reasons obtained in the case of Our Blessed Lady.

We are not surprised, therefore, to find few traces of devotion to Mary in the early records which have come down to us. And yet she was surely the object of deep veneration on the part of the early Christians. This is abundantly evident in all the literature which deals with the origin of Jesus. The Virgin-Mother shares in the glory of her Divine Child. In this respect the so-called *Gospel of St. James* exercised a considerable influence in promoting devotion to Mary. Recent investigation has gone a long way towards proving the existence of a feast in her honour before the Council of Ephesus. According to P. Jugie, this feast was a movable one, celebrated very probably on the Sunday preceding Christmas, under the title of a 'Memory of Holy Mary,' having for its object the divine Maternity and especially the virginal Conception (cf. *Échos d'Orient*, Avril-Juin, 1923, pp. 129 ss.).

A remarkable example of Mary's vigilant care of the Church occurs in the third century. St. Gregory of Nyssa relates that his namesake, St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, Bishop of Neo-Caesarea in Pontus, was favoured with a heavenly vision: Mary deigned to appear to him, together with the apostle St. John. At the bidding of Our Lady the Evangelist explained to St. Gregory the truths of the faith (*De vita Sancti Gregorii Thaumaturgi*, Migne, *Patrol. Graeca*, vol. XLVI, col. 909-912). This vision has often been quoted as an instance of Mary's maternal solicitude for the purity of the faith. We may

also see in it the beginning of those wonderful apparitions, so often repeated throughout the centuries down to our own time.

As proofs of devotion to Our Lady in the first three centuries, we have evidence of exceptional value in the mural paintings of the Roman Catacombs. The figure of the Virgin-Mother often appears in these early manifestations of the piety of the faithful. Among the frescos previous to the fourth century, two represent the prophecy of Isaias (chap. VII), three the adoration of the Magi, one the giving of the veil to a virgin. In this last-mentioned, the hand of the bishop, extended towards Our Lady, evidently points to her as a model of perfection. There are other paintings, in which Mary is clearly the principal figure, *viz.*, those which depict the scene of the Annunciation. Up to the present, two such have been discovered—one dating from the end of the second century, the other from the middle of the third (cf. Wilpert, *Die Malereien der Katakomben Roms*, pp. 187 ss.). The oldest and most celebrated of all these frescos is that found in the ancient catacomb of Priscilla on the Via Salaria. Our Blessed Lady is represented seated with the Divine Child in her arms: a man, evidently Isaias, stands before her pointing to a star. The whole scene doubtless refers to the early chapters of St. Matthew's gospel, combining as it does the prophecy of Isaias with the star of the Magi. It dates from the early years of the second century. Further excavations may bring to light yet more striking examples of piety towards Mary.

We can merely mention another proof of the deep veneration in which the Mother of Our Lord was held during this time, *viz.*, the homilies preached by the

Fathers in her honour. What we have already said abundantly establishes the point at issue. Nothing can prove more conclusively the unique place she occupied in the minds and hearts of the faithful than the jealous care with which they defended her high prerogatives from the attacks of her enemies.

From all we have said, I think we can safely conclude that the teaching of the Catholic Church about Our Lady and the devotion of which she is the object are not the exaggerations of later times. They are the normal development of principles and practices which go back through the early centuries to the Apostolic times. At the present moment there is much talk of union with Rome. For my part, I think the most hopeful sign of possible union is the growing devotion to the Mother of God among certain sections of our separated brethren. If they are devout to Mary, she who 'all heresies has destroyed alone,' will surely lead them into the true fold. May she hasten that day, may she visit soon again this land of hers, her dowry, and bring all erring souls into the unity of the Catholic faith.

## Select Catholic Bibliography.


1. Campana : *Maria nel Dogma cattolico*, ed. 2. (Turin and Rome, 1923.)
2. D'Alès : *Marie, Mère de Dieu*, in the *Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi catholique* : vol. 3, col. 155-209. (Paris : Beauchesne.)
3. Lehner : *Die Marienverehrung in den ersten Jahrhunderten.* (Stuttgart, 1886.)
4. Livius : *The Blessed Virgin in the Fathers of the first six centuries.* (London, 1896.)
5. Neubert : *Marie dans l'Église Anténicéenne*, ed. 3. (Paris, 1908.)
6. Newman : *Letter to E. B. Pusey*, in *Difficulties of Anglicans*, vol. II. (London, 1900.)
7. Ricciotti : *Alcuni punti della teologia di S. Ephrem*, in the *Scuola cattolica* for April, 1924 : pp. 261-271.
8. Tixeront : *History of Dogmas*, 1910 ff.
9. Terrien : *La Mère de Dieu et la Mère des hommes.* (Paris, 1902.)
10. Thurston : *Devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary*, in the *Catholic Encyclopedia* : vol. 15, pp. 459-464.
11. Wilpert : *Roma sotteranea, le pitture delle catacombe romane.* (Rome, 1903.)

## X.

# KENOTIC THEORIES.

By the Rev. R. A. Knox, M.A.

The Archbishop of Canterbury observed the other day that, if we were writing the Creeds now, we should probably write them very differently. That this is true, if 'we' means the Archbishop of Canterbury and those Anglicans who are of his own way of thinking, most of us will readily concede. It is a strange fact, but true none the less, that the Catholic Church, if she had to write, I will not say the Nicene Creed, but the Athanasian symbol to-morrow, would not write it in the form in which is has come down to us. And that, not because the doctrine of the Catholic Church changes, or can change, but because the occasion upon which ecclesiastical formulas are drawn up is, commonly at least, the threat of heresy, and the language in which those formulas are enshrined is consequently dictated by the nature of those errors which it is their direct mission to exclude. To illustrate my point, let me recall that in my extreme youth there was a law or by-law of some sort, which made it possible for a magistrate to fine a man for furious bicycling. No government, I take it, not even that of the United States, would now legislate against furious bicycling, simply because the modern danger is from furious motoring.

So it is with the definitions of our faith. Heresy does not create them, but it occasions them; in definition, heresy is the stimulus upon which the healthy organ

of Catholic theology reacts. And the result of that reaction is to form a sort of hard callus around certain important Christian verities, comparable to the fingernails of a human subject, or the carapace of a tortoise. Thenceforward a kind of natural armour protects, at such points, the faith of simple Christians. But meanwhile the actual language in which the definitions are couched has been so designed as to exclude one particular form of error, not necessarily ALL the errors which the unconquerable stupidity of the human mind may at some future time evolve for itself. These considerations apply especially to the Kenotic theories which we are here to discuss. They are a modern attempt to rationalize the theology of the Incarnation, but an attempt so modern that the definitions of Chalcedon, trained upon the batteries of an older heterodoxy, fulminate against them indeed, but do not score a direct hit. One could hardly expect the fathers of Chalcedon to foresee all the curious aberrations of nineteenth century Protestantism.

Those of you who heard Fr. Lattey's paper this morning (and I hope you all did) will have no difficulty in understanding what I mean when I speak of Kenotic theories. But for fear there may be some present who were unavoidably prevented from listening to Fr. Lattey, I may perhaps be excused for giving here a description, as well as I can, of what Kenotic theories are, before I discuss how they arose, what importance they have, or what is wrong with them. Kenotic Christology, taking its starting-point from that text in *Philippians* where St. Paul says that Our Lord 'emptied Himself' (ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν) when He became Incarnate, holds that the difference between Our Lord

in His Divine Nature and Our Lord in His human Nature is a difference, not of kind, but of degree. In the Tennessee trial the other day the *advocatus cercopitheci*, I forget what his name is, publicly announced that Mr. Bryan's God is simply an enlarged edition of Mr. Bryan. So, to the Kenotist, the Divine Being is simply Man with certain of Man's limitations and disabilities removed. Man, for example, has limited powers; in the Divine Being those limitations are absent. Man is restricted in his knowledge, God is omniscient, and so on. Now, when we speak of God becoming Man, says the Kenotist, what could possibly be simpler? God voluntarily limits His omnipotence, His omniscience, and so on, and *ipso facto* He becomes Man. What is the need of all these elaborate definitions about one Person and two Natures? It is all beside the point. If a king becomes a slave, we do not say that he mysteriously unites in one person the nature of a King and the nature of a slave. We say that he has taken upon him (if you will) the nature of a slave, until such time as he regains his liberty. How considerable were the limitations necessitated in the fact of God becoming Man is a question not to be solved on any arbitrary, *a priori* principles; we must go to the text of Scripture, read there the record of the Incarnate Life, and form our views accordingly.

That is the doctrine, but perhaps in its bleakest form. The history of it is a curious one. From their Greek name, one would naturally assume that the Kenotists must have been a flourishing school of theologians in the fifth century A.D., and the unwary person, anxious to say the right thing, may easily be betrayed into murmuring 'Kenotus . . . let's see, wasn't he Bishop

of Alexandria?' But as a matter of fact, for all its surface plausibility, this particular heresy was never floated, and apparently never thought of, in the whole history of Catholic Christendom. It was Martin Luther who gave the first impetus to the doctrine; it was Lutheran theologians who first tried to elaborate it. And to do them justice, their aim was not to over-emphasize, as the moderns would over-emphasize, the humiliation of the Incarnate. On the contrary, it was part of the Lutheran attempt to deify our Lord's Sacred Humanity. The Lutheran sacramental theory, which involved the omnipresence of Our Lord in His Sacred Humanity, was intimately bound up with this. To some early Lutheran theologians, then, Christ as Man was simply God walking on earth, not using, or concealing if He used, certain of those powers and privileges to which His Divine Being entitled Him. A position, it will easily be seen, not far removed from sheer Docetism.

But it was not till the nineteenth century that the doctrine achieved its real vogue in Germany, and in very characteristic circumstances. The disturbances created by the Napoleonic wars, and the new streams of European thought, were telling heavily on the theology of the Reformed Church in Germany; the daily increasing tendency was to speak and think of Our Lord as if He were merely Man and not God at all. On the other side, the old-fashioned Lutherans, true to the traditions of their founder, thought and spoke of Our Lord as if to all intents and purposes He were not Man but merely God. This rather sharply defined difference between Protestants was in grave danger, it seemed, of strengthening the pretensions of those

abominable Catholics. It was left for the genius of Prussian autocracy to discover a way out. The Kenosis theory should form a sort of *Ausgleich* between the two parties. Once admit that God becoming Man means nothing more or less than God signing away, for the time being, some of the attributes and powers of divinity, and it becomes merely a matter of taste how considerable you suppose those limitations to have been. You may, from an extreme Lutheran point of view, hold that when Our Lord died, it simply meant that He was voluntarily forgoing His natural right of immortality. Or you may hold, from the extreme Reformed point of view, that when our Lord quoted the Psalms as the work of David He was, owing to the limitations imposed on His omniscience, falling into a common popular error. The two points of view might be widely different, but they could be united under a single formula in proclaiming the Kenosis. This useful doctrine should provide a sort of goose-step to which the whole of Prussian theology might march contentedly.

In 1913, just before the importation of German Protestant theology into England was unfortunately suspended by the Defence of the Realm Act, the theologian Loofs, a bitter enemy, it is true, of the Kenotic doctrines, declared that such doctrines were losing credit more and more in scientific circles. Unfortunately, Protestant England is always apt to think tomorrow what Protestant Germany stopped thinking yesterday. A valuable little *brochure* to which I shall refer later, published only the other day, says, 'It is, I imagine, owing to the influence of the writings of Bishop Gore that a more or less pronounced

Kenoticism is prevalent or fashionable in the Anglican Church.' There is much to be said, I think, for the diagnosis; the fact, at least, is frankly admitted. But you cannot explain a widespread theological tendency by the mere *ipse dixit* of a single theologian, however earnest and however respected. The Kenotic theory must have corresponded to some exigency in the situation of English Protestant theology to acquire a popularity so pronounced. I should be inclined to attribute this popularity in the first place to the reaction of Hegelian idealism upon English theology, and in the second place to the increased prevalence of the so-called historical method in New Testament criticism.

There are three really salient differences between the theological outlook of modern Catholicism and modern Protestantism. None of them have anything to do with the Mass, or the Saints, or the doctrine of grace, or any of the old happy hunting-grounds of controversy. The first is that Protestantism, still as at the Reformation, makes the act of faith a direct act of the will, instead of an act of the intellect ordered by the will. The second is, that Protestantism has identified itself almost completely with an idealist system of philosophy. The third is that Protestantism either does not understand or does not believe the doctrine of two Natures in the Incarnation. The first two errors contribute to the last. For one who aspires to believe in Our Lord by a simple, unintellectual act of trust, does not need a Christology; or rather, whatever Christology he adopts, the centre of his devotional regard is still fixed upon the Person of Christ, and he must needs continue to worship even that which he no longer holds divine. And a man who

has fallen among idealists is no longer able to believe in distinctions; the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation, no less than the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity or the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist, becomes a mere string of words to him. It was possible to conceive of a bridge between Catholicism and Protestantism in the time of Archbishop Laud; it is barely possible now.

We are concerned here with the influence of idealist philosophy upon Christological doctrine. The theology of the two Natures, as conceived and as formulated in the early Church, has no meaning at all unless you assume that there is a distinction with a sound objective basis, and not a mere distinction in thought, between Person and Nature. Idealism knows of no such distinction; nor has it in its own system any distinction which corresponds to that or is analogous to that. It professes to have stormed the inmost fastnesses of personality, and it has found nothing there except the self-consciousness, the thing which thinks and therefore is. Once the self-consciousness has replaced the hypostasis as the true centre of being, the doctrine of two Natures united under one Person has become meaningless; for the self-consciousness already includes within itself part of what we mean by nature. Nor is it possible for such philosophers to regard the faculties, thinking, willing, *etc.*, as something tacked on to the self-consciousness from without; thought is the self-consciousness thinking, will is the self-consciousness willing. To speak of two wills in Christ means, for the idealist, two self-consciousnesses in Christ, both willing; and two self-consciousnesses means, for him, two Persons. Chalcedon, if he would be honest with himself, has become the memory of a fable.

At the same time, modern Protestant theology, in so far as it is orthodox, is driven into Kenoticism as its only possible refuge from the alternative of mere Nestorianism; and this as the result of 'the historical method' applied to New Testament criticism. This is no place to discuss the methods of such criticism; suffice it to say that its results are wholly inconsistent, so far as the manner of the Incarnation is concerned, with traditional Catholic orthodoxy. Our Lord as Man, we are told, so far from enjoying the beatific vision, was on certain subjects ignorant and probably even in error. Moreover, although, as far as we can ascertain, He was *de facto* sinless, there is no reason (we are told) to think that He was incapable of sinning; on the contrary, the fact of the Temptation shews that He could, if He would, have sinned. More and more, then, the avowedly innovating school of British theologians treats 'the Christ of history' or 'the historic Jesus' as merely a Man, who was dignified in some mysterious way and to an unusual degree by the indwelling Presence of the Divine Word. The Church of England is not technically Nestorian. At the recent service in Westminster Abbey, the Nestorian patriarch, as being not quite orthodox, like the Swedish bishop whose orders were not quite valid, was allowed to sit in choir but not to walk in the procession. In spite of this vigorous protest, however, it is difficult to conceal the fact that all the 'liberal' theologians of to-day are heading straight for the system which this unfortunate wall-flower professes.

Faced with apparent evidence that Our Lord enjoyed restricted knowledge and was capable of sin, the more orthodox sort of Protestant theologian hesitates perhaps

for a moment (like W. G. Ward) between denying the fact and defending the principle, and then decides to defend the principle. He admits that Our Lord's knowledge as Man was restricted; he refuses to say of Him, *Non potuit peccare*. But he thinks to safeguard the doctrine of Our Lord's Divinity by suggesting that these limitations were limitations imposed by the Divine Word upon Himself as the condition of His Incarnation. God becomes Man by limiting His Divine powers, and in order that this self-limitation may be complete, it must include liability to error and even liability to sin.

This latter influence is, I think, the influence which has driven Dr. Gore irretrievably into the Kenotist camp. But the former influence, namely, the philosophical difficulty (for the moderns) of asserting the Two-nature doctrine, has also contributed to the result. 'We cannot predicate of Our Lord two consciousnesses or two wills,' writes Professor Mackintosh, 'the New Testament indicates nothing of the kind, nor indeed is it congruous with an intelligible psychology.' It is not difficult to read in those words one of the characteristic slogans of the modern mind.

Now, the peculiarity of this Kenotist doctrine is that while it manages to repudiate, formally at least, the characteristic errors of the early heretics, it yet contrives to borrow something of its own from each of them. It has some fault to find with each of the three great Christological errors of antiquity. It tells the Nestorian that although he confesses a Jesus who is human, there is no real union in his system between the Jesus who is human and the Christ who is divine. It tells the Apollinarian that human flesh

and blood and animal soul do not constitute, in themselves, a complete humanity. It tells the Monophysite that the disappearance or absorption of the human Nature in the Incarnate makes the Life unmeritorious and the Passion unreal. In all these objections, against which his own system is guarded, the Kenotist can join hands with Cyril.

At the same time Kenoticism itself stands self-condemned under all three headings, if you compare it with documents officially adopted by the Council of Chalcedon. Thus St. Cyril in his letter against Nestorius writes, 'We do not say that the Nature of the Word became Flesh through being changed, nor yet that it turned into the whole Man, who is composed of flesh and blood' (*Ad Nest.* II). But the Apollinarian view thus disowned by St. Cyril is precisely the view of the Kenotists; according to them this change is what the Incarnation means. Again, the *Tome* of St. Leo in its condemnation of Eutyches has the words, *Tenet enim sine defectu proprietatem suam utraque natura; et sicut formam servi Dei forma non destruit, ita formam Dei servi forma non minuit.* 'Either nature preserves its own properties without loss; and as the form of God does not destroy the form of a servant, so the form of a servant does not diminish the form of God' (*Tome*, Section 3). It is of the essence of Kenotism, if it is to be true to its own principle, that one form replaces the other. Moreover, the anathema of the council falls on anyone who says, with Nestorius, that 'The one Lord Jesus Christ was glorified by the Holy Spirit, making use of the power bestowed through Him as a power not His own, and that it was through receiving virtue from Him that He was enabled to use

it against unclean spirits,' and so on. But this is precisely what the thorough-going Kenotist has to allege, in order to allow for the due humiliation of Our Lord during the period of His Incarnation: 'His Divinity,' says Dr. D'Arcy, 'is dependent from moment to moment upon the Father' (*Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*).

The reflection naturally suggests itself, how was it that in the whole course of the early Christological controversies, when the doctrines of the Church were still relatively unformulated, and it was easy to plunge into error, because no notice-boards warned you that you were skating on thin ice, no learned Antiochene or subtle Alexandrian hit upon this ingenious Kenotic system for himself? Why was it left to a late and Protestant age to propound a solution which is now, outside the Church of course, so widely in favour? The answer is, that although these early heretics might go astray in their Christology, they had some fixed principles of theology. They did believe that it was possible to determine and important to keep in view certain facts about the nature of the Divine Being. Protestantism, under the influence of that false definition of faith to which I have already alluded, has always neglected theology in favour of Christology. And in consequence, these modern supporters of the Kenotic doctrine do not observe that, however ingenious be their Christology, they are talking theological nonsense. They are calmly making, in the sphere of fundamental theology, postulates which would have made Nestorius run away shrieking with his hands over his ears.

In the first place, the idea that God can sign away by a gesture the attributes which belong to Him as part

of His Being drives a coach and four through the Christian axiom that the Divine Nature is immutable. I say, the Christian axiom; but indeed it is pre-Christian; it is part of any sensible natural theology. 'According to the Scriptures,' says St. Cyril (Ep. 3), 'the Word is without turning and without change, remaining always the same.' It was unnecessary to say, 'according to the Scriptures'; Plato had already discovered by the light of natural reason that 'it is impossible even for a God to change Himself; but each of the gods, being as fair and as good as possible, remains always simply in His own form (*μορφή*)' (*Republic*, 381. C). It may be possible to talk of God limiting His own infinite nature, if all your conception of God is derived from a few pious aspirations and a smattering of Hegel. But it is impossible, I will not say for a Catholic mind, but for a mind trained in that discipline of thought which we Catholics inherit from the traditions of natural philosophy, to make such a gross blunder at the very outset.

And even when a man has committed such a blunder in embracing the first principles of the Kenotic doctrine, there is enough theological absurdity in it to make him pause, if he will use the brains God has given him, and retrace his steps. Fully and logically stated, this doctrine asserts that for a period of thirty-three years the Divine Word confined Himself entirely to a single point in time and space—the Man Jesus of Nazareth. What, then, became of His Divine activities? What replaced the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity during those thirty-three years during which His Divine attributes were limited to the narrow scope of a human Nature? Godet, it is well known, faced this difficulty

like a man. He answered that the activities of the Eternal Father *ad extra* are normally mediated through the Divine Word, but during those thirty-three years He carried on those activities unmediated, by His own Almighty Power. However ludicrous and blasphemous we may think that explanation, I cannot help feeling that the modern supporters of kenotic views are less than fair to it. Their attitude is always 'Ha, ha! Poor old Godet! Fancy his talking like that!' But justice demands that we should turn on them with the question, 'If you don't talk like that, how are you going to talk? Godet tried to face a theological difficulty; you are simply running away from it!' Thus Professor Mackintosh tells us that Godet's view savours of Tritheism; so it does, strongly. But what is Professor Mackintosh's view? When a man refuses to recognize a distinction between Person and Nature, it is perhaps tactless to interrogate him too closely as to the doctrines he holds about the Blessed Trinity. But if the only objection to Godet's view is that it is Tritheistic, and Professor Mackintosh does not believe in a distinction with an objective basis between Nature and Person, must we not suppose that Professor Mackintosh, as a conscientious Sabellian, would make not one Person, but all three Persons of the Blessed Trinity suspend their Divine activities during the thirty-three years during which God walked on earth as Man?

In practice, where you can get any answer out of the Kenotists at all, they try to avoid this difficulty by throwing their own first principles overboard. They immediately proceed to talk as if the Divine Word, who had become Man by the mere process of limiting His own Divine attributes, nevertheless continued to

reign in Heaven with those same attributes unlimited. And this obviously knocks the bottom out of the whole conception. Reason would not permit them to believe that one single Person was at one and the same time lying in a manger and reigning in the heavens—lying in a manger in His human Nature, reigning in the heavens in His Divine Nature. They propose as a substitute—what? That one and the same Person in one and the same Nature was at one and the same time lying in a manger and reigning in the heavens—lying in a manger in a limited state, and reigning in the heavens in an unlimited state! Has wisdom been quite justified of her children? Have they not abolished a mystery in order to substitute nonsense? It is difficult not to sympathize with Loofs in his frankly Nestorian criticism: 'All theories we poor human creatures form concerning the Incarnation of God are presumptuous. But the most presumptuous of all is the modern doctrine of kenosis' (Hauck's *Realencyklopädie*, p. 263).

There is a third reason why the kenotist idea of the Incarnation could have presented itself to the mind of a fifth-century theologian only to be at once dismissed. People who hold this language must of necessity think of the Incarnation as something merely ancillary to the Atonement; the whole point of it, for them, lies in the condescension which brings God down within reach of man. But the Incarnation has another side, as we know, for which this new doctrine makes no allowance at all. The Incarnation means not merely that God condescends to Man's level; it also means that man is brought up to a level where he can meet with God. The union of the human nature with the Person of Christ, its close association with a Divine

Nature in Him, means that human nature is thenceforth ennobled with a new dignity. With the Ascension, human nature itself gains its first foothold in heaven. So we pray in the Mass that we may become partners of His Divinity, who deigned to become a Partaker in our humanity: the Hypostatic Union is to us a bridge between things human and things divine. But all this significance of the Incarnation is entirely lost if you adopt the kenotic system of thought. For language such as that of which I have been speaking assumes, as the very starting-point of its terms, that the Divine Nature and human nature are something essentially disparate; the difference between them is one of kind. But for the kenotist the difference between the Divine Nature and human nature is rather one of degree; to be divine is simply to be human without the limitations of humanity. If therefore when He became Man, the Eternal Word did so merely by suspending for a time the full exercise of His Divine powers, it follows by parity of reasoning that when He ascended into heaven, all He needed to do was to suspend that suspension, and become God again. The king who becomes a slave leaves his slavery behind automatically when he reassumes his kingship; so God made Man would *ipso facto* leave His Humanity behind in reassuming His Divinity. It was, then, on this view, no glorified human nature that stormed heaven at the Ascension; it was a nature which once divine had become human, and once human had become divine again.

Now, all this chapter of religious history has no particular meaning for us Catholics; it is not even a phase in the history of our own intellectual development, which must be understood in order to understand

our past; it lies away from us, its influence short-circuited by the religious apostasy of the sixteenth century. But it has importance for anybody who wants to understand the present position, and who takes a sympathetic interest in the future position, of non-Catholic Christianity in our country. It was only the other day that I was sent, most opportunely, a little Anglican *brochure* of less than fifty pages called *Anglo-Catholicism and Reunion*, by the Rev. Robert Scott. In writing to thank the author for sending it to me, I told him that I thought it was the first sensible utterance on the subject of Reunion which had appeared since I became a Catholic. (I mean *post hoc*, of course, not *propter hoc*). His thesis is this—What is the use of flattering ourselves with the hope of Reunion with the Orthodox Churches of the East, or *a fortiori* with the great Church of the West, when our dominant view about the Incarnation is one that probably will not pass muster with the former, and certainly will not pass muster with the latter?

He draws out the essential opposition between the teaching of St. Cyril and that of modern Anglican theologians who are regarded as 'quite orthodox'; he points out that even among the party which calls itself Anglo-Catholic these modern interpretations of the Incarnation are already beginning to find favour; he shews that modern Catholic theology, from St. Thomas downwards, is uncompromisingly Cyrilline, and suggests that the Greeks are not likely to sacrifice the reputation which St. Cyril holds among them, by countenancing a theological standpoint hopelessly at variance with his. And suppose, he adds, that the Greeks could be persuaded, in spite of this theological

variance, to enter into relations with the Anglican Church which would finally leave no doubt about the validity of Anglican ordinations, 'would that lead to intercommunion with Rome? Only if Rome were willing to abandon her constant and consistent teaching,' and to allow 'that to be called true which she has hitherto branded as heresy.'

I believe his diagnosis of the situation is perfectly right, and I believe that unless such protests as this receive a more careful hearing than human probabilities suggest, we shall find the Church of England drifting more and more away from us, the Anglo-Catholics as well as the rest of them, even while they fondly suppose themselves, on the ground of a few external imitations, to be drawing closer and closer to us. Theologians will insist more and more upon the completeness of Our Lord's humanity, until it passes into a matter of common belief that during His earthly life He was actually liable to ignorance, and theoretically capable of sin. The Nestorian party will concur heartily in this view, because to them the Person of the Incarnate is already that of a deified man rather than that of Incarnate God. The Kenotist party will equally concur, because it will seem to them that such defects on the part of Our Lord during His human Life are only fresh evidences of that condescension which He exercised in limiting Himself, really limiting Himself, so as to meet our level. I wonder, how long will it be before the suggestion that Our Lord forbade divorce will be met by Anglican theologians with a shrug of the shoulders and, 'Oh, yes, of course He did say that; but then you must remember that His outlook on these matters was extremely limited'?

I believe, then, that both in the pulpit and in the lecture-hall we ought at this time to be pointing out very carefully, for the sake of Anglicans, and of Catholics who rub shoulders with Anglicans, what it is that the Church teaches about the Incarnation, and how radically it differs from the teaching of most exponents of Protestant doctrine, even those who call themselves priests and wear chasubles and all the rest of it. And we may even find ourselves justified in insinuating that, in view of these modern developments, there is some reason to suspect that the Church of the first six centuries is the Church of the first nineteen centuries after all.

## XI.

# RATIONALIST CRITICISM.

By the Rev. Richard Downey, D.D.

Rationalist is a very elastic word. It has a great variety of meanings, both as a title of honour and as a term of abuse, and it has the peculiar distinction of having, at least once, completely reversed its signification. In the history of philosophy we find it used originally in connection with Cartesianism, to designate the intellectualist as opposed to the sensist, who sought to reduce all knowledge to sensation; and later, in opposition to the empiricist, who regarded experience as the sole basis of knowledge. The philosophical rationalist stood for the primacy of the faculty of reason over all forms of experience. But, in some strange way, rationalist has come to connote a man who gives not only a primacy, but a supremacy, to experience. Thus an ancient and honourable word has, so to speak, gone over to the enemy. The *Memorandum of the Rationalist Press Association* declares that rationalism 'aims at establishing a system of philosophy and ethics verifiable by experience,' thereby making a speedy end of all metaphysics, and fulfilling the prophetic words of Alexander Pope :

> Philosophy, that leaned on heaven before,
> Sinks to her second cause, and is no more.

Certainly empiricism is the basis of the rationalism which utters the religious challenge. A rationalist in this sense is defined by Mr. J. M. Robertson as 'one who rejects the claims of "revelation," the idea of a

personal God, the belief in personal immortality, and in general the conceptions logically accruing to the practices of prayer and worship.'[1] In other words, the out-and-out rationalist is what used to be called an atheist, but, through a mysterious process of verbal refinement, has come to be known as an agnostic.

But rationalist is a term of wider connotation than agnostic. In these days it is freely applied to Modernist divines, apparently without much resentment on their part. In fact, a writer in the July *Literary Guide* (p. 127) tersely defines Modernism as 'rationalism with a theological varnish'; whilst, in the same organ of free thought for October 1924, Mr. William Archer, commenting on the Oxford Conference of Modern Churchmen, held last summer under the presidency of Dean Inge, says:

> What can we do to express our sense of the Dean's services? Offer him the chairmanship of the Rationalist Press Association? I fear his acceptance of such a post might offend some of his clerical brethren—perhaps even his bishop—and one would be sorry to see him fall out with his caste. He does much better service within the Church than he could do from outside (p. 179).

This, doubtless, is only Mr. Archer's fun, but there are dour and sour rationalists who complain bitterly that the Modernists have stolen their thunder. Certainly there is a great deal in common between the professed rationalist and the ultra-liberal theologian. Huxley said of agnosticism that it was not a creed but a method, and the same is true of rationalism. It is the method of approach to religious questions which really distinguishes the rationalist, whether he be atheist or liberal thinker. Many years ago Lord Balfour pointed out

[1] *Rationalism*, p. 4.

that the vice of method at the root of all naturalism is 'the assumption that the kind of "experience" which gave us natural science was the sole basis of knowledge.'[1] The rationalist method is simplicity itself. It is the method of the physical sciences applied out of its proper sphere; it is 'the probe of chemic test' imported into the realm of the transcendental. The term rationalist, in this connection, like the term freethinker, is in itself a *petitio principii*. Just as the latter term carries with it the subtle suggestion that nobody else's thought is free, so too the former term implies that those who are not rationalists are unreasonable; presumably that they are in the grip of bigotry, ignorance or superstition.

The real question at issue, however, is, what precisely is a reasonable criterion of truth in the field of religious enquiry? Are we justified in summoning everything that claims to be religious truth to the bar of human understanding? Must we forthwith rule out of court everything that transcends experience? Does the world of sense limit the horizon of thought, or may we not rather say thus with Hegel?

> The rise of thought beyond the world of sense, its passage from the finite to the infinite, the leap into the supersensible which it takes when it snaps asunder the links of the chain of sense, all this transition is thought and nothing but thought. Say there must be no such passage, and you say there is to be no thinking; and in sooth animals make no such transition. They never get further than sensation and the perception of the senses, and in consequence they have no religion.[2]

One of the fallacies enumerated in inductive logic is to look for a kind of proof of which the matter under

[1] *The Foundations of Belief*, p. 182, 8th edn.
[2] *Logic*, Wallace's trans., pp. 87, 88.

investigation is not susceptible, demanding greater precision than is attainable from the very nature of the case; and some such undue delimitation of knowledge appears to be the fundamental fallacy of the rationalist approach to Christology.

Rationalism has scant positive achievement to its credit. Its work is destructive rather than constructive. It is essentially a system of negation and denial, which traces its ancestry back to the philosophical criticism of Kant. For the philosopher of Königsberg, religion was a matter of moral consciousness, and nothing more; and consequently from the time of Kant onwards a new element enters into Christology, as indeed, in some measure, into every other religious question. Gradually the supreme test of religious truth became more and more subjective, till we reach the modern introspective method of the inner approach, according to which every article of the Christian creed is to be translated into terms of personal consciousness, and accepted only in so far as it finds a warrant in that consciousness.

Man has become the measure of all things in a new sense; he is the measure even of divinity. Of old the Arians, though they denied real deity to Christ, admitted that He proceeded in some extrinsic way from the Father; the Sabellians regarded Him as a glorious, though transient, manifestation of the Godhead; to the Monarchians even, there was in Him a spark of the divine, either as a mortal in whom dwelt the spirit of God, or as a celestial spirit, who had assumed a human body. But to the Kantian Modernist, He is at best an individual human consciousness at its highest.

Whilst the idealistic element in the philosophy of Kant thus led to sheer subjectivism in religion, the realistic

element of his teaching has an equally pernicious effect. For his criticism led logically enough to a sceptical theory of knowledge which, from the outset, confined itself mainly, if not wholly, to religious knowledge. It is a theory of knowledge which ends in doubt, instead of certitude; a theory of knowledge, which limits the power of knowing possessed by the human mind to the sphere of sense-experience, which latter thus becomes the sole test of reality and truth. Huxley gave an impetus to the movement in England, and the liberalizing spirit was already rife in Germany. The one and only text of this new religion is, 'no man hath seen God at any time.' To talk of the divine, therefore, is to go beyond the evidence, and proclaim oneself execrably unscientific. Hence Christ must be studied as a man, and judged by the standards applied to men. At this stage rationalists vied with each other in paying tribute to Christ. There were those who belauded Him as the dominant, outstanding figure in all history, whose name, as Emerson has it, is not merely written, but ploughed into the story of the human race. Others again extolled the depth and the clarity of His practical philosophy, till its absolute transcendence became such a stumbling-block to their naturalistic view of Christ that they found it necessary to take refuge in the fantastic supposition that Christ, during the thirty years of His alleged hidden life, prior to His ministry, must have visited the East and sat at the feet of oriental sages. So much does the wisdom of Christ transcend the wisdom of the worldly wise. Others again place Christ's uniqueness in His ethical teaching. He is hailed as the great apostle of the brotherhood of man by those who have rejected the fatherhood of God.

Indeed, of late years it has become increasingly fashionable to speak and to write of Christ as though His whole message were comprised in the eight beatitudes. These naturalistic views of Christ all ignore His oft-repeated and emphatic claim to divinity, on the tacit supposition that such a claim is preposterous, and must therefore be relegated to the realm of 'mysticism' which, for the rationalist, is the shadowy abode of poetic fantasy, where Kant's antinomies, or any other impossibilities or contradictories, may dwell in harmony.

So far the general tendency amongst rationalists was to extol the character of Christ, whilst denying His divinity. Thus we were told that, though Christ was mistaken as to His divine sonship, no one could convince Him of sin; His teaching, too, though considered to be erroneous in the light of rationalist learning, was nevertheless held to find justification in what it had done for the advancement of civilization. Even Huxley at times seemed to subscribe to the dictum of Bacon: 'There was never found in any age of the world either philosophy, or sect, or religion, or law, or discipline, which did so highly exalt the good of the community, and increase private and particular good, as the holy Christian faith.'

But with the advent of Nietzsche (1844-1900), a new element enters into popular rationalism. So far from admitting anything beneficent in the teachings of Christ, Nietzsche arraigns Christianity as *the* great crime against the human race. In the final chapter of *Der Antichrist* he writes:

> I condemn Christianity. I bring against it the most terrible of accusations that ever an accuser put into words. It is to me the greatest of all imaginable corruptions . . .

it has left nothing untouched by its depravity. It has made a worthlessness out of every value, a lie out of every truth, a sin out of everything straightforward, healthy and honest. Let anyone dare to speak to me of its humanitarian blessings! To do away with pain and woe is contrary to its principles. It lives by pain and woe: it has created pain and woe in order to perpetuate itself.

The invective of Nietzsche against what he called the slave-morality of Christianity opened up the way for assaults on the character of Christ Himself. So far from being in any sense divine, it was now contended that, even as a man, He was not beyond reproach. There were blots in His moral character, else why did He curse the barren fig-tree, when it was not the season for figs? Why, too, did He give way to temper in casting out the buyers and sellers from the temple? And how explain His conduct in the affair of the Gadarene swine? These exegetical objections are mentioned, not because they are difficult, but because they are typical. They need not detain us long. The malediction of the fig-tree is obviously symbolical of the fate of Judaism. Though it was not the season for figs, the abundant foliage gave promise that the tree might be bearing fruit even somewhat out of season. So, too, was it with Judaism, with its extravagant profession and barren achievement; and its end was like unto that of the fig-tree. The anger displayed by Christ in the temple was not on His own account, because of any personal pique, but because of His zeal for the house of the Lord. As He stood in the midst of that scene of irreverence bordering on sacrilege, His impersonal anger was the appropriate expression of perfect holiness. The case of the Gadarene swine is doubtless inexplicable to anyone who closes his eyes

to the proofs of Christ's divinity, even though that be the one hypothesis that will account for many puzzling incidents recorded in the New Testament. To one who accepts the fact that Christ gave permission to the legion of devils to enter into the herd of swine, the exercise of His right of sovereign dominion ought to present little difficulty.

Again, on the intellectual side, it is urged that there are obvious limitations to Christ's knowledge. He had to ask the sisters of Lazarus where they had buried him and, a matter of greater moment, He was mistaken in thinking that the end of the world was rapidly approaching; for, did He not say, 'Amen, I say to you, there are some of them that stand here that shall not taste death till they see the Son of Man coming in His kingdom' (Matt. xvi. 28)? However, since Christ elsewhere in St. Matthew (xxiv. 36) declares with regard to the consummation of the world, 'of that day and hour no one knoweth, no, not the angels of heaven, but the Father alone,' the former passage cannot well be held to refer to the second coming. With such good reason is it generally referred to the destruction of Jerusalem, that rationalist critics are now disposed to make light of Christ's alleged blunder. Thus, says Johannes Weiss: 'This solitary limitation of His discernment, regarding His second coming, is not worthy of any consideration beside so many proofs of His perfect knowledge.'[1] The question put to the sisters of Lazarus raises no difficulty for anyone who realizes that Christ, though truly God, was in habit found as a man, and that consequently He added to His store of acquired knowledge through

[1] *Das älteste Evangelium*, p. 87.

the human method of eliciting information by questioning.

But there is another and a larger school of rationalist critics which is not concerned about isolated incidents in the gospels which seem to militate against the consubstantiality of Christ with the Father. This school takes the New Testament as a whole, and insists that, if it is studied intelligently, it reveals the progressive development of the doctrine of the Incarnation. Primitive Christianity, we are told, is one thing, Pauline and Johannine accretions quite another; and it is in these latter that the origins of the divinity of Christ are to be sought. This theory of development is usually exhibited in three stages, in the first of which is presented the Christ of the Synoptics, then the Christ of Paul, and finally the Johannine Christ:—

(1) The primitive, and therefore the true, picture of the historic Christ, it is contended, is to be found in the Synoptics. Here we have the real man Jesus, though myth and legend play picturesque parts in the story of His birth and of His miraculous powers. The real Jesus of history was the gentle teacher who walked along the sunlit roads of Galilee or the streets of Capharnaum with His disciples; who discoursed to the multitude in parables; and who was sought after by little children. The Synoptics, who knew Him and loved Him, dwell lingeringly on the intimate details of His life. So far from claiming divinity, this Jesus, it is said, even stresses the distance which intervenes between Himself and God, as in His answer to the rich young man. Says Arnold Meyer: 'When the rich young man addressed Him with the words, "Good Master," Jesus answered, "Why callest thou Me good?

None is good but one, that is, God." He has with these words disavowed bluntly divinity and divine perfection.'[1]

(2) And so, the theory proceeds, the development of Christology proper begins with Paul. He never knew Christ in the flesh and, it is asserted, was plainly not interested in the details of his Master's life. If we are to believe the psychologists who have psycho-analysed Him, Paul was interested in nothing so much as himself. He was a pronounced introvert. The fanaticism of Saul against Christianity, we are assured, is psycho-analytic evidence of his repressed attraction towards the creed of the Nazarene. He was, in fact, torn between two religious complexes, and in the psychic battle which ensued Christianity triumphed over Judaism, and at the crisis, naturally enough, something snapped in Paul's mental mechanism and—the heavens opened, just as they did to Swedenborg and many another unbalanced visionary. The Damascus incident is thus brushed aside by von Hartmann, the originator of the philosophy of the unconscious:

> It was, indeed, no wonder that a notorious visionary and epileptic, in such conflicts of the soul, during a fever in the desert (which was connected with an inflammation of the eyes, and perhaps an inflammation of the brain), was visited by an apparition of the Master of the Church which he was persecuting, as by an objective presentation of the doubts of his own conscience.[2]

It would be of interest to ask this writer, to what precise period he refers St. Paul's 'notoriety' as a 'visionary and epileptic.' Nowadays, certainly, we

[1] *Was uns Jesus heute ist*, p. 21.
[2] *Das Christentum des Neuen Testamentes*, p. 201.

may suppose his visions well-known; but it is extremely unlikely that he had any (or, if this be preferred, imagined that he had any) before that crucial one upon the way to Damascus. But we cannot allow that St. Paul at any time could rightly be called 'a notorious epileptic'; such 'notoriety,' at all events, is confined to a narrow circle of theorists, and lacks all serious historical foundation. So, for that matter, does the 'inflammation of the eyes,' thus roundly asserted, for it is at the best but an uncertain conjecture; much more so the 'inflammation of the brain,' which is a gratuitous aspersion upon one of the greatest men (upon every count) that the world has ever seen. The 'fever' in this interesting psychological myth is likewise (shall we say?) a mere 'objective presentation of the doubts' of the writer. Alas, even the 'desert' touch, picturesque in itself and helpful to the theory, is particularly unfortunate; for many miles south of Damascus the country is well watered and fertile, and formerly, says Luthardt, was much more so.[1]

'It is hard for thee,' says Our Lord, 'to kick against goads' (Acts xxvi. 14). St. Paul, then, had misgivings, which may possibly have increased the fury of his persecution. But are these words a sufficient explanation of the tremendous conviction and the tremendous labours of a lifetime? Not, surely, in the minds of those who overlay them with so much that is mere conjecture or evident fiction. St. Paul had told the tale to the 'beloved physician,' who deliberately repeats it as history (Acts ix. 1–9); he told it also to the Jews in the Temple (Acts xxii. 6–11), and to

[1] *Allgemeine Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung*, p. 396.

King Agrippa (Acts xxvi. 12–18), and mentions it elsewhere. He thought that of a sudden he had been struck blind; he thought that his companions had heard and seen something also. But set aside these difficulties, and it still remains true that his own vision is relatively insignificant amid the overwhelming mass of evidence for Christ's resurrection that he accumulates in the fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians, to which I shall return. Even this, of course, does not exhaust his knowledge of the historical Christ; but it does show that he had abundant confirmation of that Damascus vision, and that he understood the historical value of that confirmation—far better, indeed, than his critics.

However, it is further assumed that henceforth Paul was subject to ecstatic visions, and that his epistles are, for the most part, rationalizations of his habitual hallucinations, which were the real mind-stuff from which Paul evolved his concept of Christ, presumably in much the same way as a spider spins its web out of its own substance. Christ, for Paul, we are told, is not a man who was born in a stable; He is a pre-existent, spiritual being, 'a celestial man,' who merely tabernacled amongst men of ordinary mould. In these epistles of Paul, Christ is etherealized out of all recognition by a progressive evolution which stops short, however, at the threshold of divinity, making of Christ no more than the image or the reflection of God.

(3) The real apotheosis of Christ, it is claimed, is to be found only in the fourth gospel. It is, of course, denied that this gospel is the work of John the Apostle. Despite the weight of extrinsic and intrinsic evidence in his favour, he is ruled out of court. He is an eye-witness; he must be got rid of. The author, we are

told, was a man of much wider outlook than any apostle; he was a cosmopolitan, a citizen of the world, and therefore probably a native of Ephesus, the melting-pot of Asia, where Greek and Jew and Gentile met in cultured intercourse. Evidence of the kind of syncretism that went on in philosophical and theological matters is to be found in the opening passage of the fourth gospel, where Christ is called the *Logos*.

Now the *Logos* is a Greek concept which goes back to the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus, who flourished at Ephesus some five hundred years before Christ. To the Greeks, order was so conspicuous in nature that they designated the world *Cosmos*, which means 'order.' The correlative of order is reason of some kind—*Logos*. With Heraclitus, fire is the primary impersonal element from which all else evolved, and he calls it the *Logos* in so far as it is, in his scheme of things, the *rationale* of the world. With Plato, the *Logos* becomes an active intermediary in the formation of the world by a God who is far removed from matter. For Aristotle, too, God is remote and inaccessible, and the *Logos* is the 'energy' in touch with finite things. The Stoics still further developed and purified the concept of the *Logos*, making of it an operative cosmological principle, apparently endowed with intelligence and consciousness. And finally, at Alexandria, the Jew Philo rounded off the doctrine of the *Logos* by weaving into a more or less harmonious whole the Hellenic, Stoic and Hebrew concepts. This *Logos* of Philo is in God as wisdom, and in the world as reason. Philo vacillates between regarding the *Logos* as a quality at the head of the hierarchy of divine attributes, and hypostatizing it in some such way as

the Hebrews personified wisdom in the Old Testament (Wisdom xviii. 15; lx. 1, 2).

Now the author of the fourth gospel, it is said, simply applied to the historical Jesus the *Logos* fantasies which were current at Ephesus in his day. Thus, says Schmiedel: 'It ought never to be doubted that he [the author of the fourth gospel] has borrowed the word *Logos* and the ideas associated with it from Philo.'[1] The fourth gospel then, in this view, makes of Christ, not merely a 'celestial man,' a sort of mirror of the divinity, but an actual emanation from the abysmal depths of the divine reason, which sustains all else. In Christ the eternal energizing force which pervades the universe, as the source and the basis of being and life, is hypostatized in the flesh.

Such are the main outlines of the evolutionary theory which explains away the doctrine of the Incarnation as a subsequent semi-philosophical development of Christ's simple teaching. Since the theory is admittedly based on the New Testament narrative, we may reasonably claim to examine it in the light of documentary evidence.

(1) For the Synoptics, we are told, Christ was merely a man, a great teacher, at best, the Messiah. Yet St. Luke's story of the childhood of Jesus is steeped in the supernatural. Jesus is conceived of the Holy Ghost, born of a virgin, and called the Son of God. Simeon hails Him as a light to the revelation of the Gentiles and the glory of Israel, and at the age of twelve He astonishes the doctors in the temple with His wisdom and His answers. We may well ask, what manner of man is this? It is St. Matthew who records

[1] *Das vierte Evangelium*, p. 118.

St. Peter's confession, 'Thou art the Christ, the son of the living God' (Matt. xvi. 16). Of St. Mark's gospel, which is regarded as of paramount importance by rationalists generally, the liberal critic, Wilhelm Bousset, writes: 'this oldest of the Gospels is already written from the standpoint of faith; for Mark, Jesus is already not only the Messiah of the Jewish people, but the miraculous, eternal son of God, whose glory has illumined this world. And it has been rightly remarked that in this respect our three Gospels are different from the fourth only in degree.'[1] And that prince of rationalist higher critics, Harnack, says: 'already the Jerusalemite Mark has made of Jesus almost a divine apparition, or has found such a conception already existing.'[2] He even sees in Mark, as in John, 'the dominating intention of revealing the divine sonship of Jesus.'[3] Nor does the incident of the rich young man bear the interpretation put upon it by Arnold Meyer, Loisy and others. The young man addresses Jesus as though He were a rabbi, and Jesus thereupon puts to him a leading question which might very well have elicited from the young man an avowal of his belief in Christ's divinity: 'Why callest thou me good? None is good but one, that is, God.' Neither explicitly nor implicitly does Christ deny that He is God. Only by doing exegetical violence to the text is it possible to read into it any such denial.

(2) The epistles of St. Paul are admittedly hard to be understood, and for that reason alone they intrigue the psycho-analysts. It has been pointed out that

[1] *Was wissen wir von Jesus?* p. 30.
[2] *Lukas der Arzt*, p. 86, note.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 119, note.

psychology has its *bizarreries* no less than metaphysics, and not the least remarkable of them is the complicating of simple problems by looking for explanations in the depths of the unconscious, when all the time they are staring the psychologist out of countenance. It is true that the epistles of St. Paul are not much concerned with the historical incidents of Christ's life; but this is not because Paul, all unconsciously, had thrust the hard facts of Christ's everyday life into the hinterland of his mind, lest they should conflict with his subjective concept of the supra-mundane man; no, but for the exceedingly simple reason that the incidents of Christ's life were already well known to the people whom St. Paul was addressing. Besides, St. Paul's very conscious purpose was to deal with pressing problems of the day, and it is quite remarkable how, in dealing with them, he bases his teaching on the words and deeds of Christ. For instance, he says that he esteemed himself to know nothing but Jesus Christ, and Him crucified (1 Cor. ii. 2), and with ringing challenge he ventures his whole creed, his supposed subjective concept of Christ, his alleged visions and hallucinations, the very souls he had won to Christ, all, on a *fact:* 'if Christ be not risen again, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain' (1 Cor. xv. 14). The historical Jesus is all-in-all to Paul. Does he not say: 'other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid, which is Christ Jesus'? (1 Cor. iii. 11).

Christ, for Paul, is no mere man, however etherealized or celestial, 'for,' says St. Paul, 'in Him were all things created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominations, or principalities or powers: all things were created by Him and in Him'

(Col. i. 16). The general attitude of Paul towards his Master is plainly set forth by Professor Weiss of Heidelberg, whose exegesis can hardly be suspect of inclining unduly towards orthodoxy. He says: 'For Paul, Jesus Himself is an object, not only of faith, but of religious veneration. For him who begs for "grace and peace" not only "from God our Father," but also "from our Lord Jesus Christ," Christ stands on an equality with God; . . . the practical piety of Paul and his churches expects from Him [Christ] the same as from God—guidance, help, blessing. It gives to him not only praise, but also addresses prayers to Him . . . Jesus is for the Apostle not only a Mediator, Leader and Model, but also absolutely the object of his religion.'[1]

If Paul were really an introvert subject to hallucinations, his behaviour when his message is challenged has urgent need of psychological explanation. Not only does he make constant appeal to the fact of the resurrection, but in proof of its reality he points, not to the testimony of his own inner consciousness, or to his mystical experience of the vitalizing power of the resurrection, or to any of the mysterious things to which he ought to have pointed, had he been true to type; but, like the merest Philistine without a single complex, he points bluntly to the testimony of Cephas and the eleven, and to some five hundred living witnesses who had, with their own eyes, seen the risen Christ (1 Cor. xv. 5, 6). His behaviour is psychologically inexplicable, unless indeed the psycho-analysts are wrong, and Paul obstinately kept a sane mind in a fairly sound body. May it not be, perchance, that

[1] *Paulus und Jesus*, 3, 72.

it is the psycho-analysts, and not Paul, who have churned things out of their own inner consciousness?

(3) Into the question of the Johannine authorship of the fourth gospel we cannot enter here. It was written, as the author tells us himself, to show that 'Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God' (xx. 31), and St. Irenaeus adds that, in connection with this main purpose, it was intended also to refute the Christological heresies of the Cerinthians, Ebionites and Nicolaites. Consequently, the divinity of Christ is stressed in the fourth gospel in a more marked way than in the earlier gospels; and furthermore, with a view to meeting the philosophical objections of the heretics of the day, the doctrine is restated, or rather stated in a new way. The term *Logos*, as we have seen, was already well known long before the time of St. John, and there can be little doubt that it was used by the early heretics in formulating their views of Christ. This, amongst other reasons, may account for St. John's use of it in the prologue to his gospel. But that he borrowed the *doctrine* of the *Logos* from Philo, or the Greeks, cannot be seriously maintained in face of the evidence. The differences between the *Logos* of St. John and earlier doctrines of the *Logos* leap to the eye. In the first place, the *Logos* of Plato and the Greeks is an abstraction, at most, a divine attribute; whilst Zeller says of the *Logos* of Philo that it 'floats indistinctly midway between personal and impersonal entity.'[1] For the author of the fourth gospel, the *Logos* is a person of flesh and blood, to whom the Baptist bore testimony.

In the second place, the idea of an incarnation of the *Logos* was beyond the horizon of any Greek

[1] *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, vol. iii., p. 378, 3rd edn.

philosopher; and as to Philo, it will suffice to cite the testimony of Ueberweg:

> It was impossible that he should conceive of the *Logos* as incarnated, on account of the impurity of matter in his view . . . and for this reason, if for no other, it was impossible for Philo to go farther and identify the *Logos* with the expected Messias, to which course, nevertheless, he was powerfully moved by the practical and spiritual interest connected with redemption through the Messias.[1]

In the fourth gospel, on the other hand, the *Logos* was made flesh and dwelt amongst us, till He laid down His life for His friends.

In the third place, the *Logos* of Philo is, in his own simile, a chariot-driver doing the will of his liege-lord, and assuredly there can be no kind of identity, nor even community, of nature between a servant and the mighty God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. In essence the *Logos* of Philo is the *Logos* of the Greeks with its outlines little altered—a being immeasurably and incalculably below the pure isolated perfection of unapproachable deity. But for John, 'the Word was God,' consubstantial with the Father (x. 30), who glorified Him before the foundation of the world (xvii. 24).

In the prologue of St. John, then, we have a statement of the divinity of Christ, made in a manner occasioned by the development of contemporary philosophical and theological speculation. The prologue, however, is in reality a summary of the main thesis set forth in the gospel which follows, wherein the divinity of the *Logos* shines forth in the sayings and doings of Christ, even as in the Synoptics, and in the witness of St. Paul.

[1] *History of Philosophy*, vol. i., p. 231.

As the study of comparative religion is alleged to have discredited the gospel story of the Virgin Birth, so, it is contended, it has reduced the doctrine of the Incarnation to a shaken creed. Such statements 'date'; they are redolent of the days when militant rationalists monopolized and moulded the comparative method to bolster up their own theories. From Pfleiderer onwards, the favourite rationalist device for creating the impression that there is nothing unique about Christianity has always been to exaggerate the resemblances, and ignore the differences, between Christianity and other religions. To take an illustration. Mary, the mother of Jesus, is unhesitatingly identified with the Egyptian goddess, Isis. The identification is supposed to be so obvious that only a hide-bound obscurantist would venture to doubt it. One feels a little impertinent in investigating the facts, but they repay investigation. From Apuleius we know that, before the second century, Isis herself had been identified with Minerva, Venus, Diana, Proserpina, Ceres, Juno, Bellona, Hecate and Rhamnasia;[1] and seeing that the attributes of all these divinities were predicated indiscriminately of Isis, it is certainly not difficult to discover in her some superficial resemblances to the Queen of Heaven. These are stressed, whilst not a word is said about the differences between Isis and Mary. When we recall that Isis always retains the horns of a heifer as a symbol of her kinship with the beasts of the field from which she evolved, that she was wife to her own brother, and that all manner of excess characterized her worship, the process of identification receives

[1] *The Golden Ass*, xi, c. 5.

something of a check. So, too, is it with the alleged pagan incarnations. Incarnations, in a wide sense, are assuredly to be found in all the known religions of antiquity, but on examination it will be found that the resemblances to the Christian Incarnation are remote in the extreme.

By incarnation is meant the putting on of flesh, of any kind, by a deity or spirit; and we may at once dismiss as irrelevant all such incarnations as that of Jupiter consorting with Leda in the form of a swan. Again, primitive peoples, in this matter, present no problem. Sir James Frazer testifies that amongst them real incarnations are not found, and that the alleged incarnations, on investigation, have invariably turned out to be cases of the deification of men or animals.[1] In the Latin and Greek classics, too, many so-called incarnations are in reality nothing of the kind, for not infrequently it is only after some earthly hero is deified that a divine origin is assigned to him, presumably to give plausibility to the deification. Such was the case with Hercules and Bacchus, and even with Augustus and Plato.

There is, however, a wide range of literature connected with real incarnations of gods in human flesh; but the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* testifies that 'the conception of one solitary incarnation of deity is peculiar to Christianity.'[2] In all other religions there is a multiplicity of shadowy incarnations, or rather manifestations of divinity, as in the plurality of incarnate Buddhas, or the myriad animal forms of gods, ghosts

[1] *Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship*, pp. 132 ff., 279 f. (1905).

[2] *N. Söderblom* in vol. vii., p. 184.

and heroes amongst the Egyptians. In all this, as in the cases of immortal gods assuming human form to indulge their passions, one looks in vain for anything approaching a real parallel to the hypostatic union of the divine and human natures in the person of Our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ.

In addition to stressing similarities and ignoring differences, the rationalist method proceeds on the curious assumption that similarity of religious belief or practice must always be due to borrowing, and that, if there has been any interchange between Christianity and pagan cults, Christianity must be the borrower. This kind of unwarrantable inference led Professor Rhys Davids to say of the comparative method that,

> it will be of worse than no service if we imagine that likeness is any proof of direct relationship, that similarity of ideas in different countries shows that either the one or the other was necessarily a borrower . . . It would, of course, be going too far to deny that coincidences of belief are occasionally produced by actual contact of mind with mind; but it is no more necessary to assume that they always are so, than to assume that chalk cliffs, if there be such, in China, are produced by chalk cliffs in the Downs of Sussex. They have no connection one with another, except that both are the results of similar causes. Yet this manner of reasoning is constantly found, not only through the whole range of the literature of the subject from classical times downwards, but even in the works of the present day.[1]

Some years have elapsed since these words were written, and nowadays, owing to the protests of M. Cumont[2] and other eminent authorities, evidence is required,

[1] *The Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by some points in the history of Indian Buddhism*, pp. 3, 4.

[2] *Les Religions Orientales*, p. 13.

not of the similarity, which is obvious, but of the borrowing, which is the point at issue.

Of late years it has been borne in upon rationalist anthropologists that a general resemblance in the fundamental religious beliefs of all peoples is a strong argument in favour of the fact of a primitive revelation. If, indeed, the expectation of a godlike deliverer from evil, of a saviour, in the wide sense of the word, is universal in ancient religions, it is at least not unreasonable to suppose that this world-wide expectation had its basis in an actual promise. Nor do the crudities and absurdities of the saviour-myths militate against this view; for just as a stream is purest at its source and gathers up defilement on its way to the ocean, so, too, in the course of long ages, the original revelation became infiltrated with barbaric and degrading notions. The fact of a primitive revelation made or kept after the Fall is the simplest and most satisfactory explanation yet offered of what superficial resemblances are actually found in the creeds of all nations. And it is surely not astonishing that everywhere in the history of religions we catch echoes of the primitive promise of divine redemption.

# SELECT CATHOLIC BIBLIOGRAPHY.

(Books already mentioned in the special bibliographies are not here repeated.)


Abbot Vonier, O.S.B. : *The Personality of Christ* (Longmans) ; *The Divine Motherhood* (Herder), and other works.

E. Hugon, O.P., S.T.M. : *The Mystery of the Incarnation* (English translation, Faith Press).

J. Pohle, D.D. : *Dogmatic Theology*, vol. IV. (Christology); vol. VI. (Mariology), and other volumes (English translation, Herder).

Mgr. E. Le Camus, Bishop of La Rochelle : *The Life of Christ* (English translation, Cathedral Library Association, New York, 3 vols.).

Canon Fouard : *The Christ, the Son of God,* and other works : (Engl. transl. : Longmans).

B. Otten, S.J. : *A Manual of the History of Dogmas* (Herder, 2 vols.).

Archbishop Goodier, S.J. : *Jesus Christ, the Son of God* (Burns, Oates and Washbourne), and other works.

H. Felder, O.S.F.C. : *Christ and the Critics* (Engl. transl. : Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 2 vols.).

M. Lepin, S.S., D.D. : *Christ and the Gospel* (Engl. transl. : McVey, Philadelphia), and other works.

C. Lattey, S.J., M.A. : *Back to Christ* (Paulist Press, New York), and other works.

Mgr. R. H. Benson : *Christ in the Church* (Longmans), and other works.

J. P. Arendzen, D.D., M.A. : *The Gospels* (Catholic Missionary Society, London).

Hugh Pope, O.P., S.T.M., Doct. S. Script. : *The Catholic Student's Aids to the Bible* (Burns, Oates and Washbourne ; 3 vols.).

A. Durand, S.J.: *The Childhood of Jesus Christ* (Engl. transl.: McVey, Philadelphia).

A. Maas, S.J.: *Christ in Type and Prophecy* (Benziger Bros., New York; 2 vols.).

J. Huby, S.J. (ed.): *Christus, manuel d'histoire des Religions* (Beauchesne, Paris).

J. Bainvel, S.J.: *Devotion to the Sacred Heart* (Engl. transl.: Burns, Oates and Washbourne), and other works.

O. R. Vassall-Phillips, C.SS.R.: *The Mother of Christ* (Burns, Oates and Washbourne), and other works.

C. S. Devas, M.A.: *The Key to the World's Progress* (Longmans).

A. L. Maycock: *The Council of Nicaea* (C.T.S. pamphlet)

# INDEX


Abraham 25, 66, 77
Abundius 118
Acacius of Melitene 116
*Acts* 63 *n.*, 95, 100
Adhonai 98
*Admonitions of an Egyptian Slave* 14 *n.*
Adonis 47
*Adversus Haereses* 197 *sq.*, 204
Aelia 109
Agar 21, 25
Agatho, St. 166
Agrippa 240
*Aids to the Bible, Catholic Student's* 252
Akiba, Rabbi 33
Alexandria 106, 111, 115
*Allgemeine Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung* 239 *n.*
*Alttestamentliche Abhandlungen* 12 *n.*
Ambrose, St. 118 *sq.*, 198, 201
Amos 2 *sqq.*, 9, 18
*Analecta Sacra* 195
*Anathématismes de St. Cyrille, Les* 151
Angel
  of Great Counsel 36
  of Jacob's Vision 73
  of Jahveh 26
  of the Lord 34, 36
  of the Presence 29
Anointed One 7
Antioch 106, 111, 115, 127
*Apocalypse of Baruch* 35
*Apocalypse of Esdras* 33 *sq.*
*Apocalypse of St. John* 41
Apollinaris 105, 116, 122 *sqq.*, 127 *sq.*, 133, 144, 149
*Apollinarisme, L'* 126, 149
Apuleius 248
Archer 230
Arendzen viii, 252
Arianism 107, 109, 128
Arians 128, 232
*Arians of the Fourth Century* 148
Aristotle xii
Arius 104, 122, 133
ἁρπαγμός 88 *sqq.*
*Assumption of Moses* 36
Asterius 118
Athanasius, St. 108, 117, 119, 128, 199
Attis 47, 49
Augustine, St. 84, 107, 113, 119, 198, 201 *sq.*, 249
*Autour d'un Petit Livre* 59 *n.*

Babylon 14 *sq.*
Bacchus 249
Bacon 234
*Back to Christ* 252
Bainvel 253
Balaam (Bileam) 5 *sq.*
Balfour, Lord 230
Bardy, Gustave 148
Baruch 21 *sq.*, 35
Basil, St. 108, 119, 128, 148
Basilius 118
Batiffol 148
*Bazaar of Heraclides* 129, 150
Bellona 248
Ben Sira 23
Benson, R. H. 252
Bernard, St. 202
Bethlehem 8
Bethune-Baker 129, 149
Bileam *See* Balaam
Billot, Card. 175

Billuart 154 *n.*
*Blessed Virgin in the Fathers of the First Six Centuries* 210
Blessings, Patriarchal 6
Bonosius 199
Bourne, Card. viii, xiii
Boylan viii *sq.*
Bread of Life 76
Buddhas 249
Burney 69

Cajetan, Card. 174 *sqq.*, 179, 182
Campana 210
Capreolus 175, 179, 181 *sq.*, 185
*Carmina Nisibena* 202 *sq.*
Cassian 118 *sq.*
*Catholic Encyclopedia* 210
*Catholic Faith in the Holy Eucharist* viii
*Catholicisme : des Origines à St. Léon* 148
Cavallera 148
Celestine, St. 118, 121, 130, 133, 135, 138 *sq.*
Ceres 248
Cerinthians 246
Chalcedon 110, 116, 118, 121, 126, 141 *sqq.*, 217
Charles, R. H. 31
*Childhood of Jesus Christ* 253
*Christ and the Critics* 252
*Christ and the Gospel* 252
*Christ in the Church* 252
*Christ in Type and Prophecy* 253
*Christ, the Life of the Soul* 103
*Christ, the Son of God* 252
*Christotokos* 131, 133, 134
*Christus in seiner Präexistenz u. Kenose, nach Phil.* ii, 5–8 103
*Christus, manuel d'histoire des Religions* 253
Chrysostom, St. John 103, 112, 119
*Church of the Fathers* 148
*Church Times* v
Clement of Alexandria 111
*Colossians* 74, 86
Comparative Religions 45 *sqq.*
Connolly 150
*Contra Celsum* 194
*Contra Praxeam* 194
Constans 127
Constantine 106
Constantinople 106, 109, 118, 139
*Corinthians* 94 *sq.*, 98, 153, 244 *sq.*
*Cosmos* 241
Covenant, Angel of 26
Covenant of Sinai 16
Cumont 250
Cyril of Alexandria, St. 90, 108, 116, 118 *sq.*, 121, 125, 128, 129 *sq.*, 132 *sqq.*, 136, 138, 140 *sq.*, 143, 151, 164, 166, 220, 222, 226
Cyrus 12

D'Alès 210
Damasus, St. 107, 118, 128
Daniel 20, 32
D'Arcy 221
D'Argentré 163 *n.*
*Das älteste Evangelium* 236 *n.*
*Das Christentum des Neuen Testamentes* 238 *n.*
*Das vierte Evangelium* 242 *n.*
David 10, 29
Davidson xiv
Dead Sea 10
De Boor 195
*De Carne Christi* 194, 197
de Genouillac 148
*demiourgos* 27
Denis, St. 117
*Denkschriften* 15 *n.*
de la Taille xii
*De Patientia* 194
*Der alttestamentliche Prophetismus* 15 *n.*
*Der Antichrist* 234
*Deutero-Isaias* 12
*Deuteronomy* 18 *n.*
Devas 253

*Development of Christian Doctrine* 148
*Devotion to the Sacred Heart* 253
d'Herbigny vi
*Dialogue with Trypho* 37, 196 *sq.*, 203
Diana 248
Dibbura 29
*Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels* 221
*Dictionnaire Apologétique* 210
*Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* 200
Didymus the Blind 199
*Die Christologie des heiligen Cyrillus* 151
*Die Mahnworte eines ägyptischen Propheten* 14 *n.*
*Die Malereien der Katakomben Roms* 208
*Die Marienverehrung in der ersten Jahrhunderten* 210
*Die Mariologie des hl. Cyrillus* 151
*Die Philosophie der Griechen* 246
Diocaesarea in Isauria 116
Dio Chrysostom 57
Diocletian 106, 108
Diodorus of Tarsus 111
Diophysite doctrine 144
*Divine Motherhood* 252
*Divinity of Christ in the New Testament* 103
Docetism 93 *sq.*, 197
Downey vi, vii
Draguet 150
Duchesne 115
δύο φύσεις (*cf.* φύσις) 124
Durand 253
Dürr 15 *n.*

Eberle 151
Ebionites 196, 246
*Ecclesiasticus* 21, 23 *sq.*
*Échos d'Orient* 207
*Église Chrét. au temps de St. Ignace d'Antioche* 148
Egypt 14, 15
ἐκένωσεν 91 *sqq.*, 212 *sqq.*
Elias, 25, 37
Elisha ben Abuyah 28
Emerson 233
*Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* 249
Enoch 70
*Enoch, Similitudes of* 31 *sqq.*
*Ephesians* 17, 84
Ephesus 106, 118, 129 *sq.*, 135, 140, 142, 145, 161, 191, 195
Ephrem, St. 198, 202
*epignosis* 44
Epiphanius, St. 108, 128, 199
*Eranistes* 117
Erman 14 *n.*
Esau 25
Eschatology 2
*Esdras, Apocalypse of* 33 *sq.*
Ethiopian eunuch 14
Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles.* 63 *n.*, 90, 117, 141
Eutyches 116, 119, 123, 141, 144 *sq.*, 220
*Exodus* 16, 26
*Expiation, L'* 12 *n.*
*Expository Times* 101
*Ezechiel* 10 *n.*

Felder 252
Felix, St. 119
Fischer 12 *n.*
Flavian, St. 118, 142
Fouard 252
*Foundations of Belief* 231
*Four Gospels, The* 63 *n.*
Frazer 249
*Further Notes on St. Paul* 103

Gabriel 28
Garde xii
Gardiner 14 *n.*
*Genesis* 18, 25, 73
Gilbert de la Porrée 167
Gnostics 52, 196
Godet 223
Goodier, Archbp. 85, 103, 252
Gore 215, 219

*Gospel of St. James* 207
Gregorius de Valencia 154 *n.*
Gregory Nazianzen, St. 108, 119
Gregory of Nyssa, St. 108, 207
Gregory Thaumaturgus, St. 119, 207

HAGAR 25
Harnack 115, 243
Hartmann 238
Hauck 224
*Hebrews* 11 *n.*, 36
Hecate 248
Hegel 222, 231
Helvidius 199
Heraclitus 241
Heraclea 109
Hercules 249
Herzog 198
Hilary, St. 118 *sq.*, 198
Hippolytus, St. 111, 201
*Histoire des Dogmes* 148
*Hist. des Patriarches d'Alexandrie* 150
*Historical Sketches* 148
*History of Dogma* 210
*Homoousios* 128
Horus 46, 49
Hosea 2
Huby 253
Hugon 252
Hus 162 *n. sq.*
Huxley 233 *sq.*
hypostasis 105, 126, 143, 146

IGNATIUS of Antioch, St. 111, 196, 198
Immanuel 8
*Incarnation, The* xiv
Infancy, Gospel of the 200
Inge 230
*International Critical Commentary* 101
Irenaeus, St. 193, 197 *sq.*, 246
Isaiah viii, 8 *sq.*, 11 *n.*, 99, 208
Isauria 116
Isis 46, 49, 54, 248
Israel 1, 3 *sq.*, 12, 20 *sq.*

JACOB 25
  Blessing of 6, 18
  Star of 5, 6
Jahveh (Jehovah, Yahweh) 1, 3, 5, 8 *sqq.*, 25 *sq.*, 30, 96 *sqq.*
James, St. 92
  *Gospel of* 198, 200
James Baradaeus 116
Jechonias 12
Jehovah *See* Jahveh
Jeremiah 10 *sqq.*
Jerome, St. 107, 119, 198 *sq.*, 204
Jesse 8 *sqq.*
*Jesus Christ, the Son of God* 252
Joannes a S. Thoma 163 *n.*
Job 21 *sq.*, 41
*John, St.* 64 *n.*, 68–83, 84, 94, 100, 153, 207, 240, 247
John of Antioch 129, 132, 138 *sq.*, 140
John of Bâle 163 *n.*
Jonas 65
*Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 15
Jovian 128, 199
Judah 5 *sq.*
*Judges* 4, 16
Jugie 130, 143, 149, 207
Julian 127
Julian of Halicarnassus 116
*Julien d'Halicarnasse et sa controverse avec Sévère d'Antioche* 150
Julius, St. 119
Juno 248
Justin, St. 51, 196 *sq.*, 203
Juvenal 116

KANT 232, 234
*Key to the World's Progress* 253
*Kings* 4
Knabenbauer 103
Knox vi *sq.*

Laodicea 128
Lateran Council 166
Lattey 212, 252
Laud 217
Lebon 144, 150
Le Camus 252
Lehner 210
Leo, St. 107, 113, 118 *sq.*, 142 *sqq.*, 220
Leo, Emperor 119
Leontius of Byzantium 120
Lepin 252
Leyden Papyrus 14 *n.*
Licinius 109
*Life of Christ* 252
*Literary Guide* 230
Livius 210
*Livre d'Héraclide de Damas* 129 *sq.*, 150
*Logos* x, 27 *sqq.*, 43, 50, 79, 241 *sq.*, 246 *sq.*
Loisy 59, 243
Loofs 149 *sq.*, 215, 224
Lugo 163 *n.*
*Lukas der Arzt* 243
*Luke, St.* 63 *n.*, 66 *n.*, 242
Luthardt 239
Luther 129, 132, 214

Maas 253
Macedonianism 128
Mackintosh 219, 223
Mahé 151
Malachy viii, 26
Manna 76
*Manual of History of Dogmas* 252
*Maria nel Dogma Cattolico* 210
*Marie dans l'Église Anténicéenne* 210
*Mark, St.* 63 *n.*, 92, 243
Marmion, Abbot 103
Martin I, St. 166
Martindale x, xiv, 103
Maspero 150
*Matthew, St.* 63 *n.*, 65 *n. sq.*, 236, 242
Maycock 253
Médebielle 12 *n.*
Median 21
Melchisedech 11
*Memorandum of Rationalist Press Association* 229
Memnon 140
*Memra* 28 *sqq.*
Mercy-seat 30
*Mère de Dieu et la Mère des hommes* 210
Messenger of Jahveh 25
Messiah 2
Metatron 28 *sq.*
Methodius, St. 90
Meyer, Arnold 237, 243
*μία φύσις σεσαρκωμένη* (*cf. φύσις*) 124, 148
Micah 3, 8, 18 *n.*
Michael 28
Minerva 248
Mithra 41, 54 *sq.*
Monarchians 232
Monophysites 105, 107, 116 *sq.*, 119, 143 *sqq.*, 159 *sq.*, 161
*Monophysitisme Sévérien* 150
*μορφή* 87, 222
Moses 12, 65, 76
*Moses, Assumption of* 36
*Mother of Christ, The* 253
Myers, Canon x
*Mystery of the Incarnation* 252
Mystery Religions 54 *sq.*
Mysticism 52

Nathan 6
Neo-platonists 52
Nestorius 118-161 *passim*
*Nestorius and his place in the history of Christian Doctrine* 150
*Nestorius and his teaching* 149
*Nestorius et la Controverse Nestorienne* 149
Neubert 210
Newman, Card. 148, 205 *sq.*, 210
Nicaea v, 104, 108, 112, 136
*Nicaea, The Council of* 253
Nicodemus 74

Nicolaites 246
Nietzsche 234 *sq.*
*Nous* 27
*Numbers* 5

Origen 90, 111, 195, 197
Orontes 110
Orpheus 46
Osee 25
Osiris 47
Otten 252

*Papacy, The* xiv
Paul, St. 19, 21, 84-103, 178, 240
Paul of Samosata 124, 148, 149
*Paul de Samosate* 148
*Paulus u. Jesus* 245
*Paulus v. Samosata* 149
Pelagianism 133
Pelagius 202
*Pentateuch* 6
*Personality of Christ* 252
Peter of Alexandria, St. 195
2 *Peter* 100
Petrograd Papyrus 15 *n.*
Pfleiderer 248
Philip of Side 195
*Philippians* 84 *sqq.*, 91, 101, 212
Philo 27 *sq.*, 241 *sq.*, 246 *sq.*
Philosophy, Greek 50
φύσις (*cf.* δύο φύσεις, μία φύσις σεσαρκωμένη) 165 *sq.*
φύσις σύνθετος 127
Pierius 195
Pitra 195
Plato xii, 222, 246, 249
Plutarch 49
Pohle 252
Polycarp 193
Pope, Alexander 229
Pope, Fr. Hugh ix, 252
Prat 87, 103
Presence, Angel of the 26, 29
*Prophecies of a Potter* 15 *n.*
Proserpina 248
*prosopon* 124, 130 *sq.*, 136 *sq.*, 143 *sqq.*

*Proverbs* 21 *sq.*
*Psalms* 4, 7, 11 *n.*, 17 *sq.*, 28, 35, 66 *n.*
Pythagoras 52

*Ratio* 27
Raven 149
*Realencyklopädie* 224
Rehemann 151
*Religion of the Scriptures* viii, xiv
*Religions Orientales* 250
*Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* 118, 151
*Revue d'Histoire et de la Littérature Religieuse* 198
Rhamnasia 248
Rheims, Council of 166 *sq.*
Rhys Davids 250
Ricciotti 210
Rickaby 103
Robber Synod 118, 142
Robertson 229
*Roma Sotteranea* 210
*Romans* 19, 96 *sqq.*
Rome, Councils of 118, 128
Rufinus 119, 195

Sabellians 232
Salter 118
Samuel 4, 6
Sanday and Headlam (*Romans*) 101
Sara 25
σάρξ, σῶμα 128
Satan 66
*Schisme d'Antioche, Le* 148
Schumacher 87, 103
Scott, Robert 226
*Scuola Cattolica* 210
Sellin 15 *n.*
*Sermo adversus haereticos* 198
Serretos 118
Severus of Antioch 116
*Shekhina* 30
*Shema* 29
Shoot 10, 11
Sinai, Covenant of 4, 16
Slave of Yahweh 11, 12

Slave-Poems 13, 14
Socrates, *Hist. Eccles.* 195
Solomon 23, 65
Spirit of Yahweh 8
Star of Jacob 5 *sq.*
Stoicism 50
Strack and Billerbeck (*Kommentar*, etc.) 29
Streeter 63 *n.*
Suarez 174 *sqq.*, 179
*Synthronos* 28

*Tablet* xii
Tammuz 47
Targumim 30
Temple, The 65
Terrien 210
Tertullian 111 *sqq.*, 193 *sq.*, 197, 199
*Texte und Untersuchungen* 195
Thema 21
Theodore of Mopsuestia 111, 124
Theodoret 112, 117 *sq.*, 129
Theodosius 110, 116, 124, 128, 132, 139
*Théologie de St. Paul* 87, 103
Theophany 26
Theophilus of Alexandria, St. 119
Theosophy 50
*Theotokos* xi, 131-143 *passim*, 193, 195
Thomas, St. 92, 97, 103, 154, 158, 162, 164, 167, 174, 179, 186
Thurston 210
1 *Timothy* 94
*Titus* 100
Tixeront 148, 210
Toletus, Card. 154 *n.*
*Tome* of St. Leo 142, 144, 220
*Torah* 13, 24
*Tracts: Theological and Ecclesiastical* 148
Tradition 116 *sqq.*
*Trials of Theodoret* 148
Trypho *See* Dialogue

Ueberweg 247
ὑπόστασις 136 *sqq.*, 166

Valens 128
Vassall-Phillips 253
Venus 248
Virgin Mother 48
Voisin 126, 149
Vonier, Abbot 252

Walden, Thomas 162 *n.*
*Was uns Jesus heute ist* 238 *n.*
*Was wissen wir von Jesus* 243
Weiss 236, 245
*Westminster Version* 85, 89, 97, 103
Williams 103
Wilpert 208, 210
*Wisdom* 21, 242
Wyclif 162 *n.*

Yahweh *See* Jahveh

Zachary 13, 26
Zeller 246
Zerubbabel 12

Printed by
W. Heffer & Sons Ltd.
Cambridge, England

DATE DUE

JAN 25 '89

APR 20 1998

HIGHSMITH #LO-45220

BT
220
.I5
1926

The Incarnation/
Lattey

461136

BT
220
.I5
1926

461136

St. Mark's Library
175 Ninth Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10011

GENERAL THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
00017878